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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past three centuries, defining the appropriate scope of
copyright has entailed an examination of incentives and access.'
Broadening the scope of copyright increases the incentive to produce
works of authorship and results in a greater variety of such works.
Broadening copyright's scope, however, also limits access to such
works both generally, by increasing their price, and specifically, by
limiting the material that others can use to create additional works.
Given these competing considerations, defining copyright's proper
scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits of broader protec-
tion, in the form of increased incentive to produce such works, against
its costs, in the form of lost access to such works.
2
Congress, 3 courts, 4 and commentators 5 have purported to rely
on this incentives-access balance in defining some of copyright's most
1. See Feist Pubs. Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) C(The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.... To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work"); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (This limited grant [that is, copyright] is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired"). See also H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) ("In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider.., two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and,
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?').
2. Perhaps the most famous expressions of this balance belong to two English Lords. In
1785, Lord Mansfield wrote:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not
be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded.
Cary v. Longmen, 1 East 361 n.b, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.b (K.B. 1801) (quoting Lord Mansfield,
C.J., in Sayre v. Moore (1785)). Nearly sixty years later, Lord Macaulay would repeat these
sentiments in a legislative context:
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remu-
nerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is evil. For the sake of the good we must
submit to the evil; but the evil ought not last a day longer than is necessary for the pur-
pose of securing the good.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Copyright, in 1 The Speeches of Macaulay 235, 240-41 (1900)
(speech given Feb. 5, 1841).
3. See, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (Sept. 3, 1976)
(discussing the incentives-access balance in determining copyright's appropriate term); H.R.
Rep. No. 60-2222 at 7 (cited in note 1); Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 6 (1961).
4. See, for example, Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (rhis task [of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors] involves a difficult balance between the interests of
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basic parameters, including the prerequisites for copyright protection,
the general scope of protection, and specific limitations on protection.
Despite its enduring and widespread popularity, however, the incen-
tives-access paradigm is fundamentally flawed. Whether evaluated in
terms of its own framework of costs and benefits, or more
importantly, in terms of the actual costs and benefits that copyright
imposes, the paradigm fails to define the appropriate boundaries for
copyright protection.
On its own terms, applying the paradigm's suggested balance
for any given work leads to an internal paradox. As a general proposi-
tion, a work's desirability will indicate both the need to ensure the
work's creation and the need to secure its widespread distribution.
The more desirable a work is, the greater the need to ensure the crea-
tion of the work and the greater the need to secure its widespread dis-
semination. If the need to ensure a work's creation suggests a broad
copyright, while the need to secure its widespread dissemination sug-
gests a narrow copyright, then incentive and access will always
oppose each other with exactly equal force. As a result, if the
incentives-access balance were the sole criterion for determining the
proper degree of copyright protection, it would provide an
indeterminate answer as to how much protection copyright should
provide.
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce
on the other hand"); Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.
1994) (balancing the authors' rights to their original expression with the need to allow others to
build freely upon the ideas conveyed by a work); Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal
Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990) ("In drawing this fundamental distinction [between
protected expression and unprotected ideas], Congress balanced the competing concerns of
providing incentives to authors to create and of fostering competition in such creativity"); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. Kenneth Arrow is generally credited with the modern formulation of the paradigm:
"In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the
information." Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 617 (Princeton U., 1962). See
Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 1.1 (Little Brown, 2d ed. 1996); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 Yale L. J. 1533, 1560-72 (1993) (providing a natural rights perspective); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L. J. 965, 966-67 (1990) (providing an author's rights
perspective); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 341-44 (1989) (providing an economic perspective); William W.
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1700-04 (1988)
(providing an economic perspective); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright.- A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 293-302,
313-21 (1970) (providing an economic perspective).
[Vol. 49:483
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Courts have resolved this paradox by implicitly presuming that
more incentives are desirable in the absence of some unusual need for
access. Given this presumption, the paradigm no longer requires a
balance so much as a search for those situations where an unusual
need for access compels a limit to protection. The question becomes
whether providing copyright protection would threaten a compelling
need for access. Asking the question in this way makes access the
controlling factor. In doing so, this presumption resolves the paradox
otherwise inherent in balancing incentives and access, but it also
shapes copyright in a way detrimental to society. More specifically, if
we focus on the the need for access alone, that need becomes more
compelling as access to a particular work, or a particular aspect of a
work, becomes more necessary, either generally6 or for the creation of
future works.7 The more necessary the work, the more compelling the
case for access, and the more limited the protection copyright should
provide.8 As a result, relying on access to dictate the limits of copy-
right protection leads inevitably to a copyright system that provides
the most protection for those works that society least needs, and the
least protection for those works society most needs.9 To the extent
broader copyright protection corresponds with an increased incentive
to produce particular works, relying on access to define the appropri-
ate limits of copyright encourages the production of less essential
works at the expense of more essential works.
More fundamentally, however, the central flaw of the incen-
tives-access paradigm lies in its suggestion that the only cost broaden-
ing copyright entails is that we may potentially restrict access to
existing or future works of authorship. Having identified the
potential for lost access as the sole cost of broadening protection, the
paradigm suggests that we should continue to broaden copyright, and
thereby encourage the production of additional works, until further
protection would threaten a compelling need for access. Yet, the
potential for lost access is not the only cost broadening copyright
entails. If we broaden copyright, we increase the economic return on
any given authorship investment. We can thereby lure resources, in
the form of labor and capital, away from other productive endeavors
into the production of copyrighted works and lead the market to pro-
6. See Part III.A.2.
7. See Part III.A.1.
8. See Part IV.B.
9. See text accompanying notes 321-22.
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duce additional works. 10 But to create these additional works, we
must strip the resources from other sectors of the economy." As a
result, broadening copyright imposes a second critical cost: the lost
value society would have associated with the alternative investments
to which these resources would otherwise have been devoted.12 Yet,.
the incentives-access balance neither encompasses nor considers this
opportunity cost.13 Its failure to consider this critical component of
10. Authors, like others, sometimes act for reasons other than economic ones. Emotional
satisfaction, personal fulfillment, or petty anger may all lead an author to create a work, even in
the absence of any expectation of economic return. These nonpecuniary motives for authorship
do not undermine, however, this Article's analysis or conclusions. Assuming, as I do, that
pecuniary desires are central to the motivations of authors, particularly the additional authors
that broader copyright can attract, presents the case most favorable to extensive copyright
protection. If we were to assume that authors, more than others, work to satisfy their
nonpecuniary desires, the availability of such a nonpecuniary return on authorship suggests
that we could reduce the pecuniary return on authorship, and hence the scope of copyright
protection, proportionally, and yet still ensure the optimal production of copyrighted works.
11. See Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition 102-04 (MacMillan, 1933).
As Professor Machlup has explained:
It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of productive resources to re-
search and development) is too meager. But can there ever be too much? Is not more
research and development always better than less? Is it possible that too much is
devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation? This depends on what it is that is
curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More of one thing must mean less of
another, and the question is, what it is of which there will be less.... Whenever
permanent economic policies-not just war or depression measures-are discussed,
sound economists must start from the principle that no activity can be promoted without
encroaching on some other activity. More of one service or product must mean less of
another.
Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study No. 15, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1958).
12. While some of the more careful commentators have recognized the trade-off between
investment in works of authorship and other products, none have suggested a solution to the is-
sue. See Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 75 (Columbia U., 1967) CMagnify
the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's
energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the economy"); Robert M. Hurt and Robert M.
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 421, 425, 430 (1966);
Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 Economica 167, 170 (1934). For
expression of a similar concern in the patent area, see William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L. J. 267, 268-69 (1966)
(recognizing a trade-off, but suggesting that an efficiency-based solution is "well beyond the
reach of present techniques"); Machlup, Economic Review at 62-66 (cited in note 11). See also
Richard Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 11 (U. Chicago, 1976) ('An
opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits will attract
real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by consumers to prevent being charged
monopoly prices").
13. If all markets were perfectly competitive, all costs and benefits were fully internalized,
and resources were perfectly divisible, then the resources drawn into a new endeavor would
have received a price in their previous uses equal to their marginal utility in such prior uses.
See, for example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 317-18 (cited in note 11). As a result, any
use of the resources that generated a price for the resources in excess of their price (or marginal
cost) in the previous or alternative use would necessarily have to increase social welfare. Under
these assumptions, one could assert that any use that is worth more than it costs to create
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copyright's cost renders the incentives-access paradigm worthless as a
guide to copyright's proper limits.
To suggest a more appropriate approach for determining the
proper scope of copyright, this Article critically reexamines the eco-
nomic justification for copyright and identifies allocative efficiency,
rather than the incentives-access balance, as the appropriate guide.
From an allocative-efficiency perspective, copyright provides the
proper degree of protection when it ensures that individuals will pro-
duce works of authorship if, and only if, such production would repre-
sent the most highly valued use of their resources. 14 In a world of fi-
nite resources, more works of authorship must mean less of
something else. Unless the production of an additional work of
authorship is inherently more valuable to society than any alternative
use of the resources required to create the work, providing any given
degree of copyright protection is desirable only if society will likely
value 5 the additional works more highly than the something else
which it must give up.
would be a desirable use of the resources. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1700
(cited in note 5) (stating that works of authorship are underproduced if works are not created
"that would be worth more to consumers than the costs of creating them"). See also Pamela
Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2340 (1994) (arguing that market failure and resultant underproduction
occurs when the threat of copying prevents individuals from investing in a product that is worth
more than it costs). Markets are not, however, perfectly competitive, nor are costs and benefits
fully internalized. See, for example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 51, 89. As a result,
price, marginal cost, and marginal utility will not be equal for the resources in their prior use,
and an analysis of the optimal level of production must account specifically for the opportunity
cost associated with drawing additional resources into the production of works of authorship.
See Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 268-69 (cited in note 12); Hurt and Schuchman, 56 Am. Econ. Rev.
at 425, 430 (cited in note 12); Plant, 1 Economica at 170 (cited in note 12). See also R.G. Lipsey
and Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 22 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11, 16-17 (1956).
14. As Professor Baxter has explained, "[t]his is the classic economic criterion for optimal
allocation." Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 268 n.7 (cited in note 12).
15. This Article assumes that the social value of a new work or a new product is equal to
the sum of the price individuals would be willing to pay to avoid doing without the work or
product (their "reservation price"), and the price individuals would be willing to pay to avoid
doing without a further work or product, which would not have been created or whose creation
would have been delayed but-for the creation of the first work or product. However, three issues
render application of this definition difficult. First, to the extent that we attribute to an
underlying work the value of every subsequent product or work that would not have been
created but-for the first work or product, we encounter two difficulties: (1) a risk of double
counting; and (2) infinite value. The double-counting risk arises because this definition requires
us to recognize the sum of the reservation prices for a particular product as part of the value of
both the product itself and all earlier products without which this particular product would not
have been created. To address this risk, economists typically draw the demand curve for a
particular product assuming that the supply functions for other products remain constant. The
demand curve thus represents, in one sense, the "value added" by a particular new product, as it
represents the additional sum people would pay for this new product given the prices and
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To promote such allocative efficiency, a property system
generally should tend to ensure that the prices an individual will
expect to receive for investing her resources in various endeavors
provide a consistent reflection of the social value associated with the
various endeavors. Her expected price should tend to increase as the
social value of the endeavor increases, and to decrease as the social
value of the endeavor decreases. To achieve such consonance between
social value and price received, copyright must protect works of
authorship to that extent necessary to ensure that the market prices
creativity, labor, and other resources consistently, whether invested
in a work of authorship or in a product that copyright leaves
unprotected (a "non-work product"). Ensuring such consistent
treatment will require copyright to satisfy two conditions. First,
when an individual must decide between investing in one or another
work of authorship, copyright should seek to provide protection that
will lead the individual to expect a somewhat higher price for
investing in the more valuable work. Second, when an individual
must decide between investing in a work of authorship or a non-work
product, copyright should seek to provide protection that will lead the
individual to expect a higher price for investing in the work when the
characteristics of available and preexisting products. The infinite value problem arises because,
without a foreseeable end to the time period in which a particular product is a but-for cause of
later products, we have no way of closing off our valuation time period. Economists typically
rely on present value and a foreseeable return period to address this issue, and I will do the
same. Thus, all demand curves represent present value demand over the expected economic life
of the new work or product. Second, in defining reservation price for a product, we must
recognize that competition will reduce the price a person is willing to pay for a particular new
product or work. Thus, I am only willing to pay five dollars a day for subsistence-level food,
because if someone tries to charge me more, I will purchase the food from someone else. Yet, I
clearly value a subsistence supply of food at much more than five dollars a day. As a result,
reservation price refers not to the market price I need to pay, given the degree of competition
present in a market, but what I would be willing to pay to avoid doing without a product
altogether. Economists deal with this issue by separating individual demand curves from
industry demand curves, where the industry demand curve reflects a consumer's reservation
price for the product and the individual demand curves represent the price a consumer will pay
to purchase the product from one of the producers within the industry, given the degree of
competition present in the market. I use a similar approach, except I define each new work or
new product as an industry, and I determine the demand curve for the industry based upon the
present value of what a consumer would pay to avoid doing without the new work or product
and competing works or products that would not have been created but-for the new work or
product. Third, such a definition of value is accurate only to the extent that each work or
product exhibits the same degree of positive and negative externality, and that consumer
surplus is not considered a positive externality. Given these difficulties, I shall assume that the
value of a new product or work equals the area under the demand curve for that product or
work, bounded by the total quantity actually sold. See, for example, Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at
285-86 n.21 (cited in note 5). Where difficulties arise with this definition of value, I will address
them.
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work has greater social value, and a lower price for investing in the
work when the work has less social value.
To satisfy the first condition, copyright must provide a consis-
tent level of protection for the various works it protects. To satisfy
the second condition, copyright must equalize the market's treatment
of works and non-work products. Specifically, copyright should
provide works with that degree of protection that will lead an
individual to expect a price for investing her labor, creativity, and
other resources in a work roughly equal to that she would expect for
investing them in a non-work product, when the two goods are of
roughly equal value to society. By seeking to ensure consistent
treatment for comparable work and non-work product investments,
copyright should, to the extent possible in a real world market, lead
an individual to expect a higher price for devoting her resources to the
higher-valued use, whether that be the creation of an additional work
of authorship or an additional non-work product.
While ensuring such consonance between the marginal social
value and the marginal cost for each additional work is not as elegant
as the exact solution possible in a perfectly competitive market,16 such
consonance should ensure, in a real world market, that individuals
will devote their resources to the highest-valued use. 17 As a practical
matter, satisfying the first condition would require copyright to
eliminate its practice of providing different levels of protection for
works depending on whether a court labels the works fictional or
factual, entertaining or useful. Satisfying the second would require
copyright to narrow significantly its present scope of protection,
particularly for entertaining works. Satisfying these two conditions
would, therefore, require considerable change in the existing scope of
copyright law. Such a choice is nevertheless preferable to retaining
copyright's present scope, because such a choice would promote
allocation of society's resources to their highest-valued use. Given its
present scope, copyright protects more extensively an individual's
16. Under a perfectly competitive market, "[r]esources are... distributed so that [every]
unit of resources will" have a marginal cost equal to its marginal utility. See, for example,
Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 317 (cited in note 11). This Article proposes to ensure that
the marginal resources that, taken together, are devoted to creating an additional work or
product have a marginal cost in constant proportion to the marginal social value associated with
the additional work or product. For the reasons why copyright is inconsistent with a perfectly
competitive market, see note 360.
17. See Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 21-22 (U. Chicago, 1948);
Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol. 867, 895 (1990).
1996]
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creativity and labor when invested in an entertaining work than when
invested in a useful work or a non-work product. By preferencing
investments in entertaining works, copyright ensures individuals a
higher price for their resources when invested in an entertaining
work than they would receive for investing in a useful work or a non-
work product, even when the useful work or the non-work product is
of greater value to society. As a result, such protection will continue
attracting additional resources into the creation of copyrighted
entertaining works, even when those resources would otherwise have
been more valuably used elsewhere in our economy. The inevitable
result of such protection is that we will have too many entertaining
works, at the expense of having too little of everything else.
In substantial part, the incentives-access paradigm has led
copyright to its present state. Because it fails to account for the op-
portunity cost that broader copyright protection entails, the paradigm
mistakenly suggests that copyright should provide: (1) disparate
levels of protection for entertaining and useful works, and (2)
substantial protection for labor and creativity when invested in
entertaining works. If we are to avoid the flaws inherent in the
incentives-access paradigm and find a more appropriate guide to
determining copyright's proper scope, we must reject the paradigm as
an appropriate means of determining copyright's proper scope and
turn to a standard that properly accounts for copyright's true cost.
II. THE INCENTIVES-ACCESS PARADIGM INTRODUCED
While I assume that most readers are, at least implicitly,
familiar with the incentives-access balance as applied to copyright
issues, this Part briefly explains the paradigm to ensure a common
analytical framework. Within the paradigm, the need for incentives
turns on the ease with which a competitor can copy a work of
authorship in the absence of copyright. Without copyright, a
competitor18 could copy a work and thereby avoid most, if not all, of
the initial investment an authore would necessarily have incurred to
create an original work. By avoiding the initial authorship
18. A competitor in this context may include someone who reproduces the work in ques-
tion for her own use, or someone who reproduces the work and sells it to others.
19. To simplify our discussion, I will refer to the owner of the copyright in a work as the
author, unless otherwise noted. Compare by analogy, Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 292 (cited in
note 5) (collapsing the interests of authors and publishers, while recognizing that interests may
sometimes differ).
492 [Vol. 49:483
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investment, the copier could profitably market his copies at a lower
price than could the original author.2 0 Competition from such copies
would limit the price the original author could charge for her copies
and would deprive her of a reasonable opportunity to recover her
initial authorship investment.2 1  The specter of such copying
competitors might lead many would-be authors to forego authorship
altogether, resulting in the underproduction22 of such works. As the
Stationers' Company explained in a 1586 petition to the Star
Chamber:
And further if privileges [that is, copyright] be revoked no books at all should
be printed, within [a] short time, for commonly the first printer is at charge for
the Author's pains, and some other such like extraordinary cost, where an
other that will print it after him, come[s] to the Copy gratis, and so may he sell
better cheaper than the first printer, and then the first printer shall never ut-
ter [that is, sell] his books.
23
Thus, it is the ease with which others may copy works of authorship
that justifies a legal prohibition on the unauthorized copying of such
works, in order to prevent the underproduction of such works.24
To address the risk of underproduction such copying would
otherwise create, 25 copyright imposes two distinct controls on later
20. See id. at 282.
21. See id.
22. For some commentators who follow the incentives-access paradigm, "underproduction"
occurs when the threat of copying prevents the creation of a work of authorship "that would be
worth more to consumers than the costs of creating [it]." Fisher,, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1700
(cited in note 5). As discussed, this definition relies on the accuracy of these underlying
assumptions: perfect competition, perfect cost and benefit internalization, and infinitely
divisible resources. See note 13. To the extent that these assumptions are not accurate, we
cannot rely on the fact that an individual can receive a higher price for her resources in one use
than in another to establish the greater value of the higher priced use. See text accompanying
notes 370-408. Other commentators define underproduction as an "other than optimal" or "less
than optimal" level of production. See, for example, Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 1.1 at 6-7 (cited in
note 5); Samuelson, et al., 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2314 n.14 (cited in note 13). While this
definition is accurate, it is also useless unless we have defined or otherwise determined the
optimal level of production. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About
Intellectual Property: A Comment on Cheung, 8 Res. L. & Econ. 19, 21 (1986); Stephen L.
Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 99, 102 n.13 (1990); Ejan
Mackaay, Legal Hybrids: Beyond Property and Monopoly, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2630, 2634 (1994).
23. Edward Arber, ed., 2 A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of
London: 1554-1640 A.D. at 805 (1875).
24. As others have recognized, some things that copyright protects are not relatively easy
to copy. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 329 (cited in note 5) (noting
that works of fine art may not be easily copied). See also note 386.
25. See, for example, International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-41
(1918) CIndeed, it is one of the most obvious results of defendants theory that, by permitting in-
discriminate publication by anybody and everybody for purposes of profit in competition with
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authors. First, copyright directly limits the uses a later author can
make of an earlier copyrighted work by prohibiting excessive copying
from a copyrighted work.2 6 By limiting the freedom of others to copy
from a copyrighted work, copyright requires later authors either to
create more of their own work independently or to obtain the earlier
author's consent before they copy. Undertaking either alternative is
likely to increase the production costs for later works, either by re-
quiring the later author to dedicate additional time and skill in order
to create her own work or by requiring the later author to pay a li-
censing fee to the earlier author in order to copy. By increasing the
production costs for later authors, copyright increases the price a later
author will have to charge in order to recoup her own initial invest-
ment, and thereby limits the ability of a later author to undersell
profitably an earlier author.27  Second, because copyright permits a
plaintiff to establish impermissible copying circumstantially,
28 copy-
right requires later authors to avoid undue similarity to an earlier
copyrighted work in order to avoid the risk and expense of an in-
fringement action. Copyright, thereby, indirectly29 limits the produc-
tion of a substantially similar later work.30 By requiring later works
to differ from earlier copyrighted works, copyright limits the degree to
which a later author can produce a perfect substitute for an earlier
copyrighted work.31 It can thereby insulate an author's work from
effective price competition, provide the author with a degree of mar-
the news-gatherer, it would render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to cut
off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return").
26. See text accompanying notes 56-78.
27. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. 338-39 (cited in note 5); Robert
P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2657
(1994).
28. See, for example, Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987); Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
29. While the independent creation defense would theoretically protect a later author who
produced an identical work independently, the use of circumstantial evidence to establish actual
copying and the possibility of unconscious copying substantially limit, as a practical matter, the
protection the defense affords. See text accompanying notes 108-19.
30. See Part III.B.1.
31. See, for example, Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 908 (cited in note 17) Cut
perhaps the notion of competition should be drawn out further: even with government restric-
tions, competition is always around the corner, though the corner is surely farther away than it
would be otherwise"). In economic terms, such protection provides the author a degree of
market power. The degree of market power will depend on the extent to which consumers
consider other works adequate substitutes. See Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1702-03 (cited in
note 5); Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 889.
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ket power with respect to copies of her work, and increase the price
the author can profitably charge for access to her work.32
As a general matter, the more extensive the protection that
copyright provides, the fewer elements copyright will permit a later
author to copy from an earlier copyrighted work, and the greater over-
all dissimilarity copyright will require between an earlier and later
work in order to avoid an undue risk of an infringement finding.
Copyright's scope thus determines the extent of these two controls.
As copyright's scope broadens, copyright limits more and more the
ability of later authors to draw on earlier copyrighted works. It
thereby makes it more and more expensive for later authors to
produce competing works, increasing the price later authors will need
to charge for their competing works in order to recoup their
investment. As copyright's scope broadens, it also limits more and
more the ability of later authors to produce a perfect substitute for an
earlier copyrighted work, providing the original author with an
increasing degree of market power for any given copyrighted work.
Through these two effects, more extensive copyright protection can
increase the economic return an author should expect to receive for
the publication of any given work,33 and provide an increased
incentive to produce works of authorship.
At the same time, however, more extensive copyright
protection also limits access to the resulting work in two senses.
First, by limiting the ability of future authors to reuse certain
elements of the copyrighted work, broadening copyright's protection
may impede access to elements needed to produce future works.
Second, by increasing the market power associated with a copyrighted
work, broadening copyright's protection may impede access to the
work itself.
Broadening copyright protection may impede access to ele-
ments necessary to future works, thereby limiting the production of
such works, in three instances. First, even without copying, later
authors will inevitably reuse some of the same elements that have
previously appeared in copyrighted works. 34 As copyright sets more
32. See Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of
the Theory of Value 58-60 (Harvard U., 8th ed. 1962); Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1701-03 (cited
in note 5).
33. Copyright does not, of course, guarantee a profit on any given work of authorship. It
merely increases the chance that any given work will be profitable.
34. See, for example, Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930);
Computer Associates Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992); Hoehling v.
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and more of a work apart as the earlier author's exclusive property, it
heightens the risk that a jury may mistake the coincidental reappear-
ance of one of these elements for copying.35 To minimize the chance of
an infringement finding, later authors would have to search prior
works for similarities and, when found, either ensure that their works
avoid those similarities, if possible, or obtain a license to use the
similar material.3 Either the increasing search costs alone, or the
search costs together with the increasing cost of avoiding or licensing
similarities when they are found, would, in some instances, make it
"virtually impossible" for a future author to exercise freely her own
creativity. 3
7
Second, extensive protection may stifle certain types of
creative endeavors altogether. Some creative works, such as parody,
inevitably build upon preexisting works.3 8 Yet, an author will seldom
authorize others to make fun of, or criticize, her work.39 As a result,
requiring a later would-be author to obtain a license before
undertaking parody or criticism might prevent the production of such
works altogether.40
Third, by requiring permission before a later author can copy
certain elements from a copyrighted work, copyright may lead to mar-
ket failure. In some cases, even though the later author would be
willing to pay a price for the license that the copyright holder would
be willing to accept, the transaction costs of negotiating and obtaining
a license would exceed the potential gains from the license. 41 In such
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Louise Harmon, Law,
Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 367, 403-06 (1994); Litman, 39 Emory L. J. at 966-67
(cited in note 5); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10
Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. 279 (1992).
35. See text accompanying notes 107-19.
36. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 332-33 (cited in note 5); Breyer, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. at 316-18 (cited in note 5). Depending on whether a particular author is risk-averse,
risk-neutral, or risk-desiring, different authors will balance these strategies differently, each
attempting to develop her own optimal balance of risk, uncertainty, search, avoidance, and
licensing costs. Obviously, if a later author believes that truth will inevitably prevail at trial,
and that the actual fact of independent creation alone will therefore protect the author from a Ii.
ability finding, then the later author will face the cost of a mistaken infringement finding
entirely in terms of risk and uncertainty.
37. See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1176, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500
(1994). See also Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post.
Modernism, 11 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. 1, 24-33 (1992).
39. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
40. See id.
41. See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1618,
1628-30 (1982). See also Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. 79, 84 (Spring
1992); Merges, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2657, 2661-62, 2668-73 (cited in note 27).
496 [Vol. 49:483
COPYRIGHT'S PARADIGM
a case, the transaction costs would render the later author unable to
afford a license, and the transaction would not occur. Such market
failure may limit the ability of later authors to reuse elements found
in earlier works, thereby limiting the production of future works.
In addition to potentially limiting the production of future
works, broadening copyright protection may also limit access to exist-
ing copyrighted works. Specifically, by ensuring that a copyrighted
work remains unique, broad copyright protection may insulate an
author from effective price competition and provide the author a de-
gree of market power.42 This market power will enable the author to
charge a higher price for access to her work, and, as with any form of
monopoly,4 3 will generate two economic consequences. 44 First, this
market power will force those consumers who remain willing to pur-
chase the work at its higher, more monopolistic price, to pay more for
the work than they would have had to pay in a more competitive mar-
ket.45 For these consumers, broadening copyright and increasing an
author's market power transfers monies that would otherwise have
remained in their collective pocket as consumer surplus to the author
in the form of a monopoly profit or rent.46 Second, this market power
will force those consumers who would have paid a more competitive
price for the work, but who are unwilling or unable to pay the higher,
more monopolistic price, to make do with a less adequate substitute
or do without.47 For these consumers, broadening copyright imposes a
"deadweight loss," measured by the combined loss in consumer and
producer surplus associated with the sales lost as a result of the
42. How much market power will depend upon the extent to which copyright permits later
authors to duplicate the earlier copyrighted work's appeal. See Part III.A.2.
43. Some may object to the use of the word "monopoly" in such close association with
copyright. See, for example, Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law § 1C (Matthew Bender, 1992) ("Giving exclusive rights to an author or
inventor is no more a monopoly or anticompetitive than other species of real or personal
property"). I am not saying, however, that the copyright is a monopoly, merely that the
presence of the copyright on a work may lead to a market for the work that has a downward
sloping demand curve, and that the work is therefore sold in a market that is monopolistic in
the nonpejorative economic sense. See, for example, Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition at
193-94 (cited in note 32).
44. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1701-02 (cited in note 5).
45. Id. This is true unless the failure to give the author a greater degree of market power
prevents the creation of the work in the first place.
46. Id.
47. See, for example, Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 92-101 (Free Press, 1978);
Walter Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal 1-8 (U.
Chicago, 1973); Posner, Antitrust Law at 8-11 (cited in note 12); Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at
1702 (cited in note 5).
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higher, more monopolistic price.48 Because the first consequence re-
sults only in a transfer of wealth from consumers to authors, commen-
tators generally consider only the second consequence, the deadweight
loss, when measuring the societal costs associated with the market
power a copyright can create.
49
Given that broadening copyright may limit access to elements
necessary to produce future works or to existing copyrighted works,
the incentives-access paradigm suggests that we can determine copy-
right's proper scope by balancing the need for additional incentives
against the need for access. As copyright protection broadens, the in-
centive to produce any given work, measured by the expected return
on the work, increases, but both the cost of creating new works and
the deadweight loss associated with existing works also increase.50 At
some point, given a decreasing marginal return on further incentive
and an increasing marginal cost associated with further lost access,
further expanding copyright's protection will increase the cost of re-
using an element to a level that "unduly"51 discourages the creation of
future works,.2 or it will raise the price of access to an existing work
to a level that unduly limits the work's dissemination.5 3 At that point,
the need for access would outweigh the need for incentives, and the
incentives-access paradigm would demand a limit to copyright's
protection.
To explore the incentives-access paradigm more fully, and to
evaluate its influence on the shape of present copyright law, the fol-
lowing Part explores some of the key components of copyright.
48. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1702 (cited in note 5). Figure 1, see text
accompanying note 364, graphically depicts the deadweight loss monopoly causes. In the figure,
the triangle a-y-z represents the deadweight loss associated with a lead-time monopoly.
49. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Hary. L. Rev. at 1702 (cited in note 5). Compare Bork,
Antitrust Paradox 110-15 (cited in note 47) (arguing that focusing on deadweight loss alone
adequately defines the social cost of monopoly), with Posner, Antitrust Law at 11 (cited in note
12) (arguing that wealth transfer must be considered in determining the social cost of monopoly
because the availability of transfer payments could lead to resources being wasted in rent
seeking).
50. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 332-33 (cited in note 5) (explaining that
the cost of creating new works increases as copyright increases its scope); Merges, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. at 2658-59 (cited in note 27).
51. Given the nature of the balance, the cost of reusing an element becomes "undue" when
the cost of protecting an element begins to exceed the benefits from such protection.
52. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 333 (cited in note 5); Gordon, 82 Colum.
L. Rev. at 1618, 1628-30 (cited in note 41).
53. See Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1703-04 (cited in note 5).
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III. THE PARADIGM EXPLORED: THE ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT
Subject to sections 107 through 120 of the Copyright Act,5 a
copyright owner will succeed in preventing another from making a
given use of her work if she can demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, 55 and (2) copying by the alleged infringer. 5s As a practical
matter, satisfying these two elements will require the plaintiff to
show, first, that copyright protects her works7 and, second, that
copyright prohibits the defendant's actions.
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 ed.).
55. To establish ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff must establish that her work is
an (a) original (b) work of authorship that has been (c) fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; Wildlife Express, 18 F.3d at 507. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994
ed.); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1976). Historically, a plaintiff also had
to demonstrate that she had satisfied the statutory formalities, a fourth prerequisite for
protection. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 662-68 (1834). The Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, however, largely eliminated
statutory formalities as a prerequisite for protection for those works first distributed to the
public after March 1, 1989. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1988). See
also 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), 408(a) (1994 ed.) (using the word "may" to reflect that notice
and registration are permissive). To demonstrate ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff
must also demonstrate that she owns the copyright in the work and that the alleged acts of
infringement occurred within the statutory term of the copyright. See, for example, Russell v.
Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1126-29 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. The Feist Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate
"copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Id. By tacking on the qualifier
that the copied element be "original," the Feist Court may have been suggesting that the
copying of any original element would establish infringement. This is not the law. An alleged
infringer may copy an original element of the copyrighted work, yet still not infringe if the
original element copied is an unprotected idea. See, for example, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11
Otto) 99, 101-04 (1879); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122 ('Even so, granting that the plaintiffs play was
wholly original, and assuming that novelty is not essential to a copyright, there is no monopoly
in such a background. Though the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself;
so defined, the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a
part of her 'ideas' "). Perhaps the Feist Court was implicitly suggesting that ideas, like facts, are
not original to the author. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (comparing unprotected facts to
unprotected ideas). See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985) ('The copyright is limited to those aspects of a work-termed 'expression'-that
display the stamp of the author's originality"). Most likely, however, the Court chose to focus on
the requirement that the element taken be original because that was the issue before it.
57. To establish ownership of a valid copyright, the late Professor Nimmer has suggested
that a plaintiff must demonstrate the "copyrightability" of a work, see Melville B. Nimmer and
David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[A] (Matthew Bender, 1993), and some courts
have adopted his terminology, see, for example, Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730
F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1984). The word copyrightability is unfortunately ambiguous as courts
have used it to refer to four different copyright inquiries. First, some courts have used it
generally to refer to the question of whether a particular work satisfies all the prerequisites for
copyright protection. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432-33 (4th Cir. 1986);
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970) (explaining, first,
that "to be copyrightable, the work must be origina' and concluding that "[the plaintiffs works]
are, in our opinion, both original and copyrightable"). Second, some courts have used it to refer
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:483
The incentives-access paradigm has played a crucial role in
shaping both of these elements.58 In order to limit the scope of our
discussion, however, the following Sections will focus on three specific
issues: (1) the idea-expression dichotomy, (2) the similarity required
to establish infringement, and (3) the fair use doctrine. All three of
these issues arise in the course of determining whether copyright
prohibits the defendant's actions, an issue usually resolved by asking
whether the plaintiff can demonstrate "copying" by the defendant.
To demonstrate such copying, copyright requires a plaintiff to
establish two elements. First, a plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant actually copied from her work.59 Independent creation of even
to the question of whether a work is original. See John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer
Team, 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986); Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, 634
F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D. Pa. 1986). Third, some courts have used it to refer to the question of
whether a particular work is a work of authorship within the meaning of section 102(a). See
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414-16, 418 (2d Cir. 1985). Fourth,
some courts have used it to refer to whether a particular aspect of a work is excluded from
protection under section 102(b), an inquiry that should properly be undertaken in determining
whether the defendant has "copied" the plaintiffs work. See, for example, Feist, 499 U.S. at 361
(noting that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright on its telephone directory, but holding that the
facts contained in the directory were not copyrightable in determining that the defendants
taking of those facts did not constitute "copying"); Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 101-02 (noting
that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright in a book about an accounting method, but holding
that the accounting method was not "copyrightable" in determining that the defendanes taking
of that method did not constitute "copying"). See also Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878,
886 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the questions of whether a creation satisfies the prerequisites
for protection and, if so, what elements of the work copyright protects, should be kept distinct).
Some courts have used the ambiguities inherent in the word "copyrightability" to exclude
protection for a work, without making clear which of the three prerequisites for protection the
work failed to satisfy. See Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1108
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding an insurance claim form was not "copyrightable" because it was a blank
form, without identifying which prerequisite the form failed to satisfy); John J. Harland Co. v.
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that a check stub was not
"copyrightable" because it was a blank form, without identifying which prerequisite the stub
failed to satisfy). Other courts have used the ambiguities inherent in the word to transport
legal rulings from one inquiry to another, without ensuring that the same legal standard should
apply. See Magic Marketing, 634 F. Supp. at 771-72 (supporting its decision finding summary
judgment appropriate on the question of originality by citing three cases dealing with useful
article exclusion, and describing the common issue as one of copyrightability). Because of these
inherent ambiguities, this Article will avoid the terms "copyrightability" and "copyrightable."
58. Courts have used the copying element to impose access-derived limits even in cases
that deal with a seeming prerequisite for protection, such as originality. See Feist, 499 U.S. at
379-81 (holding that while the plaintiff established ownership of a valid copyright, the plaintiff
failed to establish "copying" because the factual material taken by the defendant was not
original). See also Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 3, 4-5 (Spring 1992) (using the incentives-access paradigm to evaluate the
originality standard).
59. See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275 (2d Cir. 1936)
(overruling Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1910)) (holding that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant took the material from the plaintiffs copyrighted work, and
establishing that the independent creation of an identical work is not actionable). See also Selle
v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
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an identical work is not actionable,60 at least not in theory.61 Not
every instance of actual copying will establish infringement, how-
ever.62 Instead, to be actionable, the plaintiff must establish, second,
that the defendant's actual copying has gone so far as to constitute an
"infringing" appropriation. 63
The test to determine whether any particular instance of
actual copying amounts to an infringing appropriation has varied
substantially over the last two hundred years. Until the early part of
the twentieth century, actual copying would constitute an infringing
appropriation only if it amounted to an unfair use of the plaintiffs
work in that "so much is taken that the value of the original is
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another."64 As
components of this inquiry, a court would examine whether the
alleged infringer had appropriated (a) substantial65 (b) protected
defendant took something from the plaintiffs work and concluding that the independent
creation of an identical work is not an infringement); S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751,
752-53 (E.D. Pa. 1889) (same).
60. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (holding that
independent creation using the same public domain sources to produce an identical work is not
an actionable infringement); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cases 1035, 1038 (D. Mass. 1839) (same).
61. See text accompanying notes 102-19.
62. See, for example, Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472 ("Assuming that adequate proof is made of
[actual] copying, that is not enough; for there can be 'permissible copying,' copying which is not
illicit'). But see M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 445 (If there was clear proof of actual copying
by the defendants, that is the end of the case").
63. Various phrases have been used to describe the sort of actual copying that copyright
will prohibit. The Arnstein court used the phrase "improper appropriation" to capture this
element of the infringement inquiry. 154 F.2d at 468. The late Professor Nimmer used the
phrase "actionable appropriation." Nimmer and Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B] at
13-9 (cited in note 57). This Article will use the phrase "infringing appropriation" to avoid
confusion with the specific inquiries suggested by these tests.
64. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cases 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841). See, for example, White v.
Bender, 185 F. 921, 926 (N.D.N.Y. 1911); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 9-10 (N.D. Cal. 1896);
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cases 26, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1869); Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cases 1113, 1116
(S.D. Ohio 1862); Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cases 1128, 1134 (D. Mass. 1858); Emerson v. Davies, 8
F. Cases 615, 625 (D. Mass. 1845).
65. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Assn., 209 U.S. 20, 23 (1908) (despite copying by the
defendant of the plaintiffs copyrighted merchant directory, the Court refused to enjoin produc-
tion of the defendant's because the copied entries represented only a very small fraction of the
defendanes directory). See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) ('[Ihe inquiry ac-
tually made was always to ascertain what had been appropriated, if anything, and then decide
whether the appropriation was (1) of copyrightable matter, and (2) was substantial"). See also
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1944) ('Copying, however, does not
constitute plagiarism unless a substantial and material part of matter protected by the
copyright is lifted").
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materials s (c) to create a recognizable reproduction of the original
work.67 If a plaintiff failed to establish any one of these components,
then the defendant's use would not constitute an infringing
appropriation.
When Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, it reorganized
some aspects of this inquiry, crafting, for example, a specific statutory
section that excluded protection for "ideas"68 and another that permit-
ted "fair use" of a copyrighted work.69 While the need for such sepa-
rate statutory sections was unclear, 70 Congress apparently felt that
codifying these aspects of copyright law would somehow clarify these
difficult issues.71 Unfortunately, and despite Congress's protestations
to the contrary,72 some courts have read this reorganization as chang-
ing the scope of copyright protection, particularly with respect to the
doctrine of fair use. These courts have read the reorganization as
66. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 674, 676 (1879); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122; Dymow,
11 F.2d at 692; London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1916); Daly v. Webster, 56 F.
483, 487 (2d Cir. 1892).
67. Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76 (finding that the defendants map of Philadelphia
was not an infringement of the plaintiffs map of New York City because "[the two maps] do not
convey the same information"); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1941) (finding
that the similarities were not such as would lead an "ordinary observer to believe that the film
has picturized appellant's book' and therefore holding that there was no infringement); Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 27-28 (9th Cir. 1933) (finding no infringement because the
court found "it fairly clear that, given an interval of two or three weeks between a casual
reading of the story and a similar uncritical view of [the allegedly infringing work], it would not
occur to such a spectator, in the absence of suggestion to that effect, that he was seeing in
moving picture form the [copyrighted] story"); Dymow, 11 F.2d at 692 (concluding that the
ordinary observer would not recognize the allegedly infringing work as being taken from the
original and therefore finding no infringement). See also Gray, 10 F. Cases at 1038 (finding that
one factor to consider in determining whether a use is unfair is whether the allegedly infringing
work will supersede the demand for the original); Folsom, 9 F. Cases at 348 (same). See also
text accompanying notes 201-213
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994 ed.).
69. Id. § 107.
70. Historically, courts had seen these limitations as implicit in the meaning of the word
"copy." See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76 (stating that taking the form of presenting
information from an earlier map is not an infringing use because it does not result in a copy of
the earlier map); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cases 201, 206 (E.D. Pa. 1853) (finding that a
translation of an original work is not an infringing use because it does not result in a copy of the
original within the meaning of the statute). Given that Congress, in the 1976 Act, defined the
author's exclusive rights in terms of reproducing copies of the work, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), the
courts could have used a similar approach and retained these limitations as implicit in the
statutory language.
71. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 57 (cited in note 3) C'[The purpose of § 102(b)] is to
restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy
between expression and idea remains unchanged"); id. at 65-66 (stating that § 107 is intended to
codify without modification the judicial fair use doctrine).
72. See id. at 57 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law"); id. at 66 ('Section 107 is intended to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way").
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shifting the burden of proof with respect to the fair use issue73 and as
limiting the doctrine's applicability to exceptional cases.7 4 As a result,
demonstrating an infringing appropriation requires a slightly differ-
ent approach today. First, the plaintiff must establish that the
alleged infringer has appropriated (a) protected material 75 from the
original (b) in order to produce a too-similar work7G Second, once the
73. Compare Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (placing the burden of establishing fair use on
the defendant), with Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 ('In this case, respondents failed to carry their
burden with respect to home time-shifting" (emphasis added)); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567
(placing the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the use was not fair).
74. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (focusing on parody as a transformative use); Sony,
464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (recognizing the distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses
as helpful in calibrating the fair use balance).
75. See, for example, Feist, 499 U.S. at 363-64 (holding that taking factual information
from an earlier work is not an infringing appropriation because facts are not a protected
element); Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
that taking a story about kids facing life dangers as a result of shrinking was not an infringing
appropriation because the story was unprotected at that level of abstraction); Bellsouth
Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1446 (11th
Cir. 1993) (finding that taking the name, address, telephone number, business type, and unit of
advertisement purchased for a listing was not an infringing appropriation because those
elements were unprotected); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141-42 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding that taking the concept of a flat-to-cube puzzle from the plaintiff was not an
infringing appropriation because the elements were not protected at that level of abstraction);
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that taking a story about
murders committed to obtain organs for transplants was not an infringing appropriation be-
cause the story was not protected at that level of abstraction); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field
& Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that taking a toy snowman concept was not an
infringing appropriation because the toy was not protected at that level of abstraction); Franklin
Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that
taking a painting's concept of two cardinals on an apple tree in bloom was not an infringing
appropriation because the painting was not protected at that level of abstraction); Reyher, 533
F.2d at 92 (finding that taking a story of a lost child who describes his mother as the "most
beautiful woman in the world" was not an infringing appropriation because the story was not
protected at that level of abstraction).
76. See, for example, Moore v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 946 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that an allegedly infringing song was too different as a whole from the
original to constitute an infringing appropriation); Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440,
443 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an allegedly infringing Man in the Moon mask was too
different in overall appearance from the original to constitute an infringing appropriation);
Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an allegedly infringing
motion picture was too different from the original in "total concept and feel" to constitute an
infringing appropriation); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an allegedly infringing television series was too different from the
original to consitute an infringing appropriation); Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that an allegedly infringing television
series was too different in total concept and feel to constitute an infringing appropriation);
Arnstein v. BMI, 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding that two songs were too dissimilar to
the layman's ear for the second to constitute an infringing appropriation). See also Part III.B.2.
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plaintiff has established these two elements, then the court must
decide whether the use made was fair.77
As components of this infringing appropriation inquiry, the
idea-expression dichotomy, the similarity necessary to establish an in-
fringing appropriation, and the scope of fair use play a critical role in
defining the scope of protection copyright provides. They define what
another can and cannot do with a copyrighted work, implicitly deline-
ating the boundaries of the author's property in her work. The incen-
tives-access paradigm has influenced the development of each of these
three boundaries. It has guided the separation of a work's protected
and unprotected aspects; it has defined the similarity necessary to es-
tablish infringement; and it has formed the basis for the present-day
fair use doctrine. The following Sections explore the paradigm's influ-
ence on each of these issues in turn, beginning with the familiar
maxim that copyright gives protection "only to the expression of the
idea-not the idea itself."78
A. Defining a Work's Unprotected Aspects
Once a court79 has identified an original aspect of a work as be-
ing unprotected by copyright, as being an "idea," the effects of that
identification are relatively clear. The sharing of that unprotected as-
pect or of the similarities that necessarily result from that aspect 8
cannot support an inference that the later work borrowed from the
original,81 nor can such borrowing amount to an infringing
appropriation. 82 While the effects of identifying an aspect of a work as
77. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169 (addressing whether the use made was fair given
that the parties conceded that the use would otherwise be infringing).
78. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
79. In this area, the court decisions have generally led, and Congress has generally
followed. See, for example, id. at 201, codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(b) (1994 ed.) (defining
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 99, codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). But see Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 206 (holding that the exclusive rights conferred by
copyright do not include the exclusive right to make translations of the work), overruled by
statute, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (granting authors the exclusive
translation right). This discussion will, therefore, focus on the limits courts have imposed,
keeping in mind that Congress has subsequently codified many of the same limits.
80. See Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103-05. If an unprotected aspect dictates every aspect
of a work, then copyright will protect no aspect of the work. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). See also text accompanying notes 177-89.
81. See, for example, Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (allowing dissection to determine if
similarities are sufficient to support a finding that the defendant actually copied).
82. The courts have followed two principal approaches to determine whether borrowing
from an original work amounts to an infringing appropriation: (1) the Arnstein wrongful appro-
priation test, see 154 F.2d at 473 (asking whether ordinary observers would consider the two
works "inexcusably alike, in terms of the way in which lay listeners of such music would be
likely to react'); and (2) the Krofft extrinsic-intrinsic test, see 562 F.2d at 1164 (finding that the
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an idea are thus relatively clear,8 3 the task of identifying which
aspects a court should leave unprotected has proven more difficult.
Judge Learned Hand noted the difficulties on several occasions, 4 and
eventually concluded that "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has
borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions [about where to draw the line
between idea and expression] must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."85
Despite the difficulty, once courts departed from a literal duplication
standard for infringement,86 such a line became essential in order to
separate those aspects of a work that belong to its author from those
second work must be substantially similar to the original in both ideas and in expression and
concluding that the expression will be too similar if the "ordinary reasonable person" would find
the later work "duplicates [the] peculiar appeal" or "total concept and feel" of the earlier work).
Neither test expressly permitted a court to separate idea from expression in judging the
response of the ordinary observer to the two works. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (precluding
analytic dissection in judging the response of the ordinary observer); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165
(same). Because similarities in the unprotected aspects of the works might result in the two
works appearing "inexcusably alike" to an ordinary observer, the failure to separate the
protected and unprotected aspects of a work created a substantial risk that a jury could find
infringement because of similarities dictated by unprotected aspects of the two works. Such a
risk would, as a practical matter, tend to extend protection to the unprotected aspects of a
copyrighted work. To redress this deficiency in the two tests, later courts have modified the
ordinary observer aspect of both tests to ensure that similarities resulting from unprotected
aspects of a work cannot establish infringement. See Cooling Systems & Flexibles v. Stuart
Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985) (modifying Kroffts intrinsic test to require the
ordinary observer to consider only those similarities between the later work and the protected
aspects of the original); Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356 (modifying Kroffts extrinsic test to require
an objective examination of the similarities between the two works to prevent a finding of
infringement based upon the similarities resulting from the unprotected aspects); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 909 (3d Cir. 1975) (modifying Arnstein's improper
appropriation test to require the ordinary observer to judge whether the two works are
substantially similar based solely on similarities between the later work and the protected
aspects of the original); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 66
(2d Cir. 1974) (same); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967) (same).
83. Some disagreements remain, principally over whether unprotected elements should be
considered in determining whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar as a
whole to the original work. Compare McCulloch v. Price, 823 F.2d 316, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the phrase "You Are Special Today" is unprotected, but must be considered in
determining whether the total concept and feel of the later work is sufficiently similar to the
original to constitute an infringing appropriation), with Cooling Systems, 777 F.2d at 493
(holding that the unprotected elements cannot be considered in determining whether the total
concept and feel of the later work is sufficiently similar to the original to constitute an
infringing appropriation).
84. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
85. Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489.
86. Courts perceived a literal duplication standard as providing inadequate protection of
an author's property. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ('It is of course essential to any protection of
literary property, whether at common law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited
literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
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that do not.87 Moreover, despite Judge Hand's warning, courts have
devised a number of tests intended to separate a work's protected and
unprotected elements. 88
While each of these tests purports to provide a means to sepa-
rate protected expression from unprotected ideas, each requires an ex-
ternal key-a key that courts have relied on the incentives-access
paradigm to provide.8 9 Consider, for example, Judge Hand's own lev-
els-of-abstraction approach.90 Using this approach, a court attempts
to separate a work's protected and unprotected elements by looking to
see whether the alleged infringer has copied sufficiently concrete or
detailed aspects of the original. 91 If the copier has taken elements suf-
ficiently detailed to be considered expression, then the copier has
taken a protected element.9 2 If the copier has taken only those ele-
ments that are sufficiently abstract as to be considered ideas, then no
infringement has occurred.93 As Judge Hand expressed it:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of in-
creasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
87. Compare by analogy id. ("[B]ut, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test,
the whole matter is necessarily at large").
88. See, for example, Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 706-11 (identifying the unprotected
elements of a work through abstraction, filtration, and a comparison test); Krofft, 562 F.2d at
1168 n.10 ("A description of the 'what! and the 'how' of a work serves as a useful tool in
determining whether the expression of an idea differs from the idea itself. If, in describing how
a work is expressed, the description differs little from a simple description of what the work is,
then idea and expression coincide"); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 ('vhen the
'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since
protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the
copyright owner"). See also Zachariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum.
L. Rev. 503, 513 (1945) ('I like to say that the protection covers the 'pattern' of the work... the
sequence of events and the development of the interplay of the characters").
89. Some of the tests expressly require an external key, see Computer Associates, 982 F.2d
at 707-08 (defining unprotected elements according to the need for access to the element);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 (holding that the court should identify a work's
idea(s) in order to preserve "the balance between competition and protection reflected in the
patent and copyright laws"), while others internally incorporated an access-derived key, see
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168 n.10 (concluding that the unprotected level is "a simple description of
what the work is" and justifying this conclusion by balancing incentives and access); Chafee, 45
Colum. L. Rev. at 513 (cited in note 88) (concluding that protection covers "the sequence of
events and the development of the interplay of the characters" and implicitly justifying this
conclusion with the incentives-access balance).
90. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-22.
91. Id. See Universal Athletic Sales, 511 F.2d at 909; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150
F.2d 612, 612 (2d Cir. 1945).
92. See, for example, Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1343-44 (5th Cir. 1994); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
93. See, for example, Engineering Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1343-44; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122;
Computer Associates Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affirmed in
part and vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is
a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
9 4
Using this test, a court separates a work's protected and unprotected
elements by determining whether the level at which the alleged in-
fringer has borrowed from the original is sufficiently concrete to be
protected expression, or sufficiently abstract to be an unprotected
idea.9
5
While any number of courts have purportedly used this ap-
proach to determine whether a copier has taken a protected element
from the original work,96 the approach cannot separate a work's pro-
tected and unprotected elements because it fails to define the level of
abstraction at which protection begins.9 7 As a result, a court using the
approach can determine that the element taken was more or less ab-
stract, but the court remains uncertain as to whether the element is
in any event sufficiently abstract to constitute an unprotected idea or
sufficiently concrete to constitute protected expression. Because of
this omission, the levels-of-abstraction approach, while it provides a
comfortable path to tread and generates the semblance of rigorous
analysis, can reveal nothing more than the court's preconceptions. 98
94. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
95. See, for example, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir.
1995), affirmed, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435,
1445 (9th Cir. 1994); Engineering Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1343-48.
96. See, for example, Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying
Judge Hand's levels-of-abstractions test to separate the unprotected idea from the protected
expression); Kern River Gas, 899 F.2d at 1463 (same); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d
44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,
672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163 (same); Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92
(same); UniversalAthletic Sales, 511 F.2d at 909 (same); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at
742 (same).
97. See, for example, Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) ('Hand's in-
sight is not a 'tese at all"); Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright at 77 (cited in note 12);
Nimmer and Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A], at 13-33 (cited in note 57).
98. Compare by analogy Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 ("At least in close
cases, one may suspect, the classification the court selects [whether idea or expression] may
simply state the result reached rather than the reason for it'). Unfortunately, the seductive
suggestion of an answer found in the levels-of-abstraction approach has sometimes led courts to
overlook the need for something more. Particularly troubling are those decisions that rely on
word games to fix the appropriate level of protection. For example, in Krofft, the court suggests
the following test for determining if merger has occurred: "If, in describing how a work is
expressed, the description differs little from a simple description of what the work is, then idea
and expression coincide." 562 F.2d at 1168 n.10. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 125, 148 n.23 (D.N.J. 1982) (suggesting that merger should be found "if a work
cannot be described in abstract terms, the expression adds nothing to the idea"), affirmed, 775
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For the levels-of-abstraction approach to reveal something more re-
quires a sensible means to identify the level of abstraction where pro-
tection should begin.
While some courts have relied on a form of metaphysical dart
throwing to identify the relevant level, 99 most have relied on the in-
centives-access paradigm.100 By identifying access as the limiting
principle for copyright protection, the paradigm directs a court to ex-
amine the need for access to determine whether any given level of ab-
straction, or any given element, is one copyright should protect. If
such an examination reveals that extending protection to a particular
level, or a particular element, would unduly threaten the creation of
future works or the dissemination of existing works, then the need for
F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1985). Yet, that test is useless unless we know how "simple" the "description of
what the work is" should be. For example, under this test, should we describe the work in
Herbert Rosenthal Jewerly as an object, a man-made object, an adorning object, a piece of
jewelry, a piece of gold jewelry, or something else? Words alone cannot answer that question.
Similarly, in Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 705, the Second Circuit criticized and rejected
the approach to defining the idea or ideas of a computer program that the Third Circuit adopted
in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986)
C'[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is
not necessary to the purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea"). While
criticizing the Whelan court for relying on metaphysical distinctions, the Second Circuit relied
on similar metaphysics in its definition of a program's idea or ideas; it simply changed the
relevant "program" whose purpose we are identifying. See Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 705
C'As we have already noted, a computer program's ultimate function or purpose is the composite
result of interacting subroutines.... [E]ach subroutine is itself a program, and thus, may be
said to have its own 'idea' "). Every line of code in a program instructs a computer to take (or
not take) some action, and is in that sense a "program." Should we, therefore, define the "ideas"
in the program as the purpose of each line of instruction? I think not, yet the Computer
Associates court failed to explain why its definition of "program" tied into "practical
considerations" better than defining the program as a whole as "the" program, or defining each
instruction as "the" program. As a result, when it described the various filtration rules, it
defined them with respect to an idea (or set of ideas) that "relies too heavily on metaphysical
distinctions and does not place enough emphasis on practical considerations." Id. at 706. Now,
it may so happen that Computer Associates's metaphysical choice of how many lines of code it
takes to make a "program," whose purpose we will leave unprotected, accurately captures the
level of abstraction that copyright should leave unprotected, but relying on coincidence alone to
achieve the appropriate level of protection seems an unwise way to proceed.
99. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) CThe idea of one of the operating system programs is, for example, how to translate
source code into object code. If other methods of expressing that idea are not foreclosed as a
practical matter, then there is no merger. Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility
with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but that is a
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical
issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged").
100. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540-41 (7th Cir. 1990); Kern River Gas, 899
F.2d at 1463 ('CIn drawing this fundamental distinction [between protected expression and
unprotected ideas], Congress balanced the competing concerns of providing incentive to authors
to create and of fostering competition in such creativity"); Warner Brothers v. American
Broadcasting, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90.
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access to that level or element will outweigh the need for incentives,
and the paradigm will impose a limit on copyright's protection. In the
conclusory terms courts often use when applying the levels-of-abstrac-
tion approach, actual copying at that level, or of that element, would
involve only an unprotected idea.' 0'
In application, courts have found the need for access compel-
ling, and have accordingly limited copyright protection, in two circum-
stances. First, courts have limited copyright protection to ensure the
ability of later authors to create their own works. Second, courts have
limited copyright protection to ensure society's access to adequate
substitutes for the original.
1. Elements Left Unprotected to Ensure the Creation of
Future Works
No work is entirely new.102 As a general matter, every work of
authorship consists of varying proportions of the following: (a) ele-
ments the author consciously copies from earlier works; (b) elements
the author unconsciously copies from earlier works; (c) elements the
author independently creates that also happen to appear in earlier
works; and (d) elements the author independently creates that have
not appeared in earlier works. Because an author will inevitably
reuse some elements that have appeared previously in earlier
copyrighted works,103 allowing a trier of fact to find infringement
based upon the reappearance of such elements would unduly limit the
ability of later authors to exercise their own creativity and would
threaten the creation of future works.
Copyright attempts to guard against such a risk by requiring a
plaintiff to demonstrate actual copying in order to establish that
another has infringed her copyrighted work.04 As a matter of formal
101. See, for example, Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103; Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 ("Any
similarities in plot exist only at the general level for which plaintiff cannot claim copyright
protection").
102. See, for example, Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev.
932, 942 (1939); Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1294 ("maln Hollywood, as in [life] generally, there is only
rarely anything new under the surf'); Emerson, 8 F. Cases at 619 ("In truth, in literature, in
science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout"). See also Ecclesiastes 1:9 ('There is no new thing under
the sun").
103. See, for example, Umbreit, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 942 (cited in note 102). As Professor
Chafee explained, "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predeces-
sors." Chafee, 45 Colum. L. Rev. at 511 (cited in note 88).
104. See text accompanying notes 59-62.
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copyright law, an author who, without actual copying, happens to
repeat an element that can be found in a copyrighted work, or who
unknowingly reproduces exactly a copyrighted work, is not an
infringer. 10 5  So long as the alleged infringer created his work
independently, without reference to, reliance on, or inspiration from'0 6
the copyrighted work, his work, even if identical, will not infringe the
copyrighted work.10 7  By allowing each author to pursue her own
inspirations so long as she does not actually copy, the actual copying
element attempts to assure each author adequate freedom to exercise
her own creativity.
Two considerations suggest, however, that the actual copying
element alone might not adequately address copyright's potential to
curtail the production of future works. First, because of the difficulty
of obtaining direct evidence of actual copying, copyright permits a
plaintiff to establish actual copying circumstantially by proving oppor-
tunity to copy and undue similarity10s By allowing circumstantial
proof of actual copying, copyright creates a risk that a trier of fact will
mistake coincidental similarities for copying. At a sufficiently ab-
stract level,0 9 two works that explore the same or similar subject
matter"0 will inevitably share some common elements."' If copyright
105. Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 150 ("Any subsequent person is, of course, free to use all works
in the public domain as sources for his compositions. No later work, though original, can take
that from him.... The defendant's concern lest the public should be shut off from the use of
works in the public domain is therefore illusory; no one suggests it"). See also Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Company, 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ('Others are free to copy the
original. They are not free to copy the copy"). See also Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at
345-46 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the actual copying element adequately protects against an
infringement finding based upon coincidental similarities).
106. See Nimmer and Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B], at 13-9 (cited in note 57)
(describing the elements required to establish copying).
107. As Judge Hand explained, "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author', and, if he copyrighted it,
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). See Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379
F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1967); Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 4.
108. See, for example, Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423; M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 445; Cholvin v.
B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1958); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; Nimmer and
Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B] (cited in note 57). See also Nelson v. PRN
Productions, Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1142 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that copying can be inferred
from a striking similarity even in the absence of any evidence of access); Gaste v. Kaiserman,
863 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1988) (same).
109. See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 215-16, 225 (Vanderbilt
U., 1968) ("The contradiction of protecting ideas as private property in a society devoted to
freedom of expression has been rationalized away with assurances that copyright does not
protect ideas, but only the expression of ideas. The rationalization, however, will not stand up
in light of the concept of copyright as it exists today").
110. Some courts and commentators tend to define "subject matter" and "idea" according to
the connotation of those words in everyday speech. See, for example, McCulloch, 823 F.2d at
320 (explaining that the idea of a plate was "to honor someone special at dinner"). This method
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permitted the trier of fact to infer copying from such similarities, n2 a
later author who created his work without actually copying "would
[nevertheless] face the grave risk of being found [an] infringer""1
simply because he explored the same subject matter as the plaintiffs
work.114 While the independent creation defense"5 remains formally
available to counter the inference of copying created by such
similarities, later authors could never be certain that the trier of fact
would properly distinguish coincidence from copying.1 6 Moreover,
of defining "idea" is troubling. While it would be convenient if the limits imposed on copyright
by policy considerations happen to coincide with the everyday meanings of these words, there is
no reason to believe that they necessarily will. Whether the subject matter or idea of the work
in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry is an adorning object, a piece of jewelry, a pin, a jeweled pin, a
jeweled bee pin, a jeweled pin depicting a realistic bee, or something else, depends entirely on
the appropriate level of abstraction at which policy dictates protection should begin. 446 F.2d at
739. If policy dictates that copyright must leave the work unprotected only at the level of "an
adorning object," then that is the unprotected subject matter or idea of the work. That ordinary
people would refer to the subject matter or idea of the work as something else is irrelevant in
defining the level of abstraction at which copyright protection begins, except to the extent that
this ordinary usage implicates a relevant policy concern.
111. See, for example, Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163; Durham Industries, 630 F.2d at 916 ("[F]uU
faces, pert noses, bow lips, and large, widely spaced eyes are standard doll features"); Stevenson
v. Harris, 238 F. 432, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) ('Of necessity, certain kinds of incidents must be
found in many books and plays").
112. Professor Latman uses the phrase "probative similarity" to distinguish the sorts of
similarities that will establish actual copying, and to separate such similarity from the
similarity that, if the result of actual copying, will establish an infringing appropriation. Alan
Latman, "Probative Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1187, 1204-14 (1990). See Beal v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting Professor Latman's usage).
113. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162-63.
114. See id. at 1162-64 (explaining that the first cheap plastic nude statue might monopo-
lize the field of nude statues if actual copying alone established infringement). See also
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978 (explaining that factual material in a work must be left unprotected
in order to avoid a chilling effect on authors addressing the same subject matter); Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 (crafting the merger rule in order to limit the undue scope
that copyright might otherwise provide given the use of circumstantial evidence and the
possibility of unconscious copying).
115. Describing the issue as an "independent creation defense" is not meant to suggest that
the defendant bears the burden of proof on this issue. The plaintiff, as part of her prima facie
case, must establish actual copying. If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable inference of actual copying, the defendant may counter with evidence of independent
creation. But the burden of establishing actual copying remains on the plaintiff. See Overman
v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1953).
116. In trying to establish independent creation, the defendant would face the dual hurdles
of unconscious borrowing and inevitably self-serving testimony. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry,
446 F.2d at 741 (holding that despite the defendants' testimony and the trial coures factual
finding of independent creation, it could not affirm because "[i]t seems unrealistic to suppose
that defendants could have closed their minds to plaintiffs highly successful jeweled bee pin as
they designed their own"). Because of these two factors, courts have tended to rely on an
examination of the two works, discounting the defendanes testimony of independent creation.
See Abkco Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-99 (2d Cir. 1983); Sheldon,
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even if a jury separated coincidence from copying in any given case,
the later author would still incur the substantial direct and indirect 1 7
costs of defending an infringement action.118 Only by limiting its pro-
tection to a level of abstraction where the coincidental reappearance
of an element becomes unlikely can copyright minimize the risk and
uncertainty associated with the independent creation defense and
thereby ensure the practical ability of others to pursue their own crea-
tive works.1ls
Second, if coincidence is likely to lead to an element's reap-
pearance, the element will, over time, likely appear independently in
a number of works. If copyright protected such an element, a later
author wishing to reuse that element would face extreme difficulty ob-
taining the requisite permission. Because the element would likely
appear in any number of works, the later author might be unable to
remember precisely where she saw it and unable to determine from
whom she should obtain a license. Moreover, a license from only one
of the earlier authors who had used the element would not fully pro-
tect the later author from an infringement action. If copyright pro-
tected such an element, each author whose earlier work
independently contained that element could sue any given later
81 F.2d at 54 ('Finally, in concluding as we do that the defendants used the play pro tanto, we
need not charge their witnesses with perjury. With so many sources before them they might
quite honestly forget what they took; nobody knows the origin of his inventions; memory and
fancy merge even in adults. Yet unconscious plagiarism is actionable quite as much as
deliberate"); Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147 ("[The defendant] swears that he was quite unconscious
of any plagiarism, and on the whole I am disposed to give him the benefit of the
doubt.... Whether he unconsciously copied the figure, he cannot say, and does not try to.
Everything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can tell what may evoke it. On
the whole, my belief is that, in composing the accompaniment to the refrain of 'Kalua,' [the
defendant] must have followed, probably unconsciously, what he had certainly often heard only
a short time before. I cannot really see how else to account for a similarity, which amounts to
identity").
117. The principal indirect cost would be the harm that an allegation of infringement would
impose on a person's reputation. See Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147. Thus, when a court found Rod
Stewart guilty of copyright infringement in creating his song, "Do Ya Think rm Sexy," Stewart
explained that "he was too drunk... to realize he was copying." Stewart Says Drunkenness to
Blame for Copying Song; Sexy Echoes Brazilian Tune, New Orleans Times-Picayune A37 (Jan.
1, 1995). Apparently, it is better to be a drunkard than a copier.
118. See Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540 (explaining that the cost of litigation may discourage the
production of new works).
119. See, for example, Arica Institute, Inc. o. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("Courts will not find copyright infringement where the only similarity between plaintiffs
and defendant's work is that of an abstract idea, system or discovery because to do so would un-
duly inhibit independent creation by others"), affirmed, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992); Gund, Inc.
v. Smile Intl., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) CWhat must be meant by the
provision denying protection to 'ideas' is that the law will not grant an author a monopoly over
the unparticularized expression of an idea at such a level of abstraction or generality as unduly
to inhibit independent creation by others").
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author whose work repeated that element. A license from one of the
earlier authors would not bar suit by the other earlier authors, as a
jury could plausibly infer that the later author had also copied,
perhaps unconsciously, from earlier works aside from the licensed
work.120 In order to avoid an infringement action, a later author
would have to obtain a license to use such an element, not once, but
from each of the earlier authors in whose work the element appeared.
The costs of searching multiple works to identify where the element
had previously appeared and the transaction costs of obtaining
multiple permissions to reuse the element might prevent the later use
of the element altogether, even by a later author who would be willing
to pay an acceptable price to license the element from one of the
earlier authors.
Thus, if copyright extended its protection to elements that are
likely to reappear in other works even without copying, the threat of
multiple lawsuits such protection would entail, together with the un-
due transaction costs associated with obtaining multiple licenses,
would have a substantial "chilling effect"121 on the work of future
authors.122 Such protection would deter, rather than encourage the
production of creative works. As Judge Newman has explained:
It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity.
However, that law has the capacity both to augment and diminish the pros-
pects for creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the exclusive
benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obvi-
ously promoted creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new
works if authors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be
substantially similar to preexisting works.
123
In order to avoid deterring future works, the incentives-access para-
digm suggests that copyright should limit its protection for a work's
original elements to that level of abstraction where an element's coin-
cidental reappearance becomes unikely.124 Such a limit provides later
120. See, for example, Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54-55 (ruling that even though movie producers
had a license from the author of a novel concerning events in Madeleine Smith's life, the movie
infringed upon a play based upon the same events).
121. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978.
122. See Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 240. See also Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90.
123. Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 240. See also Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530
(9th Cir. 1987) ('[Ideas and scenes a faire] have been left explicitly unprotected in order to
encourage their individual expression in original works of authorship").
124. See, for example, Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (limiting
protection for stuffed toy dinosaurs); Eden Toys, 675 F.2d at 500 (limiting protection for a
snowman toy because, "[f]or countless generations, children and the young at heart have built
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authors a safe harbor within which they can exercise their own
creativity without fear that a trier of fact will mistake their independ-
ent work for a copy, and it ensures that future authors will not face
undue transaction costs in obtaining access to those elements they
need to create their own works.
Because an element's likely reappearance will vary depending
on the type of work and the nature of the element at issue, the incen-
tives-access paradigm further suggests that the exact level of abstrac-
tion at which protection begins should also vary.125 For realistic
works, and for elements that a later author can readily find in the
preexisting public domain, coincidental similarities are likely to occur
even at a fairly precise level of detail.126 Two news stories about the
same event, two toy snowmen, or two paintings of a cardinal are
likely to share similarities at a reasonably detailed level, even in the
absence of copying, because of the common public source. 127 Similarly,
common training, a common approach to problem solving, and the ex-
ternal constraints that efficiency and memory limitations impose
mean that two computer programs written to achieve the same end
are likely to share similarities at a reasonably detailed level, even in
the absence of copying. 128  In these types of works, coincidence re-
snowmen"); Gund, 691 F. Supp. at 645 (limiting protection for a floppy stuffed dog because its
particular pose was "a common sight').
125. Some cases seem to vary the standards for protection informally in cases where the
proof of actual copying seems particularly strong. See, for example, Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222
(giving broad protection where other evidence strongly suggested that the defendant actually
copied from the plaintiff's computer program); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp.,
266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying a loose standard of originality in a case where actual
copying by the defendant was clear).
126. See Pasillas, 927 F.2d at 443 n.2 (rejecting the plaintiffs attempt to limit narrow
protection to works that depict natural objects, the court noted that "various expressions [of
certain fictional or mythical characters) share standard or stock elements"); Aliotti, 831 F.2d at
901 n.1 (portraying a tyrannosaurus rex toy with its mouth open was not protected because
'"yrannosaurus ... was a carnivore and is commonly pictured with its mouth open"); Concrete
Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that a
realistic-looking concrete deer is too general to be protected); Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Elsner
Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 980, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (leaving unprotected those features that are
common to all Santas).
127. See, for example, Eden Toys, 675 F.2d at 500; Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 66. See also
Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901-02; Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 509 F.2d at 65 ("Since all turtles are
created more or less along the same lines, appellant cannot, by obtaining a copyright upon one
design of a turtle pin, exclude all others from manufacturing gold turtle pins on the ground that
they are substantially similar in appearance").
128. See, for example, Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 708-10. See also Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (The ripeness-of-time concept of invention, developed
from the study of the many independent multiple discoveries in history, predicts that if a
particular individual had not made a particular discovery others would have, and in probably a
relatively short period of time. If something is to be discovered at all very likely it will be
discovered by more than one person"); William F. Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions
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mains plausible as an explanation for even reasonably detailed simi-
larities between an earlier and a later work. As a result, the incen-
tives-access paradigm suggests that copyright must limit its
protection for these works to a relatively concrete and detailed level,
and courts, following the paradigm's lead, have done S0.129
In contrast, coincidence does not provide as convincing an ex-
planation for an element's reappearance in fictional or fanciful works.
If two stories depict nearly identical characters who are engaging in
nearly identical behavior, coincidence provides a convincing explana-
tion for those similarities only if, and to the extent that, both stories
derive from some common public source. 130 This is not to say that co-
incidental similarities will never occur in fictional works. When a
particular development-whether that be space travel,131 organ trans-
plants, 132 the inability of the police to deal with crime,13  or the rein-
tegration of Vietnam veterans into our society1 4-- captures the pub-
lic's attention, that development will likely provide similar inspira-
Inevitable?, 37 Pol. Sci. Q. 83 (1922) (listing various inventions that were simultaneously and
independently discovered by two different people or groups of people).
129. See, for example, Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 708-11; Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901-02;
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 509 F.2d at 65-66; Gund, 691 F. Supp. at 645 (limiting protection for
a floppy stuffed dog because its particular pose was "a common sight').
130. See, for example, Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir.
1991) (refusing to find infringement of a rose-decorated fabric pattern, the court noted that
"playwrights and poets from William Shakespeare to Gertrude Stein have extolled the beauty of
this five-petaled flower, [and] by the rose's very nature one artists rendering of it will closely re-
semble another artist's work'); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Intl., Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that a "superhuman muscleman" is an unprotected idea);
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Pubs., Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1940) (referring to a
preexisting public domain character, "benevolent Hercules," in defining the limits of copyright's
protection); Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.55 (noting that while both a play and a movie drew on actual
events, they shared elements not found in the actual events, and these additional similarities
established infringement of the play by the movie); McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F. Supp. 738, 743
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (stating that although two works shared "the matter of baby talk by the
Woolcott characters," that was "one of Woolcott's irritating weaknesses" and was well-known by
the public; therefore it was not sufficient to establish infringement).
131. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356-57 (explaining that a movie's sharing of the theme of
humans encountering extraterrestrials with an earlier copyrighted play was not sufficient to
establish infringement).
132. See Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1293; London, 231 F. at 698 C'Of course, in transferring the
action of this story, centuries old, to modern times, the criminals will not be Orientals, but
highwaymen or burglars; their home will not be in a cave or a hut in a wood, but in a rented
room in a modern building; their surroundings will be squalid, not comprising a separate
kitchen; they will perpetrate their crimes according to modern methods; if they are to be given
poison, it will presumably be conveyed in meat or bread, coffee or whiskey").
133. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362; Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1450
(9th Cir. 1988).
134. Olson, 855 F.2d at 1450.
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tions to any number of authors. 135 Coincidence might also explain
even more detailed similarities if the two authors are simply integrat-
ing a new development into an old storyline. 136 Yet, in the absence of
some common referent, two authors are unlikely to produce independ-
ently fictional works that share the sort of detailed similarity likely to
be found in two independent accounts of a specific historic event. For
fictional works, coincidence becomes likely only at that fairly abstract
level where a common culture and a common audience are likely to
lead disparate authors to repeat one another.137 For that reason, the
incentives-access paradigm suggests that copyright should extend its
protection for fictional works to a higher level of abstraction than it
does for factual or useful works, and again the courts have followed
the paradigm's lead.138
Coincidence thus imposes one limit on the scope of copyright
protection in order to safeguard the ability of others to pursue their
135. Thus, two authors might independently choose to portray a karate match. Because
karate is an established sport, with recognized scoring and moves, their portrayals would likely
share a number of elements. See Data East, 862 F.2d at 208-09 (identifying the elements
required by existing karate practices to be ideas). On the other hand, some associations are so
unusual that others subjected to the same stimulus will not share the same inspiration or
insight. See Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Buchanan tells
us that Kekule's 'idea of the carbon-ring came out of the lurid imagery of a morning after a
party'; [m]any a chemist had had a like experience without such a fruitful result. Hamilton
reported of his great mathematical discovery that 'the Quaternions started into life, or light, full
grown, on the 16th day of October, as I was walking with Lady Hamilton to Dublin, and came
up to Brougham Bridge'; no other mathematician who had observed a bridge when strolling
with his wife in mid-October had made the same discovery" (footnotes omitted)).
136. See, for example, Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1293.
137. See, for example, Selle, 741 F.2d at 904 (recognizing the possibility of incidental
similarities in simple themes created to satisfy the demands of the "popular ear"); Warner Bros.,
654 F.2d at 208-10 (identifying various superhero characteristics as "too common and general"
to constitute expression); Darrell v. Joe Morris Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) ("While there
is an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are
pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear. Recurrence is not
therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism"); Pendelton v. Acuff-Rose Publishers, Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 477, 485-86 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that certain elements are not protected in musical
work because "even an occasional country music listener" would likely encounter them in any
number of such works).
138. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168 (suggesting broader protection for Michelangelo's David
were it copyrighted "because so much more was added in the expression over the idea"); Atari,
672 F.2d at 617 ("As a work embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it moves
farther away from the bee pin in Kalpakian, and receives broader copyright protection");
Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65 (explaining that impressionist paintings receive greater
protection under copyright law than realistic paintings because "the lay observer will be able to
differentiate more readily between the reality of subject matter and subjective effect of the
artist's work"); Universal Athletic Sales, 511 F.2d at 908. See also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 Duke L. J. 455, 462 ("In that heirarchy
[of artistic productions implicitly recognized by Romantic notions of authorship], art contains
greater value if it results from true imagination rather than mere application, particularly if its
creator draws inspiration directly from nature").
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own creative endeavors. By identifying as ideas those elements of a
work that, even though original, are likely to reappear in later works
even in the absence of copying, copyright ensures later authors a cer-
tain degree of freedom to pursue their own creativity without undue
fear of an infringement action. Coincidence is not, however, the only
limit on the scope of copyright's protection. In some cases, a court will
find no infringement when a later work copies an element from a
copyrighted work even though the element is not one whose reappear-
ance in a later work can be explained by coincidence. 139 In these
cases, the court is leaving the element unprotected in order to address
the second access concern: avoiding a risk of undue monopolization.
2. Aspects Left Unprotected to Avoid Undue Monopolization
Copyright can create market power in a protected work by pre-
venting others from marketing a perfect substitute for the original.
Such market power will, in turn, generate a deadweight loss as
authors exploit their market power by setting a supracompetitive
price. In order to avoid creating an undue deadweight loss, copyright
must limit the extent of the market power that a work's copyright can
create. 140 Copyright can do so by ensuring that later authors can copy
139. See, for example, Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 105; Lotus Development, 49 F.3d at 815.
See also Part III.A.2.
140. If a market, properly defined, see notes 142, 156, contains more than a few competing
works, then a consumer's ability to switch to a competing work within the market will, as a
practical matter, constrain the price a particular author can charge for her work (at least in the
absence of collusion with her competitors). If a particular author tries to charge significantly
more than the price of competing works within the market, consumers will simply turn to one of
her competitors to satisfy their desires. See, for example, Posner, Antitrust Law at 8-9 (cited in
note 12); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System
Violate the Antitrust Laws, 5 High Tech. L. J. 29, 35 (1990). As a theoretical limit, if there are a
large number of individuals producing what consumers consider to be perfect substitutes for one
another, then no single author will be able to price her work above her marginal cost. Any
attempt to do so will result in consumers switching immediately to a competitor's product.
Economists refer to such a market as a "perfectly competitive" market. See, for example, F.M.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 9-10 (Rand McNally, 1970).
On the other hand, if a market, properly defined, contains only one work, then consumers
will have little ability to switch to another product should that work's author decide to raise her
price. As a result, such an author can raise her price without undue fear of losing sales to a
competitor. A relative lack of competitors does not mean, however, that such an author can
charge any price whatsoever for her work. As she raises her price, some consumers will balk,
deciding to do without or to manage with the inadequate substitutes otherwise available rather
than pay the higher price. Because a higher price will usually reduce her sales volume, an
author who is unable to price discriminate will balance charging a higher price for fewer copies,
against charging a lower price for more copies, to determine her profit-maximizing price. While
her desire for maximum profit will, therefore, constrain her pricing decision, an author who
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those elements from an earlier copyrighted work that they need in or-
der to produce reasonable's' substitutes for the earlier work. By en-
suring the availability of reasonable substitutes, copyright can pre-
vent an author from obtaining undue market power in any given mar-
ket. 142
Note that the choice here is not between some market power
and no market power, or between monopoly and property as some
have phrased it.14 As soon as copyright prohibits exact duplication of
an author's work, it forces consumers to turn to one source-the copy-
finds her work alone in a particular market will charge more than marginal cost for access to
her work. See, for example, id. at 13-14 (discussing monopoly pricing).
141. By definition, the degree of competition between two products refers to the extent to
which a price increase on one of the products would lead consumers to switch to the other
product. Economists refer to this degree of competition as the cross-elasticity of demand
between the two products. If any increase in the price of one product would lead consumers to
switch to the other product, we would say that the products compete perfectly, and are perfect
substitutes for one another. As the price difference between two products necessary to convince
consumers to switch from one to the other becomes greater, we would say that the second
product is becoming a less adequate substitute for the original, and at some point, we would no
longer consider the second product a substitute or competitor of the original product at all. See,
for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 459, 463, 479-80 (cited in note 140);
Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 889 (cited in note 17). Under the incentives-access
paradigm, a substitute is a reasonable substitute if its availability will prevent the copyright on
the original work from creating an undue deadweight loss.
142. A market consists of those products or versions of a product among which the cross-
elasticity of demand is much greater than it is with respect to any product or version of a
product outside the market. See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 459, 463,
479-80 (cited in note 140). See also United States v. Du Pont De Nernours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
393-94 (1956). As with the word "reasonable," the incentives-access paradigm defines the word
"market" internally. A market consists of all products that are reasonable substitutes for one
another, in that allowing competition between such substitutes will limit the author of any one
work from having sufficient market power to impose an undue deadweight loss.
143. While I realize that a number of people have devoted considerable time to it, see, for
example, Chisum and Jacobs, Intellectual Property § 1C (cited in note 43); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 108, 109 (1990);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1354-94 (1989); Mackaay, 13 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 907 (cited in note 17) (explaining that patent and copyright are a species of
property right); Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 Hamline L. Rev. 261, 263 (1989) ("[Patents and copyright are forms, not of
legitimate property rights, but of illegitimate state-granted monopoly"), the monopoly versus
property debate is largely irrelevant. If we define property as a set of defined legal relationships
between various individuals and a thing, even an intangible thing such as a work of authorship,
see Restatement (First) of Property ch. 1, Introductory Note at 3 (1936), then copyright, patents,
trademarks, and other forms of "intellectual property" each define such a set of legal relations,
and are therefore property. The fact that they are property, however, tells us nothing, or at
least nothing interesting, about the degree of competition present in the markets in which such
property is traded. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 Res. L. &
Econ. 31, 33 (1986); Carter, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 104 (cited in note 22); Mackaay, 13
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 904-05 (cited in note 17). We cannot, therefore, answer the question
of whether copyright creates a monopoly by asserting that it is property, or assume that
copyright can either be property or monopoly, but not both. Property is not the opposite of
monopoly, but the foundation of it, in that without property, there could be no monopoly.
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right owner-for that precise work. Moreover, because everyone has
a favorite author, and is willing to pay a little more, drive a little fur-
ther, or search a little harder for a particular work by a particular
author, 144 even a very narrow copyright would grant most authors,
and certainly all popular authors, some degree of market power. 45
How much market power copyright will provide an author will depend
on how closely copyright permits a later author to duplicate what the
relevant consumers consider to be the attraction of the original. The
more closely copyright permits a later author to duplicate the attrac-
tion of the ongina, the more limited the market power associated with the worlks
copyright.14 The less lose, the more substantial the market power.
147
144. In justifying its decision to recommend extending the term of copyright, the Register
of Copyrights argued that such extension was necessary to prevent an author's later works from
facing unfair competition from copied versions of the author's earlier works. See H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476 at 133-35 (cited in note 3). Such an argument is unpersuasive. First, we should
recognize that to justify extending copyright's duration, the justification must address the
marginal benefits of extending copyrighes duration. Given that the 1976 Act extended
copyright from a term of fifty-six years to a term of life plus fifty years (for non-employee
authors), the justification must address the marginal benefits associated with the newly
protected period more than fifty-six years after a work is published. Second, we must also
recognize that, for dedicated fans of a given author, that author's recent works do not compete
with her earlier works. That is the reason popular authors are able to produce a hard-back
version of their newest works for a period of time. If the older works actually competed with the
newest work, consumers would not purchase the much higher priced hard-back work. Instead,
they would purchase the lower priced paper-back works as a substitute for the newer work.
While it may be true that new consumers may be indifferent between an author's older and
newer works, most of an author's readers will be established, rather than new, readers, during
the marginal period at issue, in other words the time period beginning fifty-six years after a
work's publication and ending fifty years after the author's death. As a result, even if an author
continues to publish new works during this period, competition from earlier works that have
fallen out of copyright is not likely to reduce significantly the price the author can charge for her
new works. Moreover, very few authors are likely to be publishing new works more than fifty-
six years after the publication of their first work.
145. See, for example, William R. Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 158,
161 (1985) ("There are many sellers of originals, each with the monopoly power that stems from
the fact that his work is not a perfect substitute for the others"). See also Goldstein, 55 L. &
Contemp. Probs. at 84 (cited in note 41) (recognizing that popular authors can price their works
at a price significantly above that of paperback versions of the classics).
146. For example, if others could copy the characters and themes from the Star Trek series,
so long as they told their own Star Trek stories, their "Star Trek" works would compete almost
perfectly with works authorized or created by the copyright holder in the Star Trek series. (As
my research assistant points out, Trekkies are "pretty hard-core;" as a result, the imitators
would have to duplicate some aspects of the authorized Star Trek works, such as the characters,
exactly, and the remaining aspects reasonably closely for Trekkies to accept such imitations as
adequate substitutes). For application of such a standard, see Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1954) (concluding that the reuse
of characters from The Maltese Falcon does not infringe The Maltese Falcon, so long as the
second work uses the characters to tell a new story).
147. See, for example, Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition at 62-67 (cited in note 32);
Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 50-51 (cited in note 11). A later author could not, perhaps,
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As a general principle, as copyright cedes the original author a
larger zone of exclusivity by requiring later works to differ more
substantially in order to avoid infringement, the market power and
the corresponding deadweight loss associated with any given work
will increase. 148 At some point, as copyright broadens its scope of pro-
tection, the market power such protection creates will become exces-
sive, enabling the author to charge such a high price for access to cop-
ies of her work that it imposes an undue deadweight loss and unduly
limits access to, or dissemination of, the work.149 To avoid creating
such an undue deadweight loss, the incentives-access paradigm sug-
gests that copyright must allow later authors the freedom to copy
those elements, or levels of abstraction, that later works must share
before the relevant consumers will consider them to be reasonable
substitutes for the earlier work.
As with the chance of coincidental reappearance, 50 the need for
access to avoid a risk of undue monopolization will vary depending on
the type of work and the nature of the element at issue. As a result,
the exact level of abstraction at which, or the elements for which, this
need for access dictates a limit to protection also varies. For fictional
or fanciful works, courts and commentators typically assume that a
competitor will usually need to copy only at a fairly abstract level in
order to produce a reasonable substitute for an earlier copyrighted
work.151 If copyright, for example, prohibited later authors from
copying the detailed elements of an earlier copyrighted work, such
protection would prohibit near-verbatim copying of the earlier
copyrighted work and would effectively prohibit a later author from
retelling the exact same story found in the earlier copyrighted work. 52
copy the Star Trek series, but she could produce her own work concerning a space-faring vessel
of exploration.
148. See, for example, Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competiton at 57-60 (cited in note 32).
149. The method by which courts identify the exact point at which the deadweight loss that
providing protection for an element would create becomes undue is, at best, unclear. See text
accompanying notes 297-301.
150. See text accompanying notes 125-39.
151. See, for example, Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485,
488 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Some ideas can be expressed in myriad ways, while others allow only a nar-
row range of expression. Fictional works generally fall into the first category. The basic idea of
a fictional work might be that classic, boy meets girl. This idea can be expressed, as it has been
through thousands of years of literature, with infinite variations in setting, sequence of
incident, and characterization").
152. See, for example, id. at 488. Of course, the later author could entertain us with an
identical work and claim that she created her work independently. But, for fictional works,
such a claim of independent (re)creation would, in most cases, be unreasonable. See Lawrence
v. Dana, 15 F. Cases 26, 60 (D. Mass. 1869) ("[I]t is highly improbable that two authors would
express their thoughts and sentiments in the same language, throughout a book or treatise of
any considerable size"); Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 346 n.30 (cited in note 5).
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But such protection would leave the later author free to entertain us
by telling some other story or by depicting some other scene. 5
3 So
long as consumers perceive one entertaining work as reasonably
interchangeable with another and are largely indifferent as to which
particular entertaining work they purchase, these other stories or
scenes will serve as reasonable substitutes for the one the earlier
work presents. 54 The availability of such works will, therefore, limit
the ability of any given author to raise the price of her entertaining
work too far above a competitive level. If she attempted to do so, con-
sumers would simply switch to one of the other works.
As with the chance of coincidental similarities, however, the
risk of undue monopolization becomes more significant even for fic-
tional or fanciful works as copyright extends its protection to more ab-
stract levels of the work. At a sufficiently abstract level, certain ele-
ments become essential in order for a work to compete in a relevant
market. 55 Every cyberpunk novel, 156 for example, must contain those
elements that separate cyberpunk from more traditional science fic-
tion, including counterculture heroes, hackers, punk sensibility, and a
close, often quasi-symbiotic, relationship between computer technol-
ogy and humanity in order for a consumer to recognize the novel as
153. See, for example, Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488 C'An author wishing to write yet another
work using the 'boy meets girl' idea can choose from a wide range of materials in composing his
or her own expression of the idea").
154. The accuracy of this assumption is subject to question. While Professor Goldstein has
suggested that it is true, see Goldstein, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 84 (cited in note 41) ("Patent
protection may well confer market share and effectively result in monopoly pricing. In
copyright, however, a high degree of substitutability invariably obtains. Although we would
prefer not to admit it, one author's expression will always be substitutable for another's"), his
very next sentence refutes his position, see id. (asserting that consumers would switch to
another popular author's books priced at $19.95, or to the classics, priced at $4.95, if a particular
author priced his works at $75). By recognizing that a popular author can price his works at a
level four times that of "paperback reprints of the classics," Professor Goldstein has established
that the popular author has substantial market power, in that consumers would pay four times
the price of even a good paperback work to obtain the popular author's work.
155. See, for example, Hoehling, 616 F.2d at 979 (finding certain scenes indispensible to
any treatment of the Hindenburg disaster); Data East, 862 F.2d at 209 (detailing the elements
essential to a computer karate game); Frybarger, 812 F.2d at 530 (finding similar elements in
video games to be indispensable to the expression of the idea).
156. Precisely speaking, general categories, such as romance novels, impressionist paint-
ings, and jazz ballet, do not define a relevant market. Rather, such general categories may
happen to coincide with a relevant market if the cross-elasticity of demand for all of the works
within such a general category is significantly higher than the cross-elasticity of demand
between the works in the category and any works outside of the category. But there is no
reason why that should generally be the case. Indeed, in some cases, a relevant market may
consist of a single work, or the works of a single author, because consumers do not consider any
other work to be an adequate substitute for the original(s).
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cyberpunk. If consumers, through purchasing decisions that reflect
the inadequacy of other forms of entertainment as substitutes for cy-
berpunk novels, have defined cyberpunk as a distinct market, then a
later author will need to "borrow 157 these defining elements of the cy-
berpunk genre in order to compete effectively against the original cy-
berpunk novel, William Gibson's Neuromancer.158 If copyright ex-
tended its protection to these defining cyberpunk elements, then it
would cede to Gibson control over the entire cyberpunk market. He
could prohibit others from producing substitutes for his work(s), or
demand a monopolistically priced license for entry into the cyberpunk
market. Such protection would give Gibson a substantial degree of
market power in his work(s) and would impose a corresponding
deadweight loss on consumers. To avoid that result, the incentives-
access paradigm suggests that copyright should limit its protection for
those elements, and that level of abstraction, in Gibson's work, and
for fictional works more generally, that consumers consider necessary
before they will accept a later work as a reasonable substitute for the
original work in a market. Courts, following that insight, have done
so.159
In contrast to the fairly abstract level at which competitors
will need to copy entertaining works in order to compete effectively,
competitors will usually need to copy works that do something more
than merely entertain at a more detailed level if they are to compete
effectively.160 If a work informs,161 or clothes,16 2 or transports, 63 or
157. Note that while it may be possible for another to reinvent the necessary elements of
the cyberpunk genre independently, it is not necessary that the later author do so. The point of
this access concern is to ensure that authors can legally copy, and need not create
independently, those elements necessary to compete in a relevant market.
158. William Gibson, Neuromancer (Ace Books, 1984).
159. See, for example, Moore v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 946 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the elements necessary for works to belong to the "R&B/hip-hop" genre
are not protected); Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540 ("If... the court should select a high level of
abstraction, the first author may claim protection for whole genres of work ('the romantic novel'
or, more modestly, any story involving doomed young lovers from warring clans, so that a
copyright on Romeo and Juliet would cover West Side Story too")); Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp.
1288, 1292-94 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (explaining that the subject matter that "constitutes one of the
genre's 'stock' themes" must be left unprotected).
160. See, for example, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 ('The law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy"); Masquerade
Novelty v. Unique Industries, 912 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the goal of copyright
law is to ensure the "wide availability of useful designs"); Cooling Systems, 777 F.2d at 491
("[C]opyright law considers factual works to be fundamentally different from more artistic
works"); Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488 ("Factual works are different. Subsequent authors wishing
to express the ideas contained in a factual work often can choose from only a narrow range of
expression").
161. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (holding that facts are unprotected). See also Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
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shelters, 64 or just helps us to get something done, 6 5 any later work
will often need to duplicate much of the original before consumers will
consider it a substitute for the original. For example, once an individ-
ual has learned a particular accounting system, only that particular
accounting system will suffice. 166  Such an individual would not con-
sider other accounting systems to be adequate substitutes for the
original because of the substantial expense that learning a new ac-
counting system would entail. 167 As a result, if a later author wanted
to produce accounting forms to serve consumers who have learned a
particular accounting system, her forms would necessarily appear
very similar to the accounting forms produced by the creator of the
accounting system. If the later author's forms differed in any
important respect from the original forms, the retraining such
difference would entail would lead many of the relevant consumers to
1569, 1576-84 (1963) (recognizing that the law provides such limited protection, but arguing for
more expansive protection under a "sweat of the brow" approach); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright
in Collection of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L.
Rev. 516, 530-31 (1981) (same).
162. See, for example, Bellsouth Advertising, 999 F.2d at 1442-46; Folio Impressions, 937
F.2d at 763; Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989); Carol
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 (holding that a mannequin is a useful article not protected by
copyright); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (concluding that
clothing designs are not protected by copyright), affirmed, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Jack Adelman,
Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (holding that a copyright
in the drawing of a dress did not protect the dress itself).
163. See, for example, Brandir Intl., Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, 834 F.2d 1142, 1147-
48 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that a bike rack is a useful article that is not protected by
copyright); Norris Industries v. I.T.T. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922-24 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that
a wire-spoke hub cap is a useful article that is not protected by copyright); Muller v. Triborough
Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that the copyright in the drawing of
a bridge approach did not protect the bridge approach itself).
164. See, for example, Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that copyright protection does not extend to a carpet sample folder); Imperial Homes
Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the copyright in the
architectural plans for a home did not protect the home itself). See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West
1996) (defining an architectural work as the design of a building as embodied in any tangible
medium of expression).
165. See, for example, Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103-05 (holding that an accounting
system explained in a work was unprotected); Brief English Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556
(2d Cir. 1931) (holding that copyright protection does not extend to the shorthand system);
Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15, 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 1892) (same).
166. Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103-05.
167. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476-78 (1992);
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, 19 RAND J. Econ.
123, 123 (1988); Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q. J. Econ. 375,
375-77 (1987). See also Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1358-69 (1987) (arguing that copyright protection of operating systems is in-
appropriate because it would generate a risk of undue monopolization).
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reject the later forms as substitutes for the original forms.168
Similarly, if a consumer desires a particular person's telephone
number, or information on a particular historical event, that
consumer will not usually accept other factual information as a
substitute for the desired information.169 Because of the inadequacy of
other factual information as a substitute for the desired information,
the relevant market would consist solely of the particular factual
information desired. To compete effectively in that market, a later
author would have to reproduce the particular facts for which the
consumer is looking.171 If the later author could not, then she could
not produce a substitute for the original work in the market, and in
essence, could not compete in that market.7'
Because consumers in the market for an other-than-entertain-
ing work are likely to require a later work to share a greater level of
detail before they will perceive the later work to be a reasonable sub-
stitute for the first work, the incentives-access paradigm suggests
that courts must circumscribe copyright's protection for other-than-
entertaining works more carefully than for entertaining works. Once
again, courts have done so.172 The need to avoid a risk of undue
monopolization, thus, imposes a second limit on copyright's scope. By
identifying those elements of a work that must reappear in later
works in order for consumers to consider the later works reasonable
168. See Farrell and Shapiro, 19 RAND J. Econ. at 123-24 (cited in note 167) (noting that
competition for future consumers may limit the ability to exploit such market power);
Klemperer, 102 Q. J. Econ. at 376-77 (cited in note 167).
169. See, for example, Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47 (concerning information in a telephone
directory); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.
1986) (regarding a financial reporting service); Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978-79 (concerning the
historical facts of the Hindenberg disaster).
170. See, for example, Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488-89 (holding that there was no
infringement of a copyrighted manual on playing Scrabble because the similarity was no more
than necessary to convey Landsberg's winning strategies which the court identified as ideas);
Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that the content of a game's rules were unprotected).
171. She could obtain a license, but that would not address the monopolization risk because
the license would be monopolistically priced.
172. See, for example, Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 104-05 (holding that there was no
protection for an accounting system explained in a work); Brandir Intl., 834 F.2d at 1146-47
(holding that there was no protection for useful articles); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966) (concluding that there is no protection for facts);
Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131-32 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See also 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1994 ed.) (explaining that copyright protection does not extend to any idea); §§ 101,
113(b) (explaining that copyright protection does not extend to any useful article except to the
extent it contains artistic elements that can be separated from its utilitarian aspect).
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substitutes for the original, copyright limits the market power and the
deadweight loss associated with the copyright on any given work.173
3. Summary: Access, Ideas, and Expression
The preceding analysis suggests that separating the unpro-
tected aspects of a work from its protected aspects is not a question of
identifying the ideas of a work, as a dictionary or everyday usage
might define idea. Instead, idea, as copyright uses that term, is sim-
ply the label that a court attaches to a particular element, or a par-
ticular level of abstraction, after it has decided that copyright should
leave that element or level unprotected. 174 As a result, identifying the
ideas in a copyrighted work requires neither metaphysics nor episte-
mology but a rational consideration of the reasons why copyright
should, or should not, protect a particular element or level.
In deciding whether to attach the label "expression" or the
label "idea" to a particular element or level, courts have
relied-sometimes implicitly, other times expressly--on the
incentives-access paradigm. If a court perceives a particularly
compelling need for access, either to assure the creation of future
173. Thus, while the Feist Court recognized that refusing to protect particular facts might
permit a copying competitor to appropriate much, if not all, of the value of another's work, the
Court felt that the compelling need for future authors to have access to the factual elements of
an earlier work justified its result:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others
without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not
"some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is, rather, "the essence of copy-
right," and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to re-
ward the labor of authors, but "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." To
this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.... This
result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances
the progress of science and art.
499 U.S. at 349-50 (citations omitted). See id. at 354 (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine
because it creates a monopoly in public domain materials). Other decisions make the access
point as well. See, for example, Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974 (The rationale for this doctrine [that
facts are unprotected] is that the cause of knowledge is best served when history is the common
property of all, and each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of
the past').
174. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Informnation After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 346 (1992) (qn copyright
law, an 'idea' is not an epistemological concept, but a legal conclusion prompted by
notions-often unarticulated and unproven-of appropriate competition. Thus, copyright
doctrine attaches the label 'idea' to aspects of works which, if protected, would (or, we fear,
might) preclude, or render too expensive subsequent authors' endeavors"). See also E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1503 (D. Minn. 1985) (leaving some
elements unprotected, but protecting others depending on the need for access to the elements).
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works or to minimize the risk of undue monopolization, then the court
will usually identify the element as an unprotected idea. On the other
hand, if a court fails to perceive a compelling need for access, then the
court will usually identify the element as a protected expression. The
following Section continues exploring the pervasive influence of the
incentives-access paradigm on copyright by examining the degree and
the type of similarity copyright requires a plaintiff to prove in order to
demonstrate an infringing appropriation.
B. Defining the Similarity Necessary to Establish Infringement
Once a court has separated a work's protected expression from
its unprotected ideas, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the al-
legedly infringing work is too similar to the expression of the copy-
righted work.175 Historically, whether a later work was too similar
turned on two inquiries. First, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that
particular elements in the later work were too similar to the corre-
sponding expressive elements of the plaintiffs copyrighted work.
Second, the plaintiff also had to demonstrate that because of these
similarities the later work would interfere with the plaintiffs "legally
protected interest" in her copyrighted work.176 I will refer to the first
similarity issue as the "degree of similarity" issue, and the second as
the "type of similarity" issue. The following Subsections explore, in
turn, the influence of the incentives-access paradigm on each of these
two similarity issues.
1. The Degree of Similarity Necessary to Establish an Infringement
With respect to the degree of similarity sufficient to establish
infringement, the two access concerns, creation of future works and
dissemination of existing works, that have guided the separation of
ideas and expression have led to a parallel rule in determining the de-
gree of similarity copyright requires. Specifically, this parallel rule
varies the degree of similarity required to establish infringement de-
pending upon the number of ways in which an idea may be expressed.
If there are many ways to express an idea, then courts will apply a
175. See the cases cited in note 76.
176. As Judge Frank expressed it in Arnstein v. Porter, "[t]he question, therefore, is
whether defendant took from plaintiffs work so much of what is pleasing to the [target
audience] that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."
154 F.2d at 473. See also Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489 (explaining that the test is
whether "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them, and regard [the two works] aesthetic appeal as the same").
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broad similarity standard, usually denominated "substantial similar-
ity," to determine whether particular elements found in the later work
are too similar to the corresponding expressive elements of the earlier
work. If there are fewer ways to express the idea, courts will require
a closer degree of similarity, perhaps near-exact similarities such as
literal duplication and close paraphrasing, to establish
infringement177 If there are so few ways to express an idea that an
author could copyright each of the available forms and thereby
"exhaust all possibilities of future use of the [idea]," then some courts
will require exact duplication to establish infringement.178 Others will
find that the idea and the expression merge and will not protect such
a work against even exact duplication.
179
Because courts have relied on the incentives-access paradigm
to identify a work's ideas, the paradigm plays an implicit but central
role in applying the varying similarity standard. Specifically, it iden-
tifies the relevant idea against which a court should measure the
number of available forms of expression.180 A particular jeweled bee
pin, for example, might be only one of many ways to express the idea
if the court identifies the relevant idea as jewelry. Yet, that same pin
might be the only way, or one of only a very few ways, to express the
idea if the court identifies the relevant idea as a jewel-encrusted gold
177. See Concrete Machinery, 843 F.2d at 606-07; Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman,
793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986); Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
178. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168; Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704-06
(2d Cir. 1958).
179. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 ("The difficulty, as we have noted, is
that on this record the 'idea' and its 'expression' appear to be indistinguishable.... When the
'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since
protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the
copyright owner"); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). As
even the Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry court recognized, this aspect of merger might be better
restated as a finding that the works are no more similar than necessary given a common
unprotected element. See 446 F.2d at 742 ('There is no greater similarity between the pins of
the plaintiff and the defendants than is inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in
both"). See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., Inc., 509 F.2d 64, 66 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that two jeweled turtle pins were no more similar than necessary
given the common idea).
180. As with the levels-of-abstraction approach, the range-of-expression approach is not
self-contained-it cannot separate idea from expression on its own-because it fails to define the
relevant idea against which a court should measure the number of forms of expression. In the
absence of some external guide, a court using the approach could determine that the element, or
level of abstraction, copied represents one of many ways to express one idea, while it represents
one of only a very few ways to express some other idea; yet the court would be left uncertain as
to which idea is the correct one to use.
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pin shaped to depict realistically a bee.' s' By identifying the level of
abstraction copyright should leave unprotected,82 the incentives-ac-
cess paradigm identifies which of these two possible levels of abstrac-
tion is the relevant "idea" for purposes of applying the varying
similarity standard. Once the incentives-access paradigm has
identified the relevant idea, a court can readily determine the number
of forms of expression available s3 and the corresponding degree of
similarity that copyright requires in order to find an infringing
appropriation.
84
181. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 (reasoning that given that the idea is
of a jewel-encrusted gold pin in the shape of a bee, "the 'idea' and its 'expression' appear to be
indistinguishable").
182. As discussed, the idea would be the level where the chance of independent creation or
the risk of undue monopolization became significant. See text accompanying note 174. See also
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 (discussing the size of the market).
183. For example, the plaintiff in Eden Toys, 675 F.2d at 499, alleged that the defendant
had infringed its copyright in a stuffed toy snowman. There were some similarities between the
two toys, and strong circumstantial evidence of copying, but the court believed the similarities
between the two toys were no more than were inevitable given that both realistically depicted
snowmen. Id. at 500 (explaining that any similarity between the two toys appeared "to result
solely from the fact that both are snowmen"). If the court could somehow determine that
copyright did not protect the plaintiffs subject matter selection at the level of "a realistic
snowman," then the varying similarity standard would provide a ready answer to the case.
Because the similarities were no more than inevitable given the shared idea of a realistic stuffed
toy snowman, no infringement would result. To determine the correct level of abstraction at
which copyright should begin protecting the plaintiffs work, a court would need to evaluate the
need for access to the work's subject matter selection at varying levels of abstraction. Given
that the snowman is a popular winter character readily found in the preexisting public domain,
the court concluded that the chance of coincidental re-creation became sufficiently high at the
level of "realistic snowman" to deny protection for that level of abstraction. See id. CFor
countless generations, children and the young at heart have built snowmen"). To do otherwise
would require any author who later produced a snowman to rely on the expensive and uncertain
independent creation defense to escape liability for infringement, or to obtain a license from
each prior snowman depicter, which would thereby chill later authors' ardor for pursuing their
own inspirations. See text accompanying notes 103-24.
184. In addition to identifying the correct idea, application of the varying-degree-of-similar-
ity standard also requires recognition that the number of possible, non-infringing versions will
depend on the similarity standard applied. As the similarity standard broadens, any given work
will receive a broader circle of protection that later works must avoid in order to avoid an undue
chance of an infringement finding. If a work must have a certain degree of similarity for
consumers to consider it part of the market, then the broader the circle of exclusion surrounding
each protected work, the fewer the total number of works that will fit within the market without
infringing each other. For example, if a consumer is looking for a number between one and two,
and any number between one and two will do, then there are an infinite number of ways of
expressing such a number. However, if applying the substantial similarity standard would
preclude any later author from expressing a number within 0.25 of an existing expression of
such a number, then there are, at best, only four numbers that authors can express within the
market without an undue risk of infringing each other. If the first author, for example,
"expresses" the number 1.05, then later authors must avoid expressing a number within 0.25 of
1.05, and as a result, must express a number greater than 1.30, and less than 2.00, to fit within
the market. If the second author expresses the number 1.31, then later authors must avoid
expressing a number within 0.25 of either 1.05 or 1.31, and as a result, must express a number
greater than 1.56, and less than 2.00, to fit within the market. If a third author expressed the
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In operation, the degree-of-similarity standard serves to
reinforce the separation of ideas and expression that the incentives-
access paradigm dictates. If protecting a particular element, or a par-
ticular level of abstraction, would threaten the creation of future
works, or would create a risk of undue monopolization, then copyright
will declare that element or level an unprotected idea.185 If there is
only one form, or at best a very few forms, of expressing that idea,
then protecting any one form would necessarily create a similar
threat to future works or a similar risk of undue monopolization.186
Assuming that a need for access would justify excluding protection for
a work's ideas, then the same need for access would also justify a re-
fusal to extend protection to any one form of expression if such protec-
tion would create a similar threat to access. 187 As the number of forms
number 1.57, and a fourth author expressed the number 1.83, then no more authors could enter
the market without running an undue risk of an infringement finding because, whatever
number between one and two they expressed, it would necessarily come within 0.25 of one of the
existing "works." If, on the other hand, a court applied a near-literal similarity standard to
determine infringement, we could liken such a standard to precluding any later author from
expressing a number within 0.05 of a previously expressed number. Given such a similarity
standard, there would be as many as twenty-one numbers that authors could express within the
market without infringing each other. While I realize, of course, that numbers would neither be
original, nor expression, within the meaning of copyright law, varying similarity standards have
a similar effect on the number of works that can fit within each market. As the similarity
standard broadens, fewers works will be able to fit within the range of characteristics necessary
to compete in a market without becoming too similar. As a result, the number of forms of
expressing an idea and the degree of similarity required are an interactive inquiry in that the
number of forms will depend upon the similarity standard chosen.
185. See Part III.A.
186. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Determining when
the idea and its expression have merged is a task requiring considerable care: if the merger
doctrine is applied too readily, arguably available alternative forms of expression will be
precluded; if applied too sparingly, protection will be accorded to ideas"); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742; Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79; Continental Cas., 253 F.2d at 704-06;
Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 184-85 (7th Cir. 1944) ("In the instant
situation there is no room for the skill of the mechanic or artisan in utilizing the plan or the
method disclosed. Its use, to which the public is entitled, can be effected solely by the
employment of words descriptive thereof. In our view, where the use can be effected only in
such manner, there can be no infringement even though the plan or method be copied. We
realize that such a view leaves little, if any, protection to the copyright owner; in fact, it comes
near to invalidating the copyright. This situation, however, results from the fact that the
practical use of the art explained by the copyright and lodged in the public domain can be at-
tained solely by the employment of language which gives expression to that which is disclosed").
187. As Chief Judge Aldrich has explained:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic necessarily
requires," if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of
forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance. In such circum-
stances it does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of expression comes
from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would
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in which an author can express an idea increases, the ability to
express the idea in some other way both reduces the chance that
someone will happen on the exact same form as the original author
without copying and ensures that future authors will be able to com-
pete effectively with the original work by creating one of the other
forms. 188 The incentives-access paradigm suggests, therefore, that
copyright can protect a work that represents one of many forms of ex-
pressing an idea more extensively than it can protect a work that rep-
resents only one of a few forms of expression. As a general principle,
the more forms of expression, the more extensive the protection copy-
right can provide without unduly threatening the need for access to
the work. 189
Of course, even if there are a great number of forms in which a
particular idea may be expressed, copyright must retain some limit on
the degree of similarity that will support an infringement finding. If,
for example, copyright permitted a finding of remote similarity be-
tween a later work and the expressive elements of an earlier copy-
righted work to support an infringement finding, such a broad
similarity standard would itself threaten access, even if a court had
properly identified and denied protection to a work's ideas.
Coincidence alone would often result in such remote similarities, and
such remote similarities would, in any event, often be necessary for
consumers to consider the later work a reasonable substitute for an
earlier copyrighted work. A finding of infringement based upon such
be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize
copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.
Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79 (citations omitted). See also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership
Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen an idea can be expressed in very few
ways, copyright law does not protect that expression, because doing so would confer a de facto
monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea and expression are said to be merged"); Toro Co. v.
R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
188. Both are truisms assuming that courts define the unprotected elements of a work, its
ideas, by examining the need for access to preserve independent creation and reasonable
competition. See Dymow, 11 F.2d at 691 ("[]t is as near the whole truth as generalization can
usually reach that, if the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners,
a plurality of copyrights may result, and no infringement will exist"). See also Toro, 787 F.2d at
1212 (finding no merger because the variety of parts numbering systems available would
prevent a copyright on one such system from monopolizing the idea of another parts numbering
system).
189. See, for example, Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168 (Tuhe scope of copyright protection
increases with the extent expression differs from the idea"); Atari, 672 F.2d at 617 ("As a work
embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it moves farther away from the bee pin
in Kalpakian, and receives broader copyright protection. At the opposite end of the spectrum
[from the Kalpakian bee] lie the 'strongese works in which fairly complex or fanciful artistic
expressions predominate over relatively simplistic themes and which are almost entirely
products of the author's creativity rather than concomitants of those themes"); Kepner-Tregoe,
203 U.S.P.Q. at 131-32.
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remote similarity would, therefore, interfere unduly with the creation
of future works or create a risk of undue monopolization. To avoid
such a result, copyright should ensure that the similarity standard
works hand-in-hand with the identification of ideas, and the resulting
range of expression available, to ensure that later authors have
adequate freedom both to pursue their own creativity and to create
reasonable substitutes for an earlier copyrighted work. The degree-of-
similarity standard reflects this principle and tailors copyright to
provide a degree of protection that reflects the need for access.190
In addition to varying the degree of similarity copyright will
require to establish an infringing appropriation, the incentives-access
paradigm also suggests that copyright should define particular simi-
larity standards, such as "substantial similarity," not simply by the
number of musical notes or literary elements two works share, but by
the risk that a finding of infringement based upon any given similari-
ties would unduly threaten a need for access. 191 The sharing of an
eight note sequence in an earlier and later work may, for example,
implicate a need for access in one case but not in another.192 If the
190. See, for example, Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488 ("One consequence of the policy in favor
of free use of ideas is that the degree of substantial similarity required to show infringement
varies according to the type of work and the ideas expressed in it'). As discussed, see text
accompanying notes 125-29, 160-72, the need for access is usually thought to be greater for
other-than-entertaining works. To ensure such access, courts have adopted a more narrow
similarity standard for such works. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; Cooling Systems, 777
F.2d at 491-92 (explaining that for factual works, "similarity of expression may have to amount
to verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed
infringed" (quoting Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488)); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., 513 F.2d at 1188-89
(holding that near-identity is required to establish infringement of a pamphlet describing game
rules); Continental Cas., 253 F.2d at 705-06 (holding that near-identity is required to establish
infringement of insurance forms); Miner v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 229 F.2d
35, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that near-identity is required to establish infringement of an
insurance policy); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945); Kepner-
Tregoe, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 131-32.
191. See, for example, Cooling Sytems, 777 F.2d at 491 ("Landsber's principle-that the
fewer the methods of expressing an idea, the more the allegedly infringing work must resemble
the copyrighted work in order to establish substantial similarity-must govern"). See also Selle,
741 F.2d at 903-04 ('An important factor in analyzing the degree of similarity of two
compositions is the uniqueness of the sections which are asserted to be similar"); Franklin Mint,
575 F.2d at 66 (defining the types of similarities copyright requires, the court noted that
"conventions in ornithological art... tend to limit novelty in depictions of the birds"); Haas v.
Leo Feist, 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (defining the type of similarity copyright requires to
establish copying, Judge Hand looked for "parallelism which seems to my ear to pass the bounds
of mere accident!').
192. Compare Arnstein, 82 F.2d at 277 (stating that the identity between a sequence of
twelve notes in two works did not establish substantial similarity when "the seven notes
available do not admit of so many agreeable permutations that we need be amazed at the re-
appearance of old themes"), with Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F.
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chance of the sequence's coincidental reappearance is high, or if repe-
tition of the sequence is necessary to produce a reasonable substitute
for the original, then the incentives-access paradigm suggests that
copyright should not consider the similarities substantial. 193 If, on the
other hand, copying is far more likely than coincidence as an explana-
tion for the sequence's reappearance, and a later author can produce
an adequate substitute without repeating the sequence, then a finding
of infringement based upon the similarities would not unduly
threaten a need for access. In such a case, the incentives-access
paradigm would suggest that copyright may consider such factual
similarities sufficiently substantial to establish infringement, and
courts have followed the paradigm's lead.
94
Like ideas then, substantial similarity is not simply a question
of what the average person would consider substantially similar in
everyday life. Instead, it is a legal standard that courts have defined
Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the combination of a three note sequence followed
by a five note sequence established infringement where the pattern was "highly unique"). See
also Baxter, 812 F.2d at 424 (explaining that the copying of even six notes can establish
infringement).
193. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (discussing that whether a later work is too
similar to a copyrighted work depends upon "[t]he extent to which one must permit expressive
language to be copied, in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts" (quoting Robert
A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. Copyright Soc. 560, 561
(1982))); Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the similarities
between statistics presented by two pitching forms and deciding it was not sufficient to establish
infringement given the "limited number of statistics generally considered outcome-predictive by
those familiar with the sport!'); Moore, 972 F.2d at 946 (noting the similarities attributable to
the two songs "being from the same 'R&B/hip-hop' genre"); Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425 C'Certainly,
evidence that the sequence in question is found in other works would be admissible to rebut an
inference of copying; such evidence demonstrates that the sequence is so common that the
probability of independent, coincidental creation was high"); Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1293-94 (noting
that similarities could not establish infringement where they relate to elements that "are among
the very staples of modern American literature and film"); Wickham v. Knoxville Intl. Energy
Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that the similarities between two
structures resulted from the common use of the idea of a tower with a sphere or saucer-like
structure at the top and was not sufficient, therefore, to find substantial similarity); Durham
Industries, 630 F.2d at 916 (noting that the similarities attributable to "standard doll features"
were not actionable); Chamberlin, 150 F.2d at 513 (explaining that there is no infringement
where similarities "derive from the fact that [two works detailing backgammon rules] were
necessarily drawn from the same source"); Taylor v. Newton-John, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4084,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that where similarities consisted of "a series of commonplace
phrases," a summary judgment finding no copyright infringement was appropriate).
194. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66 (noting that direct quotations amounted to
more than 13% of the allegedly infringing work, and suggesting that this fact weighed against
fair use); Fisher-Price, Inc v. Well-Made Toy Manufacturing Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding that the defendanes doll infringed the plaintiffs, the court stated that "[t]hese
dolls do not merely share features that are common to all dolls; they contain virtually identical
expressions of those features"); Selle, 741 F.2d at 903-05; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166-67, 1167 n.9
(finding infringement of the plaintiffs work because "[tihe use of the basic idea of the works
does not inevitably result in such similarities").
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by referring to the underlying policy concerns reflected by the incen-
tives-access paradigm. 195 In any given case, a court will consider par-
ticular factual similarities sufficient19 to establish an infringing ap-
propriation only if such a result would not unduly threaten access. If
the possibility of such an infringement finding would impair the pro-
duction of future works, or would risk undue monopolization, then a
court will find the similarities insufficient to establish the requisite
degree of similarity.
2. The Type of Similarity Required to Establish an Infringing
Appropriation
In addition to showing that particular elements in the later
work are too similar to the earlier work's corresponding expressive
elements, the plaintiff also has to demonstrate that the defendant's
actions have interfered with the plaintiffs legally protected interest in
her copyrighted work. 197 The question here is not whether the defen-
dant has copied expression from the plaintiffs work, but whether the
context or manner in which the defendant has used what she has
taken infringes the plaintiffs rights.198 As a general rule today, the
195. As Judge Newman explained:
The "substantial similarity" that supports an inference of copying sufficient to establish
infringement of a copyright is not a concept familiar to the public at large. It is a term
to be used in a courtroom to strike a delicate balance between the protection to which
authors are entitled under an act of Congress and the freedom that exists for all others
to create their works outside the area protected against infringement.
Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 245.
196. Note that while such similarities would be sufficient to support such a finding, they do
not require or dictate such a finding. See, for example, Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982). The trier of fact may choose to credit evidence
of independent re-creation or a common source, despite such similarities. See, for example,
Morrison v. Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding no infringement based
upon the defendants testimony of independent creation despite similarities between the works).
197. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472 ("Assuming that adequate proof is made of [actual]
copying, that is not enough; for there can be 'permissible copying,' copying which is not illicit').
198. Arnstein, for example, required the copyright holder to establish that the "defendant
took from plaintiffs works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of [the target audience] that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." 154 F.2d at 473.
In Peter Pan Fabrics, Judge Learned Hand asked whether the two works as a whole were so
similar that "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed
to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." 274 F.2d at 489. However,
that case dealt with relatively simple works of visual arts, specifically fabric designs. As a
result, it is unclear whether Judge Hand was referring to a separate inquiry addressing the
scope of an author's protected interest, or simply stating that the expression in this type of work
lies in the arrangement of shapes, colors, and designs as a whole, and that the second work
must be too similar to the expression of the first work, that is the appearance of the first work
as a whole, to determine infringement.
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author's legally protected interest extends "to any lawful use of their
property, whereby they may get a profit out of it." 199 Because allowing
unlicensed use of an author's expression would deprive an author of a
potential source of licensing revenue, essentially any reuse of an
author's expression would, today, interfere with the author's legally
protected interest.200 As a result, under present copyright law, if a
plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant has taken expression from
the plaintiffs copyrighted work, then that showing will establish in-
fringement almost without regard to the context or manner in which
the defendant reuses the plaintiffs expression. Yet, that has not al-
ways been the rule.
In the nineteenth century, an author's legally protected inter-
est extended only to the right to multiply copies of her work.201 As a
result, another's reuse of an author's expression would interfere with
the author's legally protected interest only if, given the context or
manner of the reuse, the reuse would displace or supersede demand
for copies of the author's original work in its original form.202 Thus, in
Stowe v. Thomas,203 Harriet Beecher Stowe alleged that Thomas had
infringed her copyright by translating her copyrighted work, Uncle
Tom's Cabin, into German. In language that foreshadowed the
199. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1956), affirmed sub nom Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
200. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that any copying of another's work that allows one to earn a profit weighs against a
finding of fair use); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Intl., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1371-73
(2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a book about a television series infringed the copyrights in the audio-
visual works that constitututed the television series); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d
Cir. 1992) (making a fine art statue using a cheap, kitschy postcard as a model constituted
infringement); Horgan v. MacMillan, 789 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that a book
about ballet could infringe a copyright in the ballees choreography); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding infringement where the
defendant was making a profit repackaging the plaintiffs copyrighted works). See Goldstein, 55
L. & Contemp. Probs. at 85 (cited in note 41) ("Putting these cautionary observations to the side,
I think it is historically accurate to say that, in general, Congress has given copyright owners
rights to every market in which consumers derive value from their works and in which
transaction costs do not stand in the way of negotiated payments").
201. Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cases 1128, 1133-34 (D. Mass. 1858) C'[The only
property... which the law gives him under such circumstances [when a work has been
published] is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of
characters which exhibits to others the ideas intended to be conveyed").
202. See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76 (holding that the defendant's map of
Philadelphia was not an infringement of the plaintiffs map of New York City because "[the two
maps] do not convey the same information"). See also Gray, 10 F. Cases at 1038 (stating that
one factor to consider in determining whether a use is unfair is whether the allegedly infringing
work will supersede the demand for the original); Folsom, 9 F. Cases at 348 (same); Kaplan,
Unhurried View at 17 (cited in note 12); Jaszi, 1991 Duke L. J. at 472 (cited in note 138) C'[A]t
the outset the courts treated non-identical imitations as meritorious new productions").
203. 23 F. Cases 201 (D. Pa. 1853), superseded by statute, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86,
16 Stat. 198 (granting the authors the exclusive translation right).
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Supreme Court's adoption of the idea-expression dichotomy later in
the century,2 4 the court rejected Stowe's claim.205 Once she has pub-
lished her work, the court wrote, "the author's exclusive property in a
literary composition or h[er] copyright, consists only in a right to
multiply copies of h[er] book, and enjoy the profits therefrom, and not
in an exclusive right to h[er] conceptions and inventions, which may
be termed the essence of [the] composition."26 Thomas's German
translation may have limited sales of the authorized translation and
may have limited Stowe's returns on her authorship investment, "but
in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book."207 Even if
Thomas had, in some sense, taken the expression of Stowe's work, he
had translated what he took into German. Because he had translated
what he had taken into German, Thomas's reuse would not supersede
or displace demand for copies of Stowe's English-language original.
Thomas had not, therefore, interfered with Stowe's legally protected
interest in her work, and did not infringe Stowe's copyright. 20
8
Nor was Stowe unusual for its time. Courts in the nineteenth
century consistently required a plaintiff to show that, given the
context or manner in which the defendant reused material from the
plaintiffs copyrighted work, the defendant's reuse would supersede or
displace demand for copies of the plaintiffs original.209 If a later
204. Compare Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 206 (explaining that before publication, the author
owns even his own ideas. After publication, "[s]uch an appropriation becomes impossible, and is
inconsistent with the object of publication. The author's conceptions have become the common
property of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of their right to
communicate them to another clothed in their own language"), with Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at
103 ('The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the
world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the
knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book").
205. Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 208.
206. Id. at 207.
207. Id. at 208. See also Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cases 171, 175 (D. Ohio 1847) ("[A] fair
abridgment, though it may injure the original, is lawfur).
208. Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 208. See also Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cases 1335, 1337 (N.D. Ill.
1875) (finding that one translation of a French-language play did not infringe another
translation); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L.
Rev. 321, 336-37 & n.66 (1989).
209. See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76; Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co.,
140 F. 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1905); Story, 23 F. Cases at 175 (finding that part of the defendant's
work that amounted to "a fair abridgment' lawful, and that part that could not be considered
such an abridgment unlawful); Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cases 511, 517 (D. Mass. 1847); Gray, 10
F. Cases at 1038-39 (comparing extracts taken for the "bona fide" purpose of criticism, with
extracts taken "to supersede the original work under the pretense of a review"). See also White-
Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908) (holding that a music roll for a player
piano is not a copy and is not therefore an infringement of copyright in the musical works
embodied on the roll), superseded by statute as stated in Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1248;
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author were to translate, abridge, or otherwise rework the original,
such action would not infringe the copyright in the original so long as
the later work did not act primarily to displace demand for copies of
the original.210  Thus, a defendant 2"1 could copy the style and
characteristics of a copyrighted map of New York in preparing a map
of Philadelphia, or could copy descriptions of flowers from a copy-
righted dictionary to produce a book of poetry, because the
defendant's work would, in either case, not substitute for the
plaintiffs work.212 Such "derivative" works may have copied
expression from the original, but as long as the later author had
actually reworked the original and thereby created a "new" work, a
court would not find infringement.
213
Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Congress systematically limited the freedom of others to create such
derivative works, by granting authors an ever-expanding right to con-
Emerson, 8 F. Cases at 622, 625 CA copy is one thing, an imitation or resemblance another.
There are many imitations of Homer in the Aeneid; but no one would say that the one was a
copy from the other." While a second work need not be an exact and literal copy to infringe,
only servile or evasive imitations will infringe).
210. See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76; Sampson & Murdock, 140 F. at 542; Stowe, 23
F. Cases at 208; Story, 23 F. Cases at 174-75; Webb, 29 F. Cases at 518-19 (explaining that even
though it copied an expression, a later work did not infringe because the later work was created
.with a view to make it less expensive and to circulate among a different class of readers, rather
than be a substitute with the same class"). See also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 CThe copyright
protects originality rather than novelty or invention--conferring only 'the sole right of
multiplying copies' "); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cases 1132, 1136-37 (D.N.Y. 1868) (finding that the
defendant infringed by incorporating an original scene from another's play into his own play;
when the defendant argued that he had adapted the original and ought not therefore be
considered an infringer, the court rejected his argument, distinguishing cases permitting
abridgments or digests on the grounds that the purpose of such reworkings is "distinct from that
of the work from which it was taken"); Lawrence, 15 F. Cases at 59-60; Story, 23 F. Cases at 173
(stating that a reviewer reaches the limit of permissible copying if she copies so much that she
begins "to supersede the original book"); Folsom, 9 F. Cases at 348 CIn some cases, a
considerable portion of the materials of the original work may be fused, if I may use that
expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable in the mass of the latter, which has
other professed and obvious objects, and cannot be fairly treated as a piracy"). But see Gilmore
v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) C(The work of [the plaintiff] was written for a
presidential campaign, and that of [the defendant] for young persons; and this difference of
purposes is relied upon as justification [for the copying]. But the author's right is absolute when
perfected, and the purpose of an invasion nowhere appears to be made an excuse for it'); Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 36-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("The measure of complainants rights is not limited
by the mere fact that the lithograph would not displace the photograph in the market!).
211. As one court noted, an abridgment will reduce demand for the original to a certain
extent. See Story, 23 F. Cases at 172-73. The question, therefore, must be one of degree,
balancing the extent to which consumers will perceive a later work as a substitute for the
earlier work and the amount of "labor and exercise of judgment" the later work required. Id. at
173-74.
212. See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 676-77; Webb, 29 F. Cases at 517-19.
213. See Perris, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 675-76; Sampson & Murdock, 140 F. at 542; Webb, 29 F.
Cases at 519; Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 208; Story, 23 F. Cases at 175; Jaszi, 1991 Duke L. J. at 472-
74 (cited in note 138).
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trol such reworkings.214 Yet, even after Congress acted to prohibit
certain derivative uses of a copyrighted work, at least some courts
continued to limit the author's protected interest with respect to
derivative uses to what might be termed "nontransformative"
derivative uses. In these cases, a court would find infringement of the
plaintiffs derivative rights only if the defendant had taken expression
from the plaintiffs work and used it to create a derivative work that
simply "reproduced" the plaintiffs work in a new language or medium
of distribution.215  Under this standard, courts would permit
individuals to take expression from a copyrighted work so long as they
used it to create their own work, whose appeal differed from that of
the underlying work. While the question of how much the appeal of
the defendant's work had to differ from the appeal of the underlying
work in order to avoid an infringement finding presented some
difficulties, at least some courts would find no infringement, despite a
defendant's taking of expressive elements from the plaintiffs work, in
cases where the appeal of the defendant's work differed sufficiently
from the appeal of the plaintiffs work.
216
214. See Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (granting an exclusive public
performance right to authors of musical works); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198
(granting an exclusive dramatization and translation right to authors of literary works); Act of
August 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (granting an exclusive public performance right to
authors of dramatic compositions).
215. See, for example, Kustoff, 120 F.2d at 560-61 (explaining that because similarities
were not such as would lead "the ordinary observer to believe that the film has picturized
appellanes book," there was no infringement); Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 27-28 (finding no
infringement because "it [was] fairly clear that, given an interval of two or three weeks between
a casual reading of the story and a similar uncritical view of [the allegedly infringing work], it
would not occur to such a spectator, in the absence of suggestion to that effect, that he was
seeing in moving picture form the [copyrighted] story"); Dymow, 11 F.2d at 692 (finding that the
ordinary observer would not recognize the allegedly infringing work as being taken from the
original, therefore there was no infringement); Sampson & Murdock, 140 F. at 542; McConnor v.
Kaufman, 49 F. Supp. at 744-45 (explaining that even if the defendant's work copied certain
expressive elements from the plaintiffs work, "[tihe ordinary reader would find no connection
between the two plays;" therefore, there was no infringement), affirmed, 139 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1943); Solomon v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Roe-Lawton
v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, 128 (S.D. Cal. 1927) ("Unless the public is deceived by the
pictures, and led to believe that the films are a picturization of plaintiffs literary work (the
standard of the ordinary observer being applied) then no infringement is shown").
216. See Sampson & Murdock, 140 F. at 541-42 ('mnstances may be easily cited where
portions of a copyrighted book may be published [by another without permission] for purposes
other than those for which the original book was intended. This may be particularly so where
the second publication has an entirely different outlook from the first"); McConnor, 49 F. Supp.
at 745 ("However, neither the ordinary observer, nor the keenest critic could recognize 'The Man
Who Came to Dinner' as a reproduction or copy of'Sticks and Stones.' It would take more than
a play doctor to transmute one into the other"); Solomon, 44 F. Supp. at 782 (finding no
infringement of the plaintiffs work by the defendanes motion picture because, despite
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For example, in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer,217 the plaintiff
sued the defendants for copyright infringement, alleging that the de-
fendants' silent film, entitled The Freshman, violated her copyright in
a story entitled, The Emancipation of Rodney.218 By this time,
Congress had expressly provided the author with a picturization
right.21 9 As a result, the court could not resolve the case, as it could
have in the nineteenth century, on the basis that a film was not a
copy of, nor would it displace demand for, the plaintiffs short story.
220
Instead, the court addressed the issue of infringement in terms of
whether the defendants had used the expressive elements that they
had taken from the plaintiffs work to create a work that reproduced
the appeal of the plaintiffs work in movie form.22' It was not enough,
the court wrote, that the film may have contained elements that were
too similar in degree to the expressive elements of the story.222 The
plaintiff must also demonstrate that an uncritical spectator would
readily recognize the film as the plaintiffs story in motion picture
similarities between the two works, the average person would not recognize the motion picture
as a "screen portrayal.., of the plaintiffs play"); Allen v. Walt Disney Productions, Ltd., 41 F.
Supp. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ("I have heard the compositions played, and to my ear there is a
similarity, but not such a similarity as would impress one. In other words, I would not take the
one for the other"); Arnstein v. BMI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
("Infringement... must be founded upon more than the adoption of a few measures here and
there. The theme and general melody or composition must be substantially lifted"). See also
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial
Similarity, 22 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 81, 145 (1977) ('The two pieces must be similar
enough to sound similar to a lay audience, since only then is it reasonable to suppose that the
performance or publication of the accused work could in any way injure the rights of the
plaintiff composer"). Even though the art form was well-known since well before the founding of
this country, a court did not prohibit the reuse of expression in a parody until 1956. See Benny,
239 F.2d at 537 (noting that Mr. Benny had an unchallenged custom of creating such parodies
for the previous twenty-five years, yet refusing to accord that custom any weight in defining the
scope of copyright protection), affirmed, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
217. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
218. Id. at 2.
219. See, for example, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1911) (interpreting
the dramatization right to encompass the presentation of a work in motion picture form). See
also 16 Stat. 198 (granting an exclusive dramatization right to authors of literary works).
220. Because film versions of a work do not generally compete with literary versions of the
same work, see, for example, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1988),
affirmed sub nom Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Nimmer and Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on
Copyright § 13.05[B], at 13-84 to 13-85 (cited in note 57), a film version does not displace
demand for a literary work. See also notes 246, 473.
221. In looking at the film and the story, the court noted that there were many elements
that appeared in the movie that were sufficiently similar to expressive elements of the plaintiffs
story to establish infringement if that was all a plaintiff needed to show to establish infringe-
ment. Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 27-28.
222. Id. at 28 ('We are of the opinion that such similarities as exist between the play and




form.223 After examining the two works as a whole, the court con-
cluded that the defendant's film, despite the copying, was not recog-
nizably a picturization of the plaintiffs story. As a result, even if the
defendants had taken expressive elements from the plaintiffs story,
they had not trespassed on the plaintiffs protected interest in her
work.2
24
While this case reflects a broader protected interest than the
competitive-displacement standard of the nineteenth century, it re-
tains some limit on the plaintiffs protected interest beyond that im-
plicit in the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate that particular
elements of the defendant's work are too similar in degree to the cor-
responding expressive elements in the plaintiffs work. Under either
the nineteenth-century standard or the Harold Lloyd standard, the
defendant's work not only had to contain elements too similar in de-
gree to the plaintiffs expression, but also had to be too similar in
type, in that it amounted to a mere reproduction of the plaintiffs
work, either in the same language or medium of distribution, that is a
copy, or in another language or medium of distribution, that is a
nontransformative derivative work.
Neither the competitive-displacement standard of the nine-
teenth century nor the nontransformative-derivative-work standard of
Harold Lloyd, is consistent, however, with the incentives-access
paradigm. Broadening copyright to grant a work's author the ex-
clusive right to prepare translations and abridgments of the work
would not implicate any unusual need for access. From the coinciden-
tal re-creation perspective, the chance that a later author would
create a German-language version of Uncle Tom's Cabin
coincidentally, without referring to the original English-language
version, is slight. Moreover, the risk of undue monopolization
associated with an exclusive right to translate would be no greater
than the risk of monopolization associated with the exclusive right to
reproduce the English-language version. Both the translation and the
223. Id. at 27-28.
224. In dissent, Judge McCormick, sitting by designation, insisted that the defendant had
copied "concrete forms that were conceived, developed, arranged, and put into shape by Witwer."
Id. at 40 (McCormick, J., dissenting). In Judge McCormick's view, because the defendant had
copied material parts of Witwer's expression into its film, the defendant had infringed the story,
without regard to the response of an uncritical spectator to the two works as a whole. Id.
(McCormick, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this approach, and explained that "[i]f we
can see at first blush that there is no such similarity as would impress the ordinary observer, it




reproduction rights would preclude later authors from copying the
expressive elements of Stowe's work, either in English or some other
language, 225 but both rights would leave later authors free to produce
independently their own works which explored the important themes
and racial conflicts Stowe captured in her work. If the ability of later
authors to re-explore the same themes and issues in their own works
adequately addresses the risk of undue monopolization with respect
to the English-language version of Stowe's work, it should equally
well address the risk of undue monopolization with respect to the
German-language version.
226
Similarly, application of the incentives-access paradigm sug-
gests that copyright ought not generally2 27 limit an author's derivative
work right to nontransformative derivative works. When we define a
work's "expression" and determine that given similarities between a
later work and the expressive elements of an earlier copyrighted work
are sufficient to support an infringement finding, we necessarily en-
sure that an infringement finding based upon given factual similari-
ties is not likely to threaten a compelling need for access. By defini-
tion, if protecting a particular element, or finding infringement based
upon a particular degree of similarity, would implicate a compelling
need for access, then a court applying the incentives-access paradigm
should leave that element unprotected or find that degree of
similarity insufficient to establish infringement.228 As a result, by the
time we have decided that a later work exhibits undue similarity to
an earlier work's expression, copyright will already have addressed
the need for access to the earlier work.2 9 If access is the only cost
225. See, for example, Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (noting that to constitute an infringing
derivative work, the later work must be substantially similar to the underlying work in its
expression); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.4 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Vihere defendants work is adapted for use in a medium different than that of plaintiffs,
the test for infringement remains the same"); Nimmer and Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 3.01 (cited in note 57) C'[A] work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be
considered an infringing work if the material that it has derived from a pre-existing work had
been taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work").
226. See Kalem, 222 U.S. at 63 ("It is suggested that to extend the copyright to a case like
this [where defendants have made a motion picture from a summary of the plaintiffs work] is to
extend it to the ideas as distinguished from the words in which those ideas are clothed. But
there is no attempt to make a monopoly of the ideas expressed. The law confines itself to a
particular, cognate and well-known form of reproduction"). If nothing else, the authors of the
competing English-language works, which ensure adequate competition in the English-language
market for such works, could simply translate each of their works into German.
227. As will be discussed, see text accompanying notes 255-72, broadening the author's de-
rivative rights may create a compelling need for access in unusual cases.
228. See Part III.AI.
229. Expanding the scope of the author's protected interest would increase the situations in
which copyright would require a license for reusing expressive elements from the original work.
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that broadening protection would impose, then, having already
addressed the need for access through the idea-expression dichotomy
and the degree-of-similarity inquiry, the incentives-access paradigm
can suggest no reason to impose some further limit on copyright's
protection, for example, by limiting the scope of an author's derivative
work right.230
Moreover, on the other side of the incentives-access balance,
granting an author the right to control any derivative work that
reuses expressive elements from the underlying work would increase,
perhaps substantially, the author's incentive to produce any given
workss1 Increased incentives means a likely increase in the variety of
such works available, and in the absence of any countervailing need
for access, would appear to justify expanding an author's derivative
rights. The incentives-access paradigm thus suggests that copyright
should expand its protection for derivative uses of an author's expres-
sion (until some compelling need for access appears).
23 2
Some possibility therefore exists that expanding the derivative right might lead to increased in-
stances of market failure. Yet, a court properly applying the incentives-access paradigm will la-
bel as expression only those elements of a work that are uniquely, or reasonably so, identified
with a particular author. As a result, a later author who plans to reuse the expression of an
earlier author can usually readily identify from whom she needs to obtain the license. The
transaction costs associated with negotiating a license to translate, abridge, picturize, or
otherwise reuse an expressive element will, therefore, rarely rise to a level where market
failure is likely. For those few cases where market failure becomes likely, the Court has
interpreted the doctrine of fair use to address the risk of market failure. See text accompanying
notes 255-72.
230. As a general matter, unaddressed access concerns will arise only if expanding the
scope of the author's protected interest would (a) create a serious risk of market failure due to
the excessive transaction costs associated with obtaining a license, or (b) stifle some forms of
creativity altogether. The Court has attempted to address these issues under the rubric of fair
use, and I will postpone further discussion of these unusual access concerns until we address
the fair use issue. See id.
231. See, for example, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "unfair
copying ... chills creation").
232. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (suggesting that parodic uses were not part of the
author's derivative market because "[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only
those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop"). See
also American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 ("Only an impact on potential licensing
revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should be legally
cognizable when evaluating a secondary use's 'effect upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work' "); Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1377 (noting that the fourth
factor of the fair use analysis will favor the secondary user when the use "filled a market niche
that the [copyright owner] simply had no interest in occupying'); Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that the fourth factor of the fair use
analysis may not favor the copyright owner when the secondary user "profits from an activity
that the owner could not possibly take advantage of').
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To illustrate, consider a case where a defendant has "sampled"
expression from a copyrighted musical work, and has incorporated
that phrase into a new rap song. If a court were to apply either the
competitive-displacement standard, or the nontransformative-deriva-
tive-work standard to determine whether such a taking of expression
constitutes infringement, it should find no infringement. Under a
competitive-displacement standard, the question would be whether
the rap artist had copied from the original in order to produce a work
that would displace demand for the original. In resolving this ques-
tion, a court would likely recognize that, whatever the relative aes-
thetic merits of rap and popular music, a consumer would not likely
purchase the rap song as a substitute for the popular song.233 Because
the rap song would not displace demand for the original, the later
work would not interfere with the author's legally protected interest
under the competitive-displacement standard, and it would not
therefore infringe the author's copyright in the popular song.
Similarly, if a court recognized an author's right to control
nontransformative derivative works, the question would be whether
the rap song amounted to no more than a mere translation of the
popular song into the new "language" of rap.234 So long as the
allegedly infringing rap song transformed the story or message of the
original work, the use of a sampled expression from the original to
emphasize or reinforce aspects of that transformed message would not
preempt the original author's ability to market a nontransformative
rap version of the original. As a result, the sampling, even though of
expression, would not interfere with the author's legally protected
interests in the original work under a nontransformative-derivative-
work standard, and it would not, therefore, infringe.2 35
Yet, the incentives-access paradigm suggests that such sam-
pling, if of expression, should constitute infringement. On the incen-
233. Indeed, under the Stowe competitive-displacement standard, a rap version of a
popular song that reproduced all of the lyrics from the original pop version of the song would not
infringe because it would not be a copy of, or displace demand for, the original version of the
song. See Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 208 (finding the thoughts behind a published book to be "public
property"). Because the author's protected interest did not extend beyond competitive
displacement of the demand for the author's original work, the rap version would not interfere
with the author of the pop song's legally protected interest.
234. Section 101 defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation [or] musical arrangement...." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Presumably, a
song that simply presented an existing work in a new musical format, such as rap, would fall
within this definition. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178-79 (considering a rap version of "Oh,
Pretty Woman" as a derivative work).
235. See Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 27-28. See also Sampson & Murdock, 140 F. at 542;
McConnor, 49 F. Supp. at 744-45; Roe-Lawton, 18 F.2d at 128.
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tive side, protecting the author against unauthorized sampling would
offer the original author an opportunity to earn additional licensing
revenue, and increase the available incentive to create a copyrighted
work. Unless such protection would threaten some unusual need for
access, such protection would therefore appear to be desirable. But no
such compelling need for access appears. A later author can create
future works, even rap works, without such sampling, and could
likely obtain a license to reuse the expression without incurring
excessive transaction costs in any event.236 Given the incentives that
the broader derivative right protection could provide, and the lack of
any countervailing need for access, the incentives-access paradigm
suggests that sampling of a copyrighted work's expressive elements
for reuse in a later work should constitute infringement, and at least
one district judge has agreed.237 Even without any evidence that the
rap song would displace demand for the original and even when the
rap song presented its own distinct appeal, rather than simply
reproducing the story or appeal of the original in rap, courts have held
that the unauthorized reuse of a copyrighted work's expression can
establish infringement.238
236. See, for example, Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting the practice of obtaining clearance before releasing a
work that contains a sample from another work). See also Note, A New Spin on Music
Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 726, 727-28 (1992) (explaining that the music
industry established an ad hoc licensing system for sampling). By identifying particular
elements, or a particular level of abstraction, as expression, we have necessarily concluded that
that element or level will be sufficiently identified with a particular author to minimize the
transaction costs of obtaining a license to reuse such expression. See text accompanying notes
119-24. But see Havelock Nelson, Dissed by Pirates, Dogged by "Sample Hell," a Maturing Art
Form Fights for Respect, Billboard R3, R24 (Nov. 28, 1992) (noting the significant expense and
delay involved in obtaining permissions through the ad hoc licensing system).
237. See Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 183, 185 & n.2 (referring the case to the
United States Attorney for criminal prosecution, and asserting, given that the defendant's work
embodied three words from the plaintiffs copyrighted work, "[the only issue, therefore, seems
to be who owns the copyright to the song'). See also Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312. Note that this
result is also inconsistent with the statutory definition of derivative works. In ordinary speech,
we would not say that the borrowing of only one characteristic phrase would make the rap song
a work that is based upon the popular song. The words "based upon" seem to describe a closer
and more fundamental relationship between two works, which would require the first work to
provide, in essence, the foundation of the later work. Isolated copying, even of expression,
would not seem to create a "based upon" relationship. Compare MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 701
(remanding the case for trial on the issue of infringement based upon similarities such as the
common "reference to trees looking like sentinels").
238. See Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (noting that in
determining whether sampling constituted infringement, the fact that "[t]he two songs were
utterly unlike and reached completely different markets" was irrelevant).
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In defining the scope of the author's protected interest, the in-
centives-access paradigm thus suggests that an author should have
the right to control any reuse of her work's expression. And the
course of copyright over the past two hundred years has been a steady
evolution of the author's protected interest in that direction. As
discussed, over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Congress systematically eliminated the freedom of others to
abridge, translate, dramatize, perform, or otherwise rework a
copyrighted work.239 Courts too have followed the path suggested by
the incentives-access paradigm, finding infringement even in the ab-
sence of any evidence that the later work has displaced, or would dis-
place, demand for the original.240 While some courts have been careful
to retain a target audience test that focuses on whether a later work
interferes with the plaintiffs legally protected interest, 241 the
tendency has been to drop altogether a separate inquiry into the scope
of the author's legally protected interest. Some courts have done so
by merging the actual copying and infringing appropriation inquiries
into a single test that requires only access and substantial similarity
in expression to establish infringement.242 Others have formally re-
tained a separate target audience response test, but have asked
239. See the statutes cited in note 214.
240. See Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1371-73; Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d
157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1986); Benny, 239 F.2d at 536-37; Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 F.2d 902,
907-08 (2d Cir. 1910) ("Unless the copyright statute is broad enough to cover any adaptation
which contains the plot or theme of the story, it is wholly ineffective").
241. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) (continuing to
interpret improper appropriation in terms of "the effect of the defendanes work on the plaintiffs
markee'); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding no in-
fringement where "the total effect of the image conveyed to an ordinary observer by the accused
dolls is quite distinct from that of... [the plaintiffs] dolls" (quoting the district court's opinion)).
242. See, for example, Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d
399, 402 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Copyright plaintiffs can prove infringement by demonstrating the
defendants' access to the copyrighted work and a substantial similarity between the two
works"); In Design v. Lauren Knitwear Corp., 782 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
infringement based upon access and substantial similarity). Combining the two inquiries into
one will produce the same result as would conducting separate actual copying and infringing ap-
propriation inquiries in those cases where the similarities are so extensive as to establish both
actual copying and improper appropriation. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69 (referring to the
"double-purpose evidence" of similarity). See also Universal Athletic Sales, 511 F.2d at 907-09.
However, suggesting that access plus substantial similarity alone will establish infringement in
every case creates a risk of a mistaken infringement finding in those cases where separate
consideration of actual copying and improper appropriation would demonstrate that one
element is not present, even though the evidence establishes access plus substantial similarity.
For examples of such mistakes, see Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that the substantial similarity that results from actual copying
establishes infringement); Ideal Toy Co. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 624 (2d Cir. 1962)
(finding infringement based upon access plus substantial similarity even though the overall
appearance of the second doll was not sufficiently similar to establish improper appropriation if
that element were examined independently).
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whether the audience would recognize any aspect of the later work as
being taken from the expression of the original, rather than asking
whether the audience would consider the later work a duplicate of the
original's appeal.243 By shifting the focus of the target audience test,
these courts ensure that a later work will infringe so long as the later
work contains any element that the relevant target audience would
recognize as being too similar to the earlier work's expression.
244
In effect, courts have merged the legally protected interest in-
quiry, or the too similar in type inquiry, into the question of whether
the second work contains elements that are too similar in degree to
the expressive elements of the first work.2 45 Implicitly, these courts
have adopted the position that any work that contains such overly
similar elements necessarily interferes with the plaintiffs legally pro-
tected interest, and is therefore infringing. Under this approach, a
later work, to avoid interfering with the plaintiffs legally protected
interest, must either copy only ideas or express what it has copied in
a sufficiently different way.
Whether we see the elimination of, or the change in, the target
audience test as simply an expansion of the author's legally protected
interest, or as the elimination of the too similar in type element, it al-
lows a plaintiff to establish an infringing appropriation by showing
that particular elements in the defendant's work are too similar to
corresponding expressive elements in the plaintiffs work. This
change is entirely consistent with, and to a substantial extent driven
by, the incentives-access paradigm. Because the incentives-access
paradigm suggests that the only cost from broader protection is the
potential for lost access, the absence of any compelling need for access
indicates that copyright can expand an author's derivative right pro-
tection at essentially no cost. As a result, what began as a system to
protect authors against copying competitors has become a system that
243. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 614 ("[The test is whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiffs work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs protectible expression by taking material of substance
and value").
244. See, for example, Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1371-73; Laureyssens, 964 F.2d
at 140 (allowing proof of improper appropriation "by demonstrating that substantial similarities
relate to protectible materia'); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that a plaintiff can show that an expression was "'improperly appropriated,' by
proving that the similarities relate to copyrightable material").
245. See, for example, Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1371-73; Laureyssens, 964 F.2d
at 140; Walker, 784 F.2d at 48.
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attempts to ensure that the author can control every valuable use of
her work.24
6
Our previous discussions, on the idea-expression dichotomy
and the degree of similarity copyright requires, focused on the limits
to copyright's protection that an unusual need for access dictates.
This discussion, focusing on the continuing expansion of the author's
protected interest, illustrates the other side of the incentives-access
coin: In the absence of any unusual need for access, the paradigm can
suggest no reason to limit copyright protection. Once copyright has
addressed the need for access-by excluding protection for ideas,247 by
requiring an appropriate degree of similarity,248 or otherwise-the in-
centives-access paradigm cannot justify further limiting the scope of
copyright protection, by limiting, for example, infringement to cases of
competitive displacement of the original work, or to
nontransformative derivative works.
C. Defining Fair Uses
As Congress and various courts have expanded the scope of the
author's protected interest, so too have they narrowed the scope of the
fair use doctrine. Originally intended as a general standard for in-
fringement, fair use in the nineteenth century asked whether the de-
fendant had unfairly taken advantage of the plaintiffs labor by copy-
ing the plaintiffs work in order to produce a substitute for the plain-
246. The Court in Campbell discussed competitive displacement as the relevant harm for
fair use purposes, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78, but it completely distorted the meaning of that phrase
in the process. Competitive displacement refers to displacement of the demand for the original
work by a substitute for that work. The Campbell Court, however, used the phrase to describe
displacement of demand for the original or of demand in any protected derivative market. Id.
Because the majority of consumers do not generally consider derivative works to be substitutes
for the original work itself, the Court was not referring to competitive displacement as the
nineteenth-century courts saw it, as the displacement of the demand for the original work in its
original form by a direct substitute. Rather, the Court was referring to the potential
displacement of demand in several different markets, some of which the author may eventually
exploit, others of which the author may not exploit. The Campbell Court was not really talking
about competitive displacement, then, since "competitive" displacement presupposes two
products in the same market, but about a potential inability to exploit certain derivative
markets if copyright permits another to exploit those markets first. This type of potential
displacement differs significantly from displacing demand for the original by introducing into
the originars market a substitute for the original. As a result, we ought not use the same
phrase, "competitive displacement," to refer to these two different forms of demand dis-
placement. When we include a broad protected derivative market as a part of copyright's legally
protected interest, the phrase "lost opportunity to license" better captures the nature of the
harm the copyright owner is suffering.
247. See Part III.A.1.
248. See Part III.A.2.
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tiffs work.249 If the defendant had done so, then the use was unfair,
or illegal. If the defendant had not done so, then the use was fair, or
legal. At the heart of these nineteenth-century cases was the question
whether the defendant copied as part of a bona fide effort to create a
new work or in order to supersede the original work under the
pretense of creating a new work.250 While this standard left room for
dispute on whether a defendant had acted unfairly in any given case,
it expressly authorized the reuse by later authors of an earlier
author's expressive elements. So long as the later author reworked
the expressive elements in order to create a new work, with its own
distinct appeal, a court would consider such a use fair. Thus,
translations, abridgments, and other substantial reworkings of the
original were all fair uses so long as they represented a bona fide
attempt to rework the plaintiffs original materials.
251
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, however, Congress and various courts systematically ex-
panded the scope of copyright's protection, and correspondingly, lim-
ited the freedom of others to rework a copyrighted work.25 2 Each time
Congress or a court prohibited a type of reworking that copyright had
previously permitted, such action would, by definition, reduce by one
the types of uses that could be considered fair.253 The systematic ex-
pansion of the derivative right in the twentieth century reinforced
this trend and further narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine. As
249. See Folsom, 9 F. Cases at 348. See, for example, White, 185 F. at 922; West Publishing
Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 865-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); Simms, 75 F. at 9-10;
Lawrence, 15 F. Cases at 60-61; Drury, 7 F. Cases at 1116; Greene, 10 F. Cases at 1134;
Emerson, 8 F. Cases at 625.
250. See Lawrence, 15 F. Cases at 59, 61 ('Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show
the merits or demerits of the work, but they cannot so exercise the privilege as to supersede the
original book"); Story, 23 F. Cases at 175 ('[A] fair abridgment, though it may injure the
original, is fair"); Gray, 10 F. Cases at 1038 ('In some cases, indeed, it may be a very nice
question, what amounts to a piracy of a work, or not. Thus, if large extracts are made
therefrom in a review, it might be a question, whether those extracts were designed bona fide
for the mere purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede the original work under the
pretense of a review, by giving its substance in a fugitive form"); Folsom, 9 F. Cases at 344-45
('Thus, for example, no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the
work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute
the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy").
251. See, for example, Stowe, 23 F. Cases at 208; Webb, 29 F. Cases at 518-19; Story, 23 F.
Cases at 175.
252. See note 214 and text accompanying notes 237-48.
253. For example, when Congress granted the author the exclusive right to translate or
dramatize her work, it redefined such uses of a copyrighted work as unfair, and thereby
narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine.
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a result, if we were to define fair use simply as the legal use of
another's expression, and we were further to assume that copyright
presently protects every profitable use of a work's expression, then
that would leave an unprofitable use as the only legal, or fair, use of
another's expression today. As a description of the scope of the
present-day fair use doctrine, that would not be far from wrong.
54
Because of the substantial expansion in the author's protected
interest that took place over the past one hundred twenty years or so,
fair use today serves as little more than a backstop to ensure courts
an avenue by which they can address on a case-by-case basis any
compelling access concerns that the idea-expression dichotomy and
the degree-of-similarity standard have left unaddressed. Even though
the process of satisfying the idea-expression and too-similar-in-degree
elements will usually address any need for access with which a
finding of infringement might interfere, the expansion of the author's
protected interest to encompass basically any lawful, profitable use of
her expression may nevertheless interfere with a compelling need for
access in some cases.255 To address this possibility, the incentives-ac-
cess paradigm suggests that copyright should provide a means to
identify and limit copyright's usual scope of protection in such
exceptional cases, and that is the role the fair use doctrine has come
to play.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., for
example, the Court addressed whether copyright should limit the use
by private individuals of video-tape recorders for the time-shifting256
of publicly broadcast television programs. Such private individuals
would usually know which programs they had taped, and could
presumably identify the party from whom they would need to obtain a
"time-shifting" license. Yet, despite the ready identification of the
licensing party, the transaction costs of obtaining and enforcing such
a license would routinely exceed the gains in trade available from
254. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 ('[E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright'). See also American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 922 (noting that any
copying of another's work that allows one to earn a profit weighs heavily against a finding of fair
use); Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1535 (finding infringement where the defendant was making
a profit repackaging the plaintiffs copyrighted works). Compare Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-
78 (limiting the presumption to nontransformative uses).
255. See, for example, Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78, *27,
*52-53 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the disassembly of a computer program is a fair use as a
matter of law where it is necessary to access the program's unprotected elements).
256. The Court defined "time-shifting" as the use of a videotape recorder "to record a
program he cannot view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later time." Sony,
464 U.S. at 421.
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such licenses. 257 As a result, requiring such licenses would likely lead
to market failure in many instances. 258 To avoid the risk of market
failure that requiring time-shifting licenses would create, the
incentives-access paradigm suggests that copyright should consider
such time-shifting a fair use, and the Court agreed.
2 59
In addition to increasing the chance that excessive transaction
costs might lead to market failure in some cases, the expansion of the
author's protected interest also risks stifling some forms of creativity
altogether. 260 This risk, and a corresponding need for access, will
arise for those forms of creativity that embody three characteristics.
First, the work must embody a desirable form of creativity, one that
we would like to see exercised. Second, the work must embody a form
of creativity that requires the taking of expression from earlier works
in order to exist at all. And third, the work must embody a form of
creativity that the typical author would be unwilling to authorize, or
at least, unwilling to authorize at a less-than-prohibitive price. In
combination, the presence of these elements establishes a compelling
need for access. If the later author, by the very nature of her pre-
ferred form of creativity, must borrow from the expressive elements of
an earlier work, yet cannot reasonably obtain permission for such bor-
rowing, applying copyright's usual scope of protection would
257. While the Court did not address the transaction costs issue directly, the majority
refused to consider, in evaluating the effect of the taping on the "potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work," the potential revenue the copyright holders could have earned from
licensing individuals to time-shift. Compare id. at 484-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the
"sizable markee' of persons who "would be willing to pay some kind of royalty" for the "privilege
of watching copyrighted work at their convenience"). In effect, the Court ruled that this
potential licensing revenue was not part of the copyright holder's legitimate market, and
therefore should not be considered in evaluating the fourth fair use factor. Id. at 456 (finding
that the plaintiffs "failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works"). While one
court has interpreted this refusal as an indication that the Court felt this market was "too
insubstantial to tilt the fourth fair use factor in favor of the copyright holder," American
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 n.8, I find it more plausible to infer that the Court refused to
consider such licensing revenue because of the extreme difficulty of arranging and collecting
payment for such licenses. See Richard P. Adelstein and Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of
Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 Intl.
Rev. L. & Econ. 209, 230-33 (1985) (noting that the Court refused to find infringement based
upon the cost of such licensing exceeding benefits, and critiquing that approach on the basis
that "decentralized remedial arrangements which would permit the consensual transfer of these
rights in markets" was possible).
258. More likely, if the law required such licenses, most individuals would simply ignore
the requirement, rendering that aspect of copyright protection unenforceable absent some sort
of vicarious liability that would hold the manufacturer liable for the tapers' infringements.
259. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (stating that home time-shifting is fair use).
260. See Gordon, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1632-35 (cited in note 41).
550 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 49:483
effectively prohibit the later author from exercising her preferred
form of creativity altogether. If the work is a desirable form of
creativity, the only way copyright can ensure the production of such
works is to provide an exception to its usual scope of protection. The
incentives-access paradigm thus suggests a need to limit protection as
against those works that embody these three access-related criteria,
and courts have interpreted the fair use doctrine to address the
otherwise unaddressed need for access such works present.261
Note, however, that if even one of these three characteristics is
missing, the need for access becomes far less compelling. If the later
work is not a desirable form of creativity, then there would be little
need to ensure that it can exist, and hence no need to ensure access. 262
If the later work can be created without copying, then it will exist
even without copying, and again there would be no unusual need for
access. 263 If the author of the later work could usually expect to obtain
a license for the reuse at a reasonable price, then again there would
be. no unusual need for access. Thus, if a later work borrows
expression from an earlier work, and does not embody all three of
these access-related characteristics, there is no unusual need for
access, and the incentives-access paradigm suggests that courts
should not limit copyright's protection by finding such a use to be fair.
261. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1172, 1176-77 (holding that the "fair use" doctrine allowed
the taking of words or phrases when adopted for use as commentary or parody); Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d
252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 242-43; Berlin v. E. C. Pubs.,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1964).
262. See, for example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc.,
479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (stating that, in order for the "fair use" doctrine to be ap-
plicable, the parody must achieve comic relief and make some critical comment or statement
about the original work). Obviously courts should be careful of making value judgments
concerning the desirability of particular forms of expression, as they are poor judges of the
ultimate artistic worth of a work. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 ("It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits"). Yet, the
cases do illustrate far less concern over ensuring that future authors can reuse another's work
when that reuse involves a distasteful or pornographic setting. See Walt Disney Productions,
Inc. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the reuse of Disney
characters in "adult 'counter-culture' comic books" infringed Disney' copyright in its characters);
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 117-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(holding strippers' skits infringed DC Comics's copyright in Superman and Wonder Woman
works). See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204-
05 (2d Cir. 1979) (expanding the scope of trademark protection to limit the ability of others to
reuse another's trademark in a pornographic setting); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215
U.S.P.Q. 124, 132-35 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding that the presentation of the Pillsbury Dough Boy
in a sexual situation diluted its effectiveness as a trademark); Greenberg, 11 Cardozo Arts &
Enter. L. J. at 29 (cited in note 38) (arguing that such value choices represent a form of
censorship).
263. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Applying these insights, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
held that parody is a form of creativity that embodies the three
access-related characteristics.2 64  Parody is a desirable form of
creativity. It requires borrowing from its target's expression in order
to ensure ready identification of its target. And it is not a use that a
typical author would be willing to license, except perhaps on terms
that would make this form of creative expression impracticable.2 65
Because parody embodies all three access-related characteristics, it
presents an unusual need for access, so the incentives-access
paradigm suggests that copyright should provide an exception to its
usual scope of protection in order to ensure that such parodic works
can exist. Following this insight, the Court sought to ensure parodic
access by interpreting the fair use doctrine to allow a parodist greater
leeway to copy an earlier work's expression than copyright ordinarily
allows.
26 6
At the same time, the Court was careful to limit the scope of
its fair use exception by restricting it to those forms of creativity that
embody all three access-related characteristics. The Court, for exam-
ple, extended its fair use analysis to allow a work that criticizes, or
objectively comments on, another copyrighted work greater leeway to
copy the other work's expression. 267 Such uses, in the Court's view,
embodied all three of the access-related criteria, and therefore,
required greater copying leeway than copyright ordinarily allows.
268
Yet, it refused to allow satiric uses similar leeway.269 In justifying
this distinction, the Court explained that satire can stand on its own;
it need not copy from earlier works to make its point.270 As a result,
satire does not share the same need for access that parody, criticism,
264. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1172, 1176-77.
265. Id. at 1171-73, 1175. See also Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437; Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253;
Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 242-43; Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544-45.
266. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176-77; Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436-48; Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d
at 253. But see Benny, 239 F.2d at 536-37 (suggesting in dicta that parody is treated no
differently than any other taking).
267. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171, 1173, 1178.
268. Specifically, the Court noted that criticism and comment, like parody, are desirable
forms of creative expression that require some copying of the target's expression in order to
make their point effectively, yet are not the type of derivative work a typical author would
usually authorize. Id. at 1178.
269. Id. at 1172 n.15. See also Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310 (finding the parody defense not
applicable when parody is of society generally, rather than a copied work specifically).
270. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1172 n.15.
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and comment embody, and does not therefore warrant an exception to
copyright's usual standard of protection. 271
By defining the fair use doctrine as a means to address compel-
ling needs for access, otherwise unaddressed, that may arise in par-
ticular cases, the Court has converted the fair use doctrine from the
primary standard by which courts are to resolve the issue of infringe-
ment into a secondary standard to be applied only in exceptional
cases.272 Like the expansion of the author's protected interest, this
evolution of the fair use doctrine reflects the other side of the incen-
tives-access coin: In the absence of any unusual need for access, the
paradigm suggests that copyright should not limit its protection.
Given that the process of determining whether a later work is too
similar to the expressive elements of an earlier copyrighted work ade-
quately addresses the need for access in most cases, an unaddressed
need for access, and a corresponding need for a further limit on copy-
right's protection such as the limit that the fair use doctrine could
provide, will likely arise only in exceptional circumstances. Yet,
because we may on occasion find ourselves facing such exceptional
circumstances, the incentives-access paradigm suggests that
copyright should provide some means to address such exceptional
cases. And as Sony and Campbell illustrate, this is the role courts
have assigned the fair use doctrine today.
D. Summary of the Incentives-Access Paradigm
As this exploration of copyright doctrine suggests, the incen-
tives-access paradigm has played a crucial role in shaping the scope of
copyright protection.273 As a guide to copyright's proper scope, the in-
271. Id.
272. This task of forcing the fair use doctrine into a background role is made difficult by
Congress's adoption of the four fair use factors courts in the nineteenth century. Because courts
devised these four factors to resolve the entire issue of infringement, they incorporate all of the
considerations necessary to resolve infringement. As a result, when a court tries to use the four
factors in a background role, it essentially duplicates the substantial reproduction of unduly
similar expressive elements that remains the basic standard for infringement. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. The four factors are: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature of work; (3)
substantiality of copying; and (4) the effect on the market value of the work.
273. While I have focused my exploration of the paradigm's influence on copyright's infring-
ing appropriation inquiry, the paradigm's influence cuts across all aspects of copyright law.
Many of the access-imposed limits that courts have incorporated into the copying element have
close parallels in the ownership element. Compare Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv.,
426 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1970) (redressing the need for access to the language of earlier
legal forms through more careful scrutiny of the originality of the plaintiffs work), with
Continental, 253 F.2d at 705-06 n.3 (redressing the special need for access to the language of
earlier legal forms by requiring the plaintiff to show near-verbatim duplication to establish the
copying element). See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (redressing the need for access to useful articles by
552 [Vol. 49:483
COPYRIGHT'S PARADIGM
centives-access paradigm presents two sides. On one side, the para-
digm demands a limit to protection if extending protection would in-
terfere with a compelling need for access, either because extending
protection would unduly limit the production of future works, or
would create a risk of undue monopolization. On the other side, the
paradigm suggests no reason to limit copyright's protection in the
absence of some compelling need for access. Indeed, because broader
protection would provide additional incentives to create copyrighted
works, the paradigm suggests that protection should continue to
broaden until further protection would begin to interfere with a
compelling need for access.
Following these two guides, Congress and courts have created
a copyright system that, first, protects an author against virtually any
unauthorized reuse of her work. Second, to bound this broad scope,
Congress and courts have created general and specific limits where
necessary to prevent that protection from threatening the creation of
future works or risking undue monopolization. The general limits on
protection, found in the idea-expression dichotomy and the degree-of-
similarity standard, limit protection for those works, elements, or lev-
els of abstraction, which are likely to reappear in later works even in
the absence of copying, or which must reappear in later works in
order for consumers to consider the later works reasonable
substitutes for the original copyrighted work. The specific limits,
found in the fair use doctrine and in the variety of specific limits on
protection detailed in sections 108 to 120 of the Copyright Act,
274
address particular cases where the general limits leave a compelling
need for access unaddressed. Third, application of the paradigm has
led Congress and courts to shape copyright to provide substantially
broader protection for entertaining works than for other-than-
entertaining works.
Rather than examining and critiquing each of these aspects of
copyright doctrine independently, the following Part examines the
incentives-access paradigm itself in an attempt to determine whether
the paradigm warrants the trust that courts, commentators, and
Congress have given it over the past three centuries. This examina-
excluding them from protection as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works except to the extent
that they incorporate features independent of utilitarian aspects).
274. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-20 (establishing a variety of specific limits on an author's § 106
rights designed to minimize transaction costs and ensure access to works in various instances).
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tion reveals serious flaws in the paradigm and suggests the need to
reconsider copyright's proper scope.
IV. AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF THE INCENTIVES-ACCESS PARADIGM
In defining the general limits to copyright's scope, the incen-
tives-access paradigm identifies two factors as central to defining
copyright's proper boundaries: (1) the chance of an element's coinci-
dental reappearance, and (2) later authors' need to reuse an element
in order to compete effectively. When the chance of an element's coin-
cidental reappearance or the need to reuse an element in order to
compete becomes sufficient, protecting that element would either im-
pede the production of future works or create a risk of undue monopo-
lization.275 While these two concerns may sometimes overlap,276 they
will not always or inevitably do so, and each is an independent and
sufficient justification, under the paradigm, to leave an element or
level of abstraction unprotected. Relying on this insight, copyright
doctrine has incorporated the principle that an element or level
should be left unprotected either if it is likely to reappear in later
works even in the absence of copying, or if it must reappear in later
works for consumers to consider the later works reasonable
substitutes for the original.
277
Thus, in Baker v. Selden,278 Baker did not and could not rea-
sonably argue that the similarities between his and Selden's blank ac-
counting forms were due merely to coincidence. On the contrary, not
only did Baker admit copying the form, but the sort of similarities
found in the two forms could only have resulted from copying.
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Baker could freely copy the forms
in order to produce forms that would compete effectively with
Selden's. Alternatively, in Computer Associates Intl., Inc. v. Altai,
275. See Part lII.A.1.
276. For example, with fictional works, the chance of a later work presenting a story based
upon humanity's interactions with extraterrestrials through coincidence rather than copying
may be quite high. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356-57 (holding that the common element of
human/extraterrestrial interaction was insufficient to establish substantial similarity).
Consumers may also consider works depicting such interactions as a distinct market and refuse
to consider works that fail to depict an extraterrestrial encounter to be an adequate substitute
for the first. As a result, copyright should leave the extraterrestrial interaction element of the
first work to depict such an interaction unprotected both to ensure the creation of future works,
and to limit the risk of undue monopolization.
277. See, for example, Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 707-10 (requiring the filtering out
of elements that are dictated by efficiency or by external factors, or that are found in the public
domain).
278. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
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Inc.,279 Altai could not reasonably argue that consumers would not
consider its OSCAR program a reasonable substitute for Computer
Associates's ADAPTER program unless the language of its computer
program mimicked the language of Computer Associates's program.
Most consumers purchase a computer program both unaware of, and,
so long as the program works, unconcerned with, the precise
arrangement of the programming language used.280 Nevertheless, the
court defined certain elements and levels of abstraction as
unprotected because the common training and problem-solving
approach of computer programmers made the reappearance of these
elements or levels in a later work likely, even in the absence of
copying.
28'
Because "coincidental recreation" and "necessary to compete"
are independent justifications for refusing to protect an element
under the incentives-access paradigm, we can evaluate each
justification independently. Moreover, because copyright doctrine has
incorporated each as a separate and independent justification for
denying protection to an element, an inability by either justification to
produce a sensible result draws into question that aspect of the
incentives-access paradigm and its corresponding reflection in
copyright doctrine. Yet, the necessary-to-compete justification, as it
has been applied, cannot generate sensible results even on its own
terms. Specifically, to the extent the incentives-access paradigm
suggests that we should limit copyright's protection when the
marginal deadweight loss associated with protecting a particular
element outweighs the need for an additional incentive to create that
element, we cannot do so. Courts have recognized this, and have
instead relied on common-sense intuitions about society's "need" for
access to an element to determine whether copyright should protect
an element. This common-sense approach, however, faces its own
difficulties and inevitably leads to a copyright system that provides
the most protection for the works we least need, and the least
279. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
280. In most cases, two programmers can write two programs that accomplish the same
task without using a substantially similar program code. See, for example, M. Kramer Mfg., 783
F.2d at 436 (noting that "there exists a virtually unlimited number of instruction sequences that
would enable a programmer to construct a program which performs even the more basic
algorithmic of mathematical procedures"); E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at, 1503 (recognizing that
the "defendant's duplication of the EIJ sample error table was not a requisite to compatibility").
281. See Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 708-10. See also Nimmer and Nimmer, 3
Nimmer on Copyright at 13-65 (cited in note 57).
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protection for the works we most need. The following Sections take
up each of these issues in turn.
A. Paradox: Incentive and Deadweight Loss
As a general matter, if we sought to establish when the degree
of market power that copyright creates becomes "undue" by balancing
the marginal deadweight loss against the additional incentive that
broader copyright protection for a work or element would provide, we
could not do so. Given demand and marginal cost curves of the shape
usually associated with works of authorship, the rent282 and the
deadweight loss associated with such curves will remain in roughly
constant proportion to one another without regard to the degree of
282. Economists traditionally define rent as the amount by which the sales price for each
unit of a product exceeds the average total cost for each such unit. See Scherer, Industrial
Market Structure at 14-15 (cited in note 140). This definition faces some difficulties if applied
directly to works of authorship. In most cases, where a monopoly profit or rent is expected, that
rent will be capitalized into the cost of the monopoly factors used to create the work. See
Mackaay, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2635 (cited in note 22). See also People In Brief, Orlando
Sentinel A2 (Sept. 20, 1994) (noting that Clive Cussler received $14 million for a two-book
publishing deal, that John Grisham receives $15 million a book, and that Tom Clancy receives
$13 million a book). Thus, the difference between the sums John Grisham received for his first
novel and his more recent novels represents the capitalization of the expected rent on his later
works. See, for example, Macolm Jones, Jr., Best Sellers: No Escaping Grisham's Law,
Newsweek 66 (May 8, 1995) (reporting that Grisham received $14.13 million for the film rights
to his most recent novel, The Rainmaker); People in the News, World News Digest G2 (Aug. 18,
1994) (noting that Grisham received $6 million for the more recent sale of his film rights to his
novel A Time to Kill, as compared to the $3.75 million he received for the earlier sale of his film
rights to his novel, The Chamber). If the publisher and author have done a good job of
predicting the actual rent, then the actual rent should be exactly capitalized into the author's
initial payment for the work, and the publisher should exactly break even on the resulting work.
Because of this capitalization phenomenon, the price for each copy of the work should exactly
equal the average total cost for each copy of the work, and it would appear that no rent was
earned on the work. See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 14-15 (cited in
note 140) (noting the similar result for competing monopolists). Compare Landes and Posner,
18 J. Legal Stud. at 350 (cited in note 5) (ignoring this problem in suggesting that Professor
Coase would receive an income in excess of his cost if copyright protected the Coase Theorem).
In order to avoid this difficulty, I will define rent as the amount by which the price for each
copy of the work sold exceeds what the marginal cost would have been for the last copy that
would have been sold in a perfectly competitive market. Because the marginal and average
total cost for such a copy would be equal if a perfectly competitive market is in equilibrium, see,
for example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 95 (cited in note 11), and because the rents will
usually be capitalized into the author's initial payment rather than the marginal cost of the
copies, compare Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1710-12 (cited in note 5) (discussing the capturing
of part of the rent through per-unit license pricing), this should provide an effective way to
approximate the additional income attributable to monopolistic aspects of the work's production
in the context of the works of authorship. Moreover, the results I will derive using the averaged
price model, see text accompanying notes 369-89, will turn on the averaged price received for
resources, without regard to whether that price reflects rents or costs. See also Chamberlin,
Monopolistic Competition at 194-95 (cited in note 32); Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 92-
101, 120-29 (cited in note 11).
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monopolization present. While a footnote demonstrates this point
mathematically, 2 3 the point is readily apparent. Both the rent and
the deadweight loss are functions of the extent to which an individual
can raise the price of her product above a perfectly competitive level.
The more an individual can profitably raise the price of her product
above a perfectly competitive level, the greater the rents and the
greater the deadweight loss with respect to her product. As copyright
provides an author with an increasing degree of market power, it in-
creases the extent to which the author can profitably raise her price
above a perfectly competitive level, and simultaneously increases both
the rent the author receives for her work and the deadweight loss as-
sociated with protection of her work. As a result, if we narrow copy-
right's protection to reduce the deadweight loss associated with the
copyright on a particular work, we necessarily reduce the rent the
author can expect to receive for publishing the work. By narrowing
copyright protection of, and thereby reducing the rent associated with,
certain types of work, we decrease the incentive to create or publish
those types of works, and reduce the chance that an author will invest
the resources necessary to create such a work in the first place. 284
As a result, without some external guide to determine the ap-
propriate degree of access, attempting to balance marginal incentive
(or rent) against marginal deadweight loss produces only paradox.285
If we limit a work's protection to ensure its dissemination, we neces-
sarily reduce the incentive to create such work and decrease the
chance that the work would have been created in the first place. If we
283. Proof. Let the demand curve for the market have the equation P=a-bX, where P is the
price and X is the quantity demanded. If the marginal cost is constant, and the market is a
perfectly competitive market, then Pc=C, where C is the marginal cost, and Xc=(a-C)b. If the
market is a monopoly, then marginal revenue is defined by the equation dRJdX=a-2bX. To
maximize profit, an individual will sell that quantity where the marginal revenue equals the
marginal cost, or Xm=(a-C)/2b. Her profit-maximizing price is Pm=a-b*((a-C)/2b)) or
Pm=(a+C)/2. Her rent is defined as R=Xm*(Pm-C) or R=((a-C)/2b)*(a-C)/2. (Because marginal
and average total costs are mathematically related, see, for example, Robinson, Imperfect
Competition at 27 (cited in note 11), a product that has a constant marginal cost will also have a
constant average total cost.) Simplifying, R=((a-C)**2)/4b. The deadweight loss associated with
such a monopoly is defined as Ld=((Xc-Xm)*(Pm-Pc))/2. Because Xm=Xc/2, Ld=((a-
C)/2b)*(((a+C)/2)-C)/2. Simplifying, Ld=((a-C)**2)/8b. As a result, for any slope b, between zero
and infinity, RILd=(((a-C)**2)4b)(((a-C)**2)8b)=2. Or, in simple terms, the rent, and hence
incentive, associated with any given degree of market power will always be exactly twice the
deadweight loss.
284. See, for example, Mackaay, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2638 (cited in note 22). This assumes
that individuals can estimate reasonably accurately the likely protection a court will afford a
work in the event of an infringement action before she invests her resources in the work.
285. Compare Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 341 (cited in note 5) (arguing that
the lost consumer surplus drops out of the analysis).
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increase a work's protection to increase the chance of its creation, we
necessarily increase the price the author will charge for the work and
thereby restrict access to the work if and when it is created.
Unsurprisingly, given its reflection of the incentives-access
paradigm more generally, the caselaw reflects this paradox. In
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,286 for example,
The Nation magazine obtained a purloined copy of Gerald Ford's auto-
biography, excerpted key portions of the manuscript that concerned
the Nixon pardon, and published those excerpts as part of an article
on the Nixon pardon.287 As a result of The Nation's article, Time
magazine backed out of a commitment to pay the copyright holders2 88
for the exclusive right to print prepublication excerpts from the manu-
script.28 9 To resolve the case, the incentives-access paradigm would
suggest that the Court should balance the deadweight loss associated
with granting the copyright holders the exclusive right to serialize
portions of the work against the additional incentive such a
serialization right would provide. The Court knew (or could reason-
ably determine) the facts that the paradigm directs a court to balance:
the additional incentive was the price Time magazine had promised to
pay for the serialization right; the deadweight loss was the lost value
associated with those consumers who desired but would not obtain ac-
cess to the serialized portion of the underlying work if the excerpt ran
exclusively in Time. Yet, the Court could not generate a determinate
answer from those facts. The majority insisted that the additional
revenue was vital to ensure the creation of the work (and future
works of similar character),290 while the dissent insisted that granting
protection would unduly limit dissemination of an important work
(and of similarly important works in the future).2 9' To which the
majority replied, without this incentive, the work might not have been
created in the first place.292 But what good is it, the dissent insisted,
if, after it is created, access to it is limited.293
In essence, each side's argument quickly boiled down to assert-
ing one side or the other of the incentives-access paradigm. Neither
286. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
287. Id. at 542-43.
288. In this case, President Ford had assigned his copyright with respect to the
serialization right to Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. Id. at
542.
289. See id. at 543.
290. See id. at 557.
291. See id. at 582, 588-90 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
292. See id. at 556-59.
293. See id. at 589 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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side could produce a definitive answer (or even a relevant response) to
the other side's argument, not because the facts were unavailable, but
because the facts the two sides focused on, deadweight loss and addi-
tional incentive, do not balance one another in the way that the incen-
tives-access paradigm presupposes. Instead, they are mathematically
related to one another. 294 If we assume, for example, that a work has
a demand curve that decreases at a constant rate and a flat marginal
cost curve,2 95 then whatever degree of monopolization is present, the
rent will always be twice the deadweight loss.296 As a result, even if
the Court could decide that copyright should limit its protection when,
for example, the dollar-for-dollar marginal deadweight loss begins to
exceed the marginal rent broadening copyright would provide, that
would not enable the Court to determine whether copyright should
limit or expand its protection for any given work because the addi-
tional incentive would always be twice the additional deadweight loss
for any given increase in copyright's scope. 297
To resolve this paradox, commentators have suggested that
while the incentive to authors will increase at a constant rate as copy-
right broadens its protection, the returns for that additional incentive
will not.298  Investments in works of authorship, like other invest-
ments, will encounter decreasing marginal returns as additional re-
sources are invested; as a result, a court could balance the marginal
benefit from additional incentives against the marginal deadweight
loss to determine copyright's proper scope. 299 While some commenta-
294. See note 283.
295. Those who have analyzed copyright using economics have made similar assumptions.
See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 327 & n.4 (cited in note 5) (assuming
a negatively sloping downward curve).
296. I am assuming that the slope of the demand curve lies between zero and negative
infinity (in other words the demand curve is neither perfectly horizontal or vertical), and that
the demand exceeds the marginal cost at some point along the demand curve (in other words
the product is profitable). See note 283.
297. A relatively constant relationship between increased rent and increased deadweight
loss will remain even if we allow the demand and marginal cost curves to vary somewhat from
the straight-line functions we have assumed.
298. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1715-17 (cited in note 5); Landes and
Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 341-42 (cited in note 5) (explaining that consumer and producer
surplus levels would be higher at a lower level of copyright protection).
299. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1715-17 (cited in note 5) (stating that
the point of highest allocative efficiency is the point at which the difference between aggregate
efficient gains and losses is the greatest); Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 341-42 (cited
in note 5). If done properly, application of such an approach will generate the same answers as
will the averaged price analysis presented later in this Article. See Parts VI and VII.
Professors Landes and Posner's analysis is flawed, however, because it assumes that the
resources required to produce additional works of authorship will be drawn from markets that
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tors have attempted to apply such an approach,300 courts and
Congress have generally eschewed such an approach in favor of a
common-sense approach to the monopolization issue.301 Under this
approach, if access to an element seems more than merely desirable,
if it seems necessary in the ordinary sense of the word, then courts
and Congress have generally concluded that protecting such an
are perfectly competitive and have perfectly internalized all costs and benefits. As a result, they
can assume that the marginal cost of such resources will equal the marginal social value in
their former use, and need not, therefore, separately account for the lost social value associated
with the uses to which the resources would have been devoted but-for broader copyright
protection. Thus, their equation 16 states: W=f(N)w-E(N, z), where W is total welfare, N is the
number of (equivalent) works created, w is the consumer and producer surplus per work before
deducting the cost of creating the work, and z is the level of protection copyright provides.
Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 341. To account for the opportunity cost associated
with drawing additional resources into the production of works of authorship, this equation
should state: W=f(N)w-E(N, z)-V(N, z), where V is the lost value associated with the products
that would have been produced had the resources not been devoted to the creation of additional
works of authorship. Professors Landes and Posner might intend to incorporate V into E, the
cost of creating additional works, but their discussion of E suggests that it represents the
increasing private cost of expressing a work as copyright protection increases, because of the in-
creased need to take care to avoid infringement, the increased transaction costs to obtain the
requisite permission to reuse elements, and the increasing administrative cost associated with
broadening copyright protection. See id. at 341, 344, 345-56. They make no mention of the
opportunity cost involved, and I must, therefore, assume that Professors Landes and Posner
have assumed that this social cost is fully reflected in E, the private cost of creating additional
works. Ironically, they appear to have retained this assumption even though they recognized
that copyright prevents perfect competition, see Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1710-15 (describing
various inefficiencies associated with a hypothetical case of copyright protection); Landes and
Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 354-55 (suggesting that an author would delay introduction of an
original work to obtain licensing revenues for derivative works; such revenues would only exist
if both derivative purchasing and the derivative selling markets are not perfectly competitive),
and they presumably realize that in the absence of perfect competition, the private cost
associated with resources drawn from other investments will not equal the marginal social
value associated with such resources' former use, even if we continue to assume that resources
are infinitely divisible. See note 13. Their failure to account for the difference between private
and social cost associated with broader copyright protection causes their analysis to identify a
broader-than-optimal standard of copyright protection as optimal, and renders it unreliable.
See also Samuelson, et al., 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2314 n.14, 2339-40 (cited in note 13) (defining
market failure in a similarly flawed manner).
300. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1715 (cited in note 5) (applying this
balancing approach). To the extent that Professor Fisher reaches a different conclusion
concerning copyrights proper scope than I will, compare id. at 1717, with text accompanying
notes 528-30, he provides no principled basis to determinate the aggregate efficiency loss caused
by forbidding each successive use, and as a result, he underestimates such loss. See Fisher, 101
Harv. L. Rev. at 1716.
301. See, for example, CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "ideas are too important to the advancement of
knowledge to permit them to be under private ownership"); Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488
C'Corollary to this axiom [that copyright protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea
itself,] is a strong public policy permitting all to use freely the ideas contained in a copyrighted
work"). See also Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874 (10th Cir. 1938) (A
copyright upon a form of contractual provisions should not be construed so as to impinge upon
the natural right of persons to make contracts containing the same contractual provisions and
creating like contractual rights and obligations").
COPYRIGHT'S PARADIGM
element would be undesirable. Thus, copyright leaves useful
products, facts, and theories unprotected not because, on balance, the
marginal cost from protecting such elements or works necessarily
exceeds the marginal benefit, but because access to such other-than-
entertaining elements or works is "necessary" in a way that, from this
common-sense perspective, the need for access to an entertaining
work can never be.
B. "Necessary" Elements
The belief that access to useful works presents, in some sense,
a qualitatively different issue than access to entertaining works is not
a new one. The Stationer's Company advanced a similar argument in
its 1643 petition to the Star Chamber:
(1) Books (except the Sacred Bible) are not of such generall use and necessity,
as some staple commodities are, which feed and cloath us .... and many of
them are rarities onely and usefull only to a very few, and of no necessity to
any, few men bestow more in Books then what they can spare out of their su-
perfluities, and the gain of such as live by sellings of Books is not so great, as
to raise them to an equality of riches with many others of sordid and ignoble
professions. And therefore propriety in Books maintained amongst Stationers,
cannot have the same effect, in order to the public, as it has in other com-
modoties of more public use and necessity.
30 2
Because, the argument goes, entertaining works are luxuries, while
useful articles and other-than-entertaining works are closer to neces-
sities, creating a monopoly in the markets for entertaining works will
necessarily be less harmful than a corresponding degree of monopoly
in the markets for other-than-entertaining works.
In substantial part, this argument is not economic, but
moral-an issue not of how much people are willing to pay for certain
things, but of the difference between the things we need and the
things we can manage without. From this moral perspective, the
harm a person suffers when she is denied access to a life-saving medi-
cine cannot be measured by the price she would have paid for the
medicine; the value of life goes beyond any mere dollar figure. We
should, therefore, exercise greater care when we permit surcharges
that add to the price of necessities, than when we permit surcharges
302. Arber, ed., 1 A Transcript of the Registers at 587 (cited in note 23).
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that add to the price of luxuries.1 3° In determining copyright's proper
scope, this principle suggests that, whatever the dollar extent of the
deadweight loss associated with broad copyright protection of an
other-than-entertaining work, when compared to the deadweight loss
associated with broad copyright protection of an entertaining work,
broad protection of the other-than-entertaining work presents a far
more serious concern than broad protection of the entertaining work.
The other-than-entertaining work, if not a necessity, is at least much
closer to a necessity than the entertaining work. From this moral
perspective, access to an other-than-entertaining work is, therefore,
more important than access to the entertaining work, and any degree
of monopolization would, for such necessities, be an "undue" degree.
This argument also has an economic component. Specifically,
perceptions of whether a work is a necessity may serve as a proxy for
the deadweight loss that protecting the work would likely create.
From this perspective, the more necessary access to a work or element
seems, the greater the deadweight loss that would likely result if
copyright were to protect that work or element. If we want to avoid
giving copyright a scope that will create a certain level of deadweight
loss for any given work, copyright should narrow its protection as a
court perceives the work as becoming more of a necessity. For such
works, the deadweight loss will reach the "undue" threshold at a
narrower scope of protection than will protection of "unnecessary"
works. Again, the argument concludes, to the extent that other-than-
entertaining works are more necessary than entertaining works,
copyright should narrow its protection for other-than-entertaining
works to avoid creating an undue deadweight loss.
Whether understood from an economic or a moral perspective,
this common-sense approach eliminates the need to balance
incentives and access, and relies on intuitions concerning the
importance of a work to society to determine whether copyright
should limit its protection for a particular work.304  From this
303. As an example of such greater care, courts typically point to the patent system's
requirement that the Patent Office examine an invention's novelty before a patent may issue
with respect to a useful article. See Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 102 ("To give to the author of
the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty
has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters-patent, not of copyright"); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742 ("We
think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger private preserve than Congress intended to
be set aside in the public market without a patent"). See also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 ('Unlike a
patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed").
304. Compare Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 346 (cited in note 174). Copyright could limit
its protection for such a work by denying protection of any sort, see 17 U.S.C. § 112 (denying
protection for useful articles), by labeling certain elements or aspects of the work "ideas," see 17
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perspective, a court need only determine whether an element or a
work is more like something that people need, or more like something
people merely want, in order to identify the situations where
extending protection would likely create a risk of undue
monopolization. When a work or element begins to cross the line from
luxury to necessity, we can view protecting such a work as either
imposing a surcharge on a necessity, or creating a risk of undue
deadweight loss; but in either case, the common-sense approach
suggests that at that point, a court should define a corresponding
limit to copyright's scope and confine copyright's protection for such a
work or element.
Three difficulties mar the utility of this common-sense ap-
proach, however. First, even if we accept the notion that access to
necessary works is more important than access to luxuries, this ap-
proach leaves unclear how much of a surcharge or deadweight loss we
should be prepared to accept. As others have recognized, we generally
presume that any such monopoly surcharge or corresponding
deadweight loss is undesirable305 Presumably, a proponent of this
approach would argue that we must be willing to accept some
surcharge or deadweight loss in order to ensure an adequate incentive
to create works of authorship. Yet, this approach provides no
principled basis for deciding how much incentive is "adequate," or how
much surcharge or deadweight loss is acceptable3 06 As a result, it
U.S.C. § 102(b), by requiring a more substantial degree of similarity before finding infringement
of such a work, see, for example, Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488 (requiring "substantial similarity
not only of the general ideas [of the works] but of the expression of those ideas as well"), or by
finding that the copying of certain aspects or elements of such a work are an otherwise fair use,
see 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (establishing that the type of work at issue is the first factor in a fair
use calculus). See also Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 310.
305. See Plant, 1 Economica at 170 (cited in note 12) ("The output which monopoly alone
can evoke is not normally regarded as preferable to the alternative products which free
competition would allow to emerge"). See also Arnold Plant, The New Commerce in Ideas and
Intellectual Property 15 (U. London, 1953) ("[A] special case for a monopoly for publishers cannot
rest on the general proposition that if business men are enabled to make monopoly profits, some
of them will be devoted to good works").
306. The approach ultimately relies on the likelihood that an element will reappear in later
works, even in the absence of copying, to define the limits of the permissible surcharge or
deadweight loss. Thus, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742, the court discussed the
issue in terms of conferring a monopoly on the plaintiff if the jeweled bee pin were protected.
Yet it is hard to imagine that consumers would not consider other forms of jewelry adequate
substitutes for such bee pins. Thus, the decision seems to rest more on the fact that bees are a
natural subject for jewelry and that such jewelry would likely occur in the future even without
copying. In other words, "the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger private preserve than
[copyright should protect]," id., because coincidence alone would likely lead others to fashion
such jewelry even in the absence of copying. As will be discussed, relying on the chance of
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provides no principled basis for determining when the degree of
monopolization that extending copyright's protection to a particular
work or element would create becomes undue.
Second, if we are relying on perceptions about whether a work
or element is a necessity to serve as a proxy for the deadweight loss
that protecting the work or element would likely create, such an ap-
proach will, in many cases, generate a misleading indication of the
likely deadweight loss associated with such protection. Deadweight
loss consists of two components: (1) the extent of the lost satisfaction
each consumer experiences who is unable to purchase a product be-
cause of its higher, more monopolistic price, and (2) the number of
consumers who experience such loss.307 The first factor is a function of
the degree of market power associated with a particular work. The
greater the market power, the more substantial the monopolistic
mark-up on the product, and as a general matter, the higher the aver-
age deadweight loss per consumer.3 8 The second factor is a function
of the extent of the market for the work. The more people who desire
to purchase the work, the more people who will, all other things being
equal, experience the average deadweight loss if the work is priced
more monopolistically. 309 While perceptions about necessity may
serve as an adequate proxy for market power, or the average dead-
weight loss each consumer will experience if copyright were to protect
a work, it does not incorporate a consideration of the size of the rele-
vant market, and will not, therefore, usually reflect the number of
consumers who will experience such a deadweight loss.310
For example, courts often cite Einstein's theory of relativity as
an example of an element too important to society for copyright to
coincidental recreation alone would lead to a value-based return on works of authorship that
would be both unfair and inefficient. See Part V.C.
307. See Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 358 (cited in note 12). See also Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
107-10 (cited in note 47).
308. For a work that has a demand curve that slopes downward at a constant rate and a
flat marginal cost curve, the average deadweight loss per consumer will be exactly half the
monopolistic mark-up for any given degree of monopolization. See note 283.
309. For a work that has a demand curve that slopes downward at a constant rate and a
flat marginal cost curve, any degree of monopolization will cut in half the number of units sold,
leaving half the consumers who would have purchased the work in a perfectly competitive
market to do without or make do with the best available substitute. See id.
310. In one sense, "necessity" might refer to those things everyone needs in order to
survive. Thus, the Stationers' Company referred to food and clothing, which are items everyone
requires. Courts, however, have defined necessities to include everything that is useful, even if
it is useful only to a small part of society. See, for example, Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103-05
(leaving an accounting system unprotected because it was useful); Lotus Development, 49 F.3d
at 818-19 (leaving Lotus's menu structure unprotected); Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1142 (leaving an
undulating tube bike rack unprotected); Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488-89 (providing narrow
protection for a guide on playing Scrabble well).
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protect.31' Because of its importance, extending copyright protection
to the substance of Einstein's theory would likely give Einstein (or his
heirs) considerable market power and enable him to set a profit-
maximizing price for access to his theory significantly higher than the
price he could set if copyright refused to protect the substance of his
formula. Yet, even if we accept the intuition that extending
protection to the substance of his theory would allow Einstein to
mark-up the price for access to his work substantially, thereby
creating a significant loss in satisfaction for those who could not
afford the higher, more monopolistic price, we cannot determine the
total deadweight loss such protection would cause until we have
determined the number of people who would experience such a loss.
Moreover, to the extent the number of people who experience such
disutility is relatively small, relying on the average deadweight loss
as a proxy for total deadweight loss may prove misleading. For
example, if copyright extended broad protection to Einstein's theory
and to the movie E.T.-The Extraterrestrial, we might assume that
the copyright on Einstein's theory would impose a higher average
deadweight loss than the copyright on the movie.3 2 Yet, we cannot
draw any conclusion concerning the total deadweight loss each
copyright imposes, unless we know how many consumers experience
such disutility. If the number of individuals who experience such
disutility with respect to Einstein's theory is sufficiently fewer than
311. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ('These would be no more than Shakespeare's 'ideas' in the
play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of the
Origin of Species").
312. In addition, I have assumed that courts' perceptions of necessity serve as an adequate
proxy for market power, or per consumer deadweight loss. Yet, in many cases, courts refuse to
protect elements that do not appear to create any risk of undue market power. For example,
courts have narrowed copyright's protection for quasi-fictional theories of historical events, such
as Hoehling's theory of a saboteur aboard the Hindenberg, or Nash's theory that Dilinger
survived to hide his treasure in California, on the grounds that such "facts" must remain freely
available to the public. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978-79; Nash, 899 F.2d at 1541-43. Similarly,
courts have limited protection for designer costumes, clothing, artistic bike racks, and spoked
hubcabs, on the ground that such items are useful and must, therefore, remain freely available
to the public. See Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 455 (finding that a costume was a useful article not
protected by copyright); Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that a bike rack
was a useful article not protected by copyright); Norris Industries, 696 F.2d at 922-24 (finding
that a wire-spoke hub cap was a useful article not protected by copyright); Fashion Originators
Guild, 114 F.2d at 84 (finding that clothing designs were not protected by copyright). It is hard
to imagine that even reasonably broad protection of any of these items would create any
significant degree of market power in the markets for such items. As a result, the assumption
that broad copyright protection for other-than-entertaining works invariably presents a greater
likelihood of undue market power than broad protection for entertaining works is untrue in at
least some cases. See, for example, Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307 (recognizing that "the
Hughes biography may not be a profound work").
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the number who experience such disutility with respect to the
movie,313 broad protection of Einstein's formula might create a smaller
total deadweight loss than would broad protection of the movie E.T.
In any event, because deadweight loss is a function of both the
extent of the deadweight loss each frustrated consumer experiences
and the number of frustrated consumers, we cannot rely on percep-
tions concerning the extent of the likely per consumer deadweight loss
alone to estimate total deadweight loss.14 Even if the copyright on an
entertaining work imposes only a small deadweight loss on each con-
sumer unable to afford the work's higher, more monopolistic, price,
such small losses can quickly add up if spread over a sufficiently large
audience base. Moreover, to the extent the consumer base for
accounting systems, scientific principles, or other other-than-
entertaining works will sometimes be much smaller than the
audience base for entertaining works, broad copyright protection for
entertaining works will sometimes impose more substantial
deadweight losses than would broad copyright protection for other-
than-entertaining works.
31S
313. This assumption is plausible if we limit our deadweight loss analysis to first-order
deadweight losses. The number of physicists who actually understand and use Einstein's theory
in their work is far smaller than the number of people who saw the movie E.T. See John Horn,
"Fugitive" Holds On; "Jurassic Park" Eyes Worldwide Mark, Chicago Tribune N-4 (Sept. 17,
1993) (reporting worldwide gross theatre receipts of $660 million for the movie E.T.); Bernard
Weinraub, 'Waterworld" Disappointment as Box Office Receipts Lag, N.Y. Times D1 (July 31,
1995) (reporting domestic theatre receipts of nearly $400 million for the movie E.T.). If we
include those individuals who recite and define the elements of Einstein's theory without any
real understanding of or use for it in our count of individuals who would be denied access given
broad copyright protection of the theory, then we would need to revamp our estimate as to the
likely average deadweight loss. Such persons might lose the use of the theory as a means of
demonstrating their intelligence, but their disutility from being denied access would not likely
be significantly more than the disutility experienced by those denied access to, or forced to wait
for access to, the movie E.T.
314. See Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 358 (cited in note 12).
315. See, for example, Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307 (recognizing that the Hughes
biography may have value only for "future biographers (if any) of Hughes or for historians or
social scientists"). Moreover, the rationale that Baker articulated in justifying narrow
protection for useful works is also inadequate. The Court sought to justify the distinction
between useful and entertaining works on the grounds that an author creates a useful work so
that it can be used. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 102-04. Even if one accepts the Court's assumption
that Selden published the books in order to communicate his accounting system to the public,
rather than to earn a reasonable return on his authorship investment, the Courts reasoning
cannot support the suggested use-entertainment or use-explanation line. Consider two possible
interpretations of the Courtes reasoning. First, the Court might have been suggesting that
because consumers purchased Selden's book in order to use the system, granting a copyright to
the system would somehow frustrate this purpose. Id. at 103-05. Selden was not, however,
seeking an injunction against the use of his accounting system; he was merely trying to enjoin
Baker from publishing a set of forms copied from his copyrighted works. While allowing Baker
to produce and distribute copied forms might make the use of the accounting system less
expensive, similar reasoning would apply equally well to entertaining works. If others were
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Nevertheless, even if relying on perceptions of necessity would
generate mistakes in estimating the deadweight loss in some cases,
we might assume that other-than-entertaining works will usually
have a consumer base as large as that typical for entertaining works.
If we made such an assumption, then we could rely on the degree of
market power that extending copyright protection to particular works,
elements, or levels would provide as an indicator of the total
deadweight loss such protection would likely cause. Given the same
audience base, a greater degree of market power will impose a greater
deadweight loss than would a lesser degree of market power. To the
extent an assumption of equally sized consumer bases is accurate, and
to the extent other-than-entertaining works are more "necessary"
than entertaining works, perceptions of necessity may correctly
suggest that extensive protection for other-than-entertaining works,
as a class, would create a more substantial deadweight loss than
extensive protection for entertaining works.316
Alternatively, from the moral perspective, even if we are not
certain that the typical other-than-entertaining work has as large an
audience base as the typical entertaining work, we might argue that
the exact dollar magnitude of particular deadweight losses is not ma-
allowed to produce lower priced copies of, for example, an original "ornamental illustration,"
presumably the copiers could underprice the original work and thereby make experiencing the
"pleasure in... contemplation" that is the illustration's "final end" less expensive. Id.
Second, the Court might have been referring to the training effect present in learning
Selden's accounting system. Once a consumer has learned Selden's accounting systems, she
would not consider supplies for other accounting systems adequate substitutes for the supplies
needed to use Selden's system because of the retraining costs she would have to incur in
learning to use the supplies designed for use with other accounting systems. As a result,
protecting the system might leave purchasers of the system open to exploitation by monopolistic
pricing of the supplies needed to use the system. But see Farrell and Shapiro, 19 RAND J.
Econ. at 123-24 (cited in note 167) (noting that competition for future consumers may limit the
ability to exploit such market power). Yet it is hard to see how this exploitation differs from the
monopolistic pricing of merchandise associated with popular films or of the monopolistic pricing
of sequels. Indeed, sequels are designed and intended specifically to take advantage of a similar
sort of training that occurs when the original work successfully involves us with the characters
and situations it presents.
316. As with any attempt at classification and line-drawing, attempting to classify works as
either other-than-entertaining and hence deserving of narrow protection, or entertaining and
hence deserving of broad protection, may generate some mistakes where we classify a particular
work as other-than-entertaining when it, in fact, deserves broad protection, or vice-versa. Such
mistakes are an inevitable part of line-drawing, however, and do not undermine the desirability
of line-drawing so long as the cost associated with such mistakes does not exceed the cost of
drawing additional lines or creating additional classifications. See, for example, Fisher, 101
Harv. L. Rev. at 1719-22 (cited in note 5). For a more general discussion of the costs and
benefits associated with classification and line-drawing, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical
Legal Studies 15-63 (Harvard U., 1987).
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terial. To the extent that a work or element seems more like a neces-
sity than a luxury, we should, from this moral perspective, be more
careful in extending protection to such a work or element without re-
gard to the particular dollar deadweight loss in order to avoid impos-
ing surcharges on necessities. In short, we can arguably rely on per-
ceptions of necessity to define where copyright should limit or narrow
its protection either because such perceptions will, under certain as-
sumptions, indicate the likely extent of the deadweight losses that
more extensive protection would create, or because such perceptions
would identify those necessities for which we should take particular
care to minimize the monopoly surcharge broader copyright protection
would enable an author to charge.
Even if we accept, however, that perceptions of necessity can
serve as an accurate indicator of deadweight loss, or can identify situ-
ations where a surcharge would be particularly inappropriate,
limiting protection for either reason is unwise. Such an approach
would, by definition, limit protection for those works we most need.
Indeed, it limits protection precisely because of our need for the work.
As a result, even if copyright could better ensure access to such a
necessary work once it has been created by limiting its protection for
such work, limiting protection would reduce the chance that the work
would have been created in the first place. To assert, therefore, that
we do not want copyright to force others "to reinvent the wheel" 317 is,
at best, problematic. If requiring others to reinvent, rather than copy,
the wheel is necessary to ensure the invention of the wheel in the first
place,318s then obviously, we should require others to do their own
work, that is reinvent, rather than copy, in order to ensure the
wheel's creation.
More generally, we should not rely on perceptions of necessity
to determine copyright's proper limits because such perceptions of ne-
cessity will, by definition, more or less directly reflect the social value
of the work. In economic terms, providing any given degree of copy-
right protection will impose increasing deadweight losses with respect
317. See E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1498 n.11. See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 354;
Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 310 CIt is just such wasted effort that the proscription against
the copyright of ideas and facts, and to a lesser extent the privilege of fair use, are designed to
prevent').
318. Of course, we can never be certain what exactly any given increase in copyright's
protection will lead to. As a result, we should work with typical or average works of authorship
in determining copyright's proper scope, and leave the decision over which works to create to
the market and to individual genius. See Part VI.B.2.
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to any given work as the work's social value increases.3 9 The more
valuable a work to society, the greater the deadweight loss that any
given degree of copyright protection would create. As a result, if we
limit copyright's protection to avoid excessive protection for necessary
works, then we will necessarily limit copyright's protection for those
works that are most valuable to society. To the extent broader
protection for a work corresponds to a greater incentive to create such
work, limiting copyright's protection for such works necessarily leads
to a copyright system that provides the least protection for those
works we most value. Such narrowed protection will reduce the
incentive to invest in such "necessary" works, when compared to the
incentive to invest in "unnecessary" works, and reduce the chance
that, or delay the time before which, an author will create any given
needful work. As a result, instead of ensuring society's access to
needful works, narrowing protection for necessary works is likely to
reduce society's access to such works by reducing the number of such
works created in the first place.
2 0
C. Conclusion
This analysis indicates serious difficulties in relying on a risk
of undue monopolization to generate sensible results even on its own
terms. Because deadweight loss will usually correspond directly to
the rent (or incentive to create a particular work), for any given
degree of copyright protection, we cannot identify when the degree of
monopolization becomes undue by balancing the marginal incentive
against the marginal deadweight loss that broadening copyright's
protection would cause. Such an approach produces only paradox.
Courts have sought to avoid the paradox inherent in attempting such
a balance by relying on their perceptions of society's need for, or the
319. For example, for a work that has a demand curve that slopes downward at a constant
rate and a flat marginal cost curve, the social value of the product will always equal three times
the deadweight loss, regardless of the market power associated with the work, if the social value
of the work equals the sum of the author's monopoly profit and the consumer surplus associated
with the work.
320. See John Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ.
337, 348 (1993) ("As I said at the beginning, the intellectual property that is well protected is
not intellectual property of great value or great creative merit, and the intellectual property
that is of great originality and great creative merit is not at all well protected. The result is
that quite disproportionate resources are attracted to producing these essentially second-rate,
but fortuitously favored, activities"). Compare Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 344
(cited in note 5) ("We know that the optimal extent of copyright protection tends to rise with the
value of a work").
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usefulness of, a work or element to determine whether copyright
should protect the work or element. However, this common-sense
approach faces its own central difficulties. First, it provides no
principled basis for determining when the deadweight loss copyright
creates becomes "undue." Second, common-sense perceptions of
necessity are not always a good indicator of the deadweight loss that
extending protection would impose. Third and most importantly,
even if they were, or we found persuasive the moral principle that
access to necessary works is qualitatively more important than access
to luxuries, relying on perceptions of necessity alone inevitably leads
to a copyright system that provides the least protection for the works
that we most need. Indeed, it provides the least protection for such
works precisely because we most need them. Yet, such an approach
frustrates the very purpose it aims to serve. By narrowing its
protection for such works, copyright will lead to the creation of fewer
such works, as the lower incentive copyright thereby provides will
likely lead to less investment in such works. Such narrowed
protection is likely, therefore, to deny everyone access to some such
needful works (by failing to provide an adequate incentive to ensure
such work's creation) where broader protection would have ensured
the work's creation and thereby guaranteed at least some degree of
access. 3
21
While we might rely on coincidence alone to define copyright's
appropriate limits-by refusing to protect an element when coinci-
dence provides a plausible explanation for an element's reappear-
ance-coincidence cannot justify many of the limits copyright pres-
ently imposes on its protection.3 22 As a result, if we retain some sense
that some elements are too important to society for copyright to pro-
tect, yet do not want a copyright system that encourages the creation
of less essential over more essential works, then we must turn away
from the incentives-access paradigm and consider a new approach to
defining copyright's proper limits. The next Part begins developing
321. We might try to balance the lost value associated with those works that would not be
created against the gains in access to existing works; however, courts have not done so. See
notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
322. For example, coincidence alone cannot justify refusing to extend protection to an
original accounting system or to an original menu structure such as that Lotus 1-2-3 employs.
Yet courts and commentators consider limits on the protection of such original elements an
essential part of the copyright system. See, for example, Lotus Development, 49 F.3d at 817-19.
See also Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 341, 350 (cited in note 5) (relying on excessive
rent as the basis for denying copyright protection for the Coase Theorem, after explaining that
deadweight loss is not relevant to determining copyrights appropriate limits; also identifying
copyright protection of the Coase Theorem as creating such rents, yet ignoring similar rents
copyright creates for popular authors such as Tom Clancy, Scott Turow, and John Grisham).
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such a new approach by considering the question of who creates the
value of a work of authorship.
V. INTERLUDE: JOINT VALUE GOODS
Implicit in the battle between more or less copyright protection
lies a sometimes hidden debate over the worth of an author's labor.
The debate has centered around two competing positions. First, those
commentators who argue for a narrower scope to copyright protection
typically assert that an author should be entitled to the minimum
sum necessary to ensure the work's creation and production.323
Second, those commentators who argue for a broader scope to
copyright protection typically assert that an author should be entitled
to the full value of his creative work.324
In essence, the debate centers on the issue of whether an
author should receive, and consumers should have to pay, the cost of
producing a creative work, or the value of that work. In making the
claim for a broad scope for copyright protection, commentators typi-
cally assert that an author should be entitled to the value of a work of
his own creation. The proposition can sound innocuous if artfully
323. See Macaulay, Copyright, in 1 The Speeches of Macaulay at 235, 240-41 (cited in note
2); Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 286 (cited in note 5) ('In fact, why is the author's moral claim to
be paid more than his persuasion costs any stronger than the claim of others also responsible for
producing his book: the publisher, the printer, the bookseller, and those responsible for the
literature of the past that inspired him?"). Compare Goldstein, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 82
(cited in note 41) ('CIf it would have taken no more than $100,000 to get Margaret Mitchell to sit
down at her typewriter to pound out 'Gone With the Wind,' and to get her publisher to publish
the book, this is all they should receive [according to the low protectionists]"). From an
economic point of view, we should not focus on the incentives to create any given work, as this is
misleading. Instead, we should focus on whether the incentives to create works of authorship as
a class are adequate, leaving the decision as to which work will be produced to those in the
industry. See Part VI.B.2.
324. See, for example, Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 ('The central principle on which this
[royalty on home recording equipment] hinges is this: The right of those who create television
programs and feature films to own what they create") (statement of Jack Valenti, president of
Motion Picture Assn of America) C'Hearings"); Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 1.1 (cited in note 5)
(suggesting that copyright "entitles copyright owners to capture the full value that consumers
attach to their works"); Goldstein, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 84 (cited in note 41); Gary
Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five
Accidents, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 381, 385 (1986) ('CWhatever its origins, modern copyright
law implicitly embraces the labor theory-that an author is entitled to the fruits of his labor");
Interview with former Register of Copyrights, David Ladd, 29 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 334, 337 (1985) (suggesting that a copyright owner is entitled to "compensation... based
upon what the public is willing to pay" for every use of a copyrighted work).
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phrased, and the proponents of broadening copyright are usually car-
eful to focus on the author's "central" role in creating the work,
32 5 im-
plicitly downplaying the role others have played in creating the
product and its value. Careful phrasing should not, however, mislead
us as to the nature of the author's contribution.
Without denying the hard work and creativity that an author
may have invested in a work, we should also recognize two groups of
other individuals whose efforts, as much as those of the author, are
factual predicates of the market value of any given work of author-
ship: (1) those whose efforts made possible the physical creation and
mass-market dissemination of the work; and (2) those whose efforts
created a pool of spendable resources with which consumers can pur-
chase the work. The absence of the efforts of the individuals compris-
ing either of these groups would, as purely a factual matter, radically
reduce, if not completely eliminate, the market value of any given
work.
A. Creating the Physical Product
With respect to the physical creation of a work of authorship,
courts and commentators have long recognized that an author will
often build on pre-existing public domain material or on a pre-existing
copyrighted work.32  The connection between earlier works and the
"new" work may be obvious, as in the case of a film based directly on
an existing play or novel,327 or the connection may be more tenuous, as
in the case of an impressionistic painting that has been influenced by
325. The usual approach is simply to identify the work as belonging solely to the author,
and leave implicit the conclusion that the author solely created the work's value as well. See
Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 1.1 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the "copyright owner [is entitled] to
capture the full value that consumers attach to their works").
326. See, for example, Kaplan, An Unhurried View at 2 (cited in note 12); Umbreit, 87 U.
Pa. L. Rev. at 942 (cited in note 102); Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright
Theory, 10 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. 423, 430-32 (1992).
327. See Kalem, 222 U.S. at 55 (holding a film-maker who produced a silent film that
followed the story of Ben Hur liable for infringement); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 301 (holding that an
artist who created a statue of two persons sitting on a bench with eight puppies infringed the
copyright on a photograph of the same scene); Daly, 6 Fed. Cases at 1132 (holding that a play
that included a last-second rescue of a man from the path of an onrushing train infringed an
earlier play that included a very similar scene). Yet, even with respect to such obvious
borrowing, the question of infringement may remain difficult. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ('I find, therefore, that, whilst the
defendants' writers had access to the Play and undoubtedly had it constantly before their minds
when they were making the scenario for the Picture, they did not copy anything therein or take
anything therefrom which was protected by copyright, and that, as a matter of law, therefore,
they did not infringe the plaintiffs' copyrighe'), reversed, 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding




the works of Matisse.328 A later work may build on a theme or context
established by an earlier work,29 or offer a contrast to the theme or
context of an earlier work.330 In each of these cases, the earlier work
influences and inspires the later work,331 and however a court resolves
the legal issue of infringement, we must recognize that, as a purely
factual matter, the later work reflects the combination of the talents
of the earlier authors and the talents of the work's recognized author.
Even for the author who creates an entirely novel work
(assuming that is possible), the work itself would be of very little
value without some means for making it generally available.332 As
should be readily apparent, numerous other products are necessary
factual predicates for the physical production and distribution of
every work of authorship. In the case of a literary work, for example,
the availability of the pen, paper, and the printing press are essential
prerequisites to the work's widespread distribution 33 Without these
items and the efforts of those who invented them, the value of the lit-
erary work would be radically reduced, if not eliminated.
More recently, copy machines, video-cassette recorders, and bi-
nary storage and distribution technology, such as CD-ROMs and the
Internet, serve as reminders that the market value of a work of
authorship depends directly on the technology available to distribute
the work.334 As did the printing press for written works four centuries
328. Compare John Livingston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu: A Study in the Ways of the
Imagination (1927) (tracing the genesis of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's two poems 'The Rime of
the Ancient Mariner" and "Kubla Khan" in preexisting literary material).
329. See National Comics Pubs., Inc. v. Fawcett Pubs., Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir.
1951) (defining the standard to determine whether Captain Marvel infringed the copyright in
Superman comic strips); Detective Comics, 111 F.2d at 432 (finding that the plaintiffs Superman
character was infringed by the defendanes Wonderman character).
330. See Warner Brothers, 720 F.2d at 243-45 (finding that a television series entitled The
Greatest American Hero did not infringe motion pictures, television shows, and comic books
based on the Superman character). See also Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 757-58 (finding that
placing Disney characters in an adult, counter-culture setting was infringing); Greenberg, 11
Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 29 (cited in note 38).
331. See, for example, Litman, 39 Emory L. J. at 966-67, 1008-11 (cited in note 5); Umbreit,
87 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 942 (cited in note 102).
332. Compare Goldstein, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 81 (cited in note 41) (recognizing dis-
tribution technology as a prerequisite for widespread distribution of works of authorship).
333. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 286 (cited in note 5). See also David Lange, At Play in
the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate
Millennium, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. 139, 144-47 (1992) (discussing how copyright law has been
forced to adapt to the technological revolution).
334. See, for example, Malcolm Jones, Jr., with Ray Sawhill, Who Owns the Word?,
Newsweek at 71-72 (Aug. 14, 1995) (noting how dramatically technology has changed the
publishing industry).
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ago,335 these more recent advances open whole new horizons for exist-
ing and future works of authorship, vastly increasing the market
value associated with these works.336 Given that the combination of
the distribution technology and a copyrighted work creates the added
market value, we cannot possibly assign the added value to one or the
other simply as a factual matter.337
B. Creating the Work's Value
Putting to one side the essential role others always play in the
physical creation and dissemination of the work, however, a more
important consideration remains. Whoever is responsible, factually,
for creating the physical product itself, the value of the product in our
market economy will always be joint because it depends entirely on
whether consumers have any "surplus" 338 resources with which to
purchase the product.
Imagine, if you will, a society with just one product: the essen-
tials of life. Everyone in the society works full-time as a self-sufficient
farmer to supply the food, clothing, and shelter essential to his or her
family's survival. Over time, individuals develop techniques that
permit them to supply more of these essentials than is necessary for
their own survival. This surplus, which might exist in actual goods or
in the creation of leisure time, represents the start of a market econ-
335. See Kaplan, An Unhurried View at 2 (cited in note 12) (discussing the invention of the
printing press); Lange, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 140 (cited in note 333) (same).
336. See James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the
VCR 291 (W.W. Norton, 1987). Compare Lange, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 146 (cited in note
333) (stating that "today's technologies are designed to change the way we think about
property... forever").
337. This has not stopped people from trying. Compare, for example, the various attempts
to attribute the added value resulting from the VCR to one side or the other, as purely a factual
matter. Compare Lardner, Fast Forward at 247-48 (cited in note 336) C'Here is what the home
tapers use to harm our industry. It is nothing but a pile of plastic and chemicals and oxides and
spindles, and it is useless until it comes alive with copyrighted music from those who we
represent' (quoting Stanley Gortikov, president, Recording Industry of America)); id. at 263
('Japanese machines do not create entertainment. The American motion picture industry does"
(quoting Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America)); id. at 266 ('Underneath all the
legal arguments and legal labels that we've thrown around in this case, the case is really very
simple and straightforward. Petitioners have created a billion dollar industry based entirely on
the taking of somebody else's property" (quoting Stephen Kroft, oral argument to the Court in
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984))), with id. at 291 C(Most of the
video dealers thought that Hollywood ought to be thanking them-and the electronics indus-
try-for a new source of revenue, not only on current movies but on 'a lot of movies that were ly-
ing around in a vault somewhere'" (quoting Ira Gomberg)); id. ( This [the proceeds from tape
sales] is all gravy money" (quoting George Atkinson, president, Video Station)).
338. "Surplus" refers to the resources left over after a consumer purchases those items she
considers more essential. See J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital 38-41 (Oxford U., 2d ed. 1946).
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omy because the surplus can be offered in trade for other goods, creat-
ing a demand that had not previously existed.
Assume further that this demand leads to the creation of a sec-
ond product: works of authorship. 339 After the introduction of this
second product, the wealth of society increases. Society now has both
the essentials and a luxury, one form of entertainment. It would be
improper, however, to attribute, as simply a factual matter, the in-
crease in wealth due to the introduction of works of authorship exclu-
sively to the suppliers of the second product because the combination
of the two products, rather than either product on its own, leads to
the added wealth. In the absence of either the essentials or the works
of authorship, the increase in society's wealth that occurred at the
time works of authorship were introduced would disappear.340
In our market society, despite its greater complexity, the
"joint" nature of market value remains. The amount a consumer will
spend on a work of authorship, or any other product, depends entirely
on how much money she has left after she buys everything she
considers more important;341 and the only reason a consumer will have
money left after buying the more important items is that we require
those items to be made available, as a general rule, at cost. If, for
example, the state had established a lawful monopoly in the provision
of food that permitted food suppliers to charge each consumer her
reservation price for her food, a consumer would have far less, if any,
money left to spend on works of authorship. 342
Thus, whoever is responsible for the physical creation of a
product, the value of that product is invariably joint, as the product's
value depends entirely on the availability of a pool of spendable re-
sources ("consumer surplus") that has been previously created by the
individual efforts of everyone who contributes to society's wealth. As
339. We can assume for purposes of the example that the creation of creative works
includes all of the other products necessary to the mass market distribution of the works.
340. Indeed, if we took away the essentials, all of the society's wealth would disappear.
341. Thus, when economists draw a demand curve for any given product, they hold
constant the prices charged for other products, assume that the conditions of supply of all other
commodities are fixed, or otherwise constrain shifts in demand caused by the interrelated
nature of all demand curves. See, for example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 20 (cited in
note 11).
342. Indeed, if the state enforced such a system, and if the providers of food could properly
determine each consumer's reservation price, the only way an individual in such a society could
have any money left over to spend on entertainment products would be to obtain her own food
from a source other than the government-established markets. Otherwise, we would expect
that the average person would spend every penny of her salary to purchase the food that, more
so than anything else, is essential for her family's survival.
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a result, while one can correctly say that an author's labor and
creativity is one factual cause of the value of "her" work of authorship,
one can equally well say that the farmers, the engineers, and
everyone else who has in any way contributed to our wealth as a
society are factually responsible for that value as well. As with the
efforts of those who ensured the physical creation of the work of
authorship in a marketable form, the labors of the individuals
constituting this group are indispensable to the work's value because
they establish a pool of consumer surplus, without which the work's
market value would be radically reduced, if not eliminated. 43
C. Copyright's Role in Assigning Joint Value
Given that the value associated with any new work of author-
ship, or more generally, with any new product, is therefore joint, the
task becomes one of assigning that joint value between those who
have contributed to it. Copyright plays a central role in this task. By
defining copyright's scope more broadly, we can provide the author a
greater degree of exclusivity in marketing her work and increase the
costs to others of introducing competing works. We can thereby
reduce the degree of competition an author will face and award an
author a greater share of the work's joint value. 3" Such a shift would
increase the incentives to invest capital and labor in creating works of
authorship, and would likely lead to the creation of additional works.
However, such a shift would necessarily reduce the incentives for in-
vesting in every other task, both (a) directly, by allocating a greater
share of the value of a work of authorship to the author, rather than
to the many others who contributed to the value of the work, and (b)
indirectly by (1) increasing the price of works of authorship, which re-
duces the buying power of wages generally, and (2) decreasing the
relative earning power of those who are not authors. As a result,
broadening copyright's scope will increase the returns available for
authorship investments, while reducing the returns for every other
343. Having made the decision that products are to be made available at cost, it becomes
easier to see why commentators might assign the increase in social wealth created by a new
work to the work's author. Because we have already decided what value to assign the
preexisting products (their cost), our ability to think about only so many things at one time
makes it natural, indeed inevitable, that we will push the preexisting products from our minds,
and accept them as a given. Having pushed the many other but-for causes of the new wealth
from our minds, only the new work remains, and it is an easy mistake to associate the new
wealth exclusively with the creator of the new work. Courts, in particular, may be prone to
assign the value in that manner because the true nature of the choice will usually be obscured
by the copier-versus-author context of the typical infringement action.
344. See text accompanying notes 25-33.
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sort of labor. By doing so, copyright can encourage the creation of ad-
ditional works of authorship, but it does so by luring the necessary re-
sources away from other productive sectors of our economy. 345 If copy-
right expands its protection too much in an attempt to "award" an
author the "value" of her work when the rest of our economy operates
on a "cost" basis, it will generate both inefficiency and unfairness.
To illustrate, consider a world where the state has established
a perfect price-discriminating monopoly in the production of food, and
a competitive market in every other sector of the economy. Given
such a property regime where one sector of the economy has a value-
based return, while every other sector has a cost-based return, only
members of the value-based sector of the economy would have any
money left at the end of the month to spend on anything other than
the absolute necessities of life. Everyone in one of the cost-based
sectors will have to turn over their entire earnings, less perhaps an
allowance for other essentials such as clothing and shelter, simply to
purchase the food they require to survive. Such a property regime
would create both inefficiency and unfairness. In terms of
inefficiency, if the state allows additional "entry" into the value-based
sector of the economy, for example, by allowing individuals to become
self-sufficient farmers who distribute any surplus production through
the state's food monopoly, then, so long as there is room for more such
farmers, many individuals will choose to become farmers, rather than
work in one of the cost-based sectors of the economy. For the
individual, such a choice would represent the only way in which to
obtain something more than the absolute necessities of life. (Of
course, not everyone would choose to become a farmer, even if that
choice were available, as some rare individuals would choose to
develop other abilities, despite the fiscal hardship that such a choice
would entail.) For society, however, such a choice would eventually
lead to inefficiency, as it would lead many individuals to become
farmers, even when society would have valued their skills more highly
in some other sector of the economy.346
345. See Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 268-69 (cited in note 12); Hurt and Schuchman, 56 Am.
Econ. Rev. at 425, 430 (cited in note 12); Plant, 1 Economica at 170 (cited in note 12).
346. In theory, the more efficient food producers could buy out the less efficient food
producers and thereby prevent too many individuals from remaining in the food production
sector of the economy. In the real world, however, transaction costs and uncertainty would
prevent such contractual agreements from reducing society's investment in the food production
sector to an optimal level.
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In terms of unfairness, such a property regime would, for those
rare individuals who choose to follow a non-farming career path, or if
the state allows no further entry into the food production market, es-
tablish a heirarchy with workers in the food production sector of the
market at the top, and workers in every other industry underneath.
While the engineer, the artist, and the scholar would work for a crust
of bread and a place to sleep, those who controlled food production
would have not only their castles on the hill, but substantial control
over the lives of those beneath them.
Not surprisingly, this description of the results of such a prop-
erty regime closely parallels life in historical communities where a
particular group had control over an essential of life, such as feudal
England, where landed nobility effectively controlled production of
and access to food, or ancient Egypt, where the royalty controlled
access to water. Of course, works of authorship are not as essential to
life as food and water, so the unfairness and inefficiency that
establishing a value-based return in the authorship sector of the
economy would create would not be quite as strong as the unfairness
and inefficiency that would result from establishing a value-based
return in a more essential sector of the economy. As a result, even if
copyright were to enable authors to price discriminate perfectly, many
whose creativity lay outside the authorship area would choose to de-
velop their own skills, rather than become authors. Moreover, those
who choose not to become authors would not become serfs of the
authorship community, in the fashion of feudal England.
Nevertheless, if the inefficiency and unfairness associated with a
value-based return on authorship would not be as serious in degree as
they would be for a monopoly on food production, substantial
inefficiency and unfairness would result. While not everyone would
choose to become authors given the value-based return available in
that sector of the economy, many would so choose, even when society
would have valued their skills more highly in some other sector of the
economy. And if we cannot say that establishing a value-based return
for authors would create a serf/nobility community, where authors
were the nobility, we can say that such a property regime would
award authors a disproportionate share of society's wealth.
In any event, because the efforts and labors of so many play an
essential role in creating a work's market value, one cannot assign the
market value of any given copyrighted work to the author simply as a
factual matter. As Professor Ronald Coase has suggested with
respect to joint cost issues: "The traditional approach has tended to
obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made. The question is
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commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what
has to be decided is: How should we restrain A? But this is wrong.
We are dealing with a problem of reciprocal nature."347 Similarly, the
issue in intellectual property is commonly thought of as one in which
A's intellectual effort adds value to our society, and what has to be
decided is: How should we reward or compensate A? But this
conception is also wrong. In a market economy, the value of A's effort
is invariably joint, reflecting the contributions of everyone, and the
proper question is: How should we allocate that joint value among
those who have contributed to it?
As a result, when we assign a greater share of a work's value
to one person rather than another because we perceive that person as
being the principal or primary cause of the value, that perception
necessarily entails a judgment about the relative value of the various
types of labor and investment that produced the work's joint value.
Allocating the joint value of the new work, therefore, calls not for a
factual decision that one person or another created the work and its
value, but for a judgment as to what sort of investment and what sort
of labor we should encourage. In recognizing the joint nature of the
market value of a work of authorship, the question becomes: Why
should we encourage investment in some tasks, and yet discourage in-
vestment in others? Allocative efficiency provides one answer to that
question.
VI. COPYRIGHT, JOINT VALUE, AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
The basic purpose of a property system, from an economic per-
spective, is to ensure that resources are allocated to their highest val-
ued use. Since the Stationers' Company first articulated some of the
basic economic arguments in favor of copyright,345 copyright propo-
nents have advanced two basic arguments as to why copyright would
347. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1960).
348. See Arber, ed., 1 Transcript of the Registers at 583-88 (cited in note 23). This 1643
petition by the Stationers' Company to renew its printing monopoly advanced six economic
reasons for the renewal: (1) books were luxuries and so a monopoly would not create the same
harm in this field as a monopoly over a necessity such as food would create, (2) a monopoly was
essential to assure order in the book trade, (3) a monopoly would prevent both overproduction
and underproduction of books, (4) a monopoly would reduce the costs and risks to the
booksellers, (5) a monopoly would provide an essential incentive to professional authors, and (6)
the widows and children of deceased authors would rely entirely on the monopoly for their
living.
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promote such allocative efficiency: (1) natural monopoly, and (2) ease
of copying.3
49
In the very early days of copyright, the Stationers' Company
sought to justify its printing monopoly based upon the natural monop-
oly character of the printing trade. Because printing entails a high
fixed cost for the first copy of a work, and continually decreasing mar-
ginal costs for additional copies over the range of expected production,
the Stationers' Company argued that competition would produce dis-
order in the market.3 50 A governmentally sanctioned printing monop-
oly would provide order, and would also require fewer resources to
produce a given quantity of a work because a printing monopoly
would ensure that only one printer incurred the high fixed costs
initially required to print any given work. While the natural
monopoly character of the printing industry may suggest the need for
a governmentally sanctioned printing monopoly, governmentally
sanctioned monopolies today, such as local utility services, are usually
subject to governmentally imposed price regulations with respect to
the end product.351 Because such price regulations are not a central
part of copyright, and because the compulsory licensing that might
serve as a substitute for such price controls has proven anathema to
349. Copyright proponents sometimes advance a misrepresentation or misinformation
argument as a third reason why copyright promotes allocative efficiency. Specifically, these
commentators argue that copyright can ensure that consumers are not misled by prohibiting
others from reusing elements of a copyrighted work that consumers and potential consumers
have come to associate uniquely with a particular author. While there are serious weaknesses
in this argument, trademark law already addresses this concern, see Lainothe v. Atlantic
Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing how the Lanham Act prohibits
"passing off'), and is, in any event, better suited to address this concern than copyright law. See
Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 290-91 (cited in note 5) (arguing that copyright law is not necessary
to protect an author's dignitary interests); Hurt and Schuchman, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. at 424
(cited in note 12). See also Berne Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 2(2), (3), 102
Stat. 2853 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1988). As a result, I will
not consider the misrepresentation argument further in this Article.
350. Arber, ed., 1 Transcript of the Registers at 587 (cited in note 23):
A well regulated propriety of Copies amongst Stationers, making Printing flourish, and
Books more plentifull and cheap; whereas Community (though it seeme not so, at first,
to such as look lesse seriously, and intentively upon it) brings in confusion, and many
other disorders both to the damage of the State and the Company of Stationers also; and
this will many wayes be evidenced. For first, If it be lawfull for all men to Print all
Copies, At the same time severall men will either enviously, or ignorantly [i.e. of the
other's impressions,] Print the same thing, and so perhaps undo one another, and bring
in a great waste of the Commodities, whereby the State shall be at losse, and discord,
and enmities will also follow, whereby Christianity it self shall be scandalized.
Secondly, the fear of this confusion will hinder men from Printing at all, to the great
obstruction of Learning, and suppression of many excellent and worthy peeces. [Works
of] singular use and esteem, are now out of Print, and the age must still be deprived of
them, for no man dares, or can with safety Print them.
351. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 343-49 (Little Brown,
4th ed. 1992).
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most copyright proponents, 352 most modern copyright proponents have
abandoned the natural monopoly character of the publishing industry
as a justification for copyright.
The second argument that copyright promotes allocative effi-
ciency is that works of authorship are exceptionally easy to copy.
353
As a result, in the absence of some form of legal prohibition, a com-
petitor could copy the original work and thereby avoid many of the
costs incurred by the original author. Such copying would permit the
competitor profitably to market a competing version of the work at a
lower price than would be profitable for the original author. 54 Faced
with intense price competition from a competing version of the work,
the original author would be unable to price copies of her work so as
to recover an adequate recompense for her initial investment in the
original work.355 To the extent the author could earn an adequate
recompense in another field, she may forego authorship in favor of
this other field,356 even though society would have preferred the
dedication of her efforts to authorship. 357 Modern justifications of
copyright from an economic perspective rest entirely on this second
argument. Identifying the appropriate scope for copyright protection
requires a more careful understanding of this argument.
352. The Berne Convention also largely prohibits the use of compulsory licenses. See
Berne Convention arts. llbis(2), 13(1) (authorizing compulsory licenses only with respect to the
public broadcasting of literary and artistic works, and the making of sound recordings).
353. See text accompanying notes 18-24. Some have referred to the second issue in terms
of free-riders or the public good character of works of authorship. See, for example, Goldstein, 1
Copyright § 1.2, at 9-10 (cited in note 5) ("[In the absence of copyright, as] soon as the first
producer's volume reached the marketplace it would be accessible and freely replicable by
all.... [A] competitor would enjoy free something for which the first producer had to pay").
The first label is not accurate. Because a copying competitor will usually purchase the copy of
the original from which she copies, she is not a free-rider. The second label is somewhat more
accurate, but it often seems to take on talismanic significance and can tend to mislead as much
as inform. See Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm,
94 Colum. L. Rev. 2594, 2594-95 (1994) (noting that others have relied on "analytically
confusing or inapt catchphrases" rather than careful analysis of the issue, and have failed to
explain how we should identify "market failures"). Unfortunately, Professor Karjala's analysis
suffers from the same weakness, though it does substitute his catchphrase "misappropriation"
for the more common catchphrase "market failure." For a further discussion of the public good
aspect of works of authorship, see Part VI.C.2.
354. See, for example, Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 282 (cited in note 5).
355. See id.
356. Professor Machlup has identified four general categories of uses to which resources
can be devoted: "(1) The production of consumer goods, (2) the production of capital goods, (3)
the production of knowledge, and (4) the production of security from invasion and resolution."
Machlup, Economic Review at 46 (cited in note 11).
357. See, for example, Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 895 (cited in note 17).
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A. Introduction: A Model of Investment Decisions
In order to explore the relationship between copyright and allo-
cative efficiency, we begin by assuming first that individuals will
dedicate their available resources, in the form of labor or capital, to
those uses that they expect will bring the highest return on those
resources; second that no uncertainty is present;35 and third that
price discrimination 359 is not possible. Given these assumptions, an
investor's decision to make one investment rather than another will
depend upon the risk-adjusted return she expects to earn on the
available investments. When investing in a new product, the
expected return will consist of two components.
First, in the absence of perfect competition, 60 any new product
will enjoy an initial lead-time period during which no reasonable sub-
358. We need not assume that there is no uncertainty for purposes of this analysis; we need
only assume that there is no difference in the relative uncertainty associated with works of
authorship as compared to other investments. Whenever an individual decides to invest in a
product, there is always some risk that the predicted demand for, or cost of, the product will
differ from the produces actual demand or cost. This inability to predict actual demand or cost
is referred to as uncertainty. In a certain world, an individual faced with ten investment
choices could rank the ten according to their expected return without making any mistakes. In
the real world, however, individuals do face uncertainty, and so, at least in some cases, make
mistakes in ranking the investments. As a result, in the real world an individual may invest in
the sixth-best product, instead of one of the better products because of uncertainty. Uncertainty
alone does not undermine the argument made in the text, however. So long as individuals are
on average as correct in their rankings of investment choices with respect to works of
authorship as they are with respect to other products-in other words, so long as there are "no
relative differences in the degree of uncertainty," Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 297 n.68 (cited in
note 5)-then the text's analysis remains accurate.
359. In the early part of the twentieth century, economists defined price discrimination as
"[tihe act of selling the same article, produced under a single control, at different prices to
different buyers." Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 179 (cited in note 11). Present day
economists define price discrimination more broadly to include the "sale (or purchase) of
different units of a good or service at price differentials not directly corresponding to differences
in supply cost." Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 315 (cited in note 140). See also note
483.
360. Perfect competition exists when consumers can and will instantaneously switch to an
identical substitute produced by a competitor if any one producer raises the price of her product.
See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 10-11 (cited in note 140) (defining a
homogeneous product). In a perfectly competitive world, copyright would provide the proper
scope of protection if it simultaneously satisfied three requirements: (1) preventing competitors
from" obtaining any cost advantage by copying as compared to the cost to the original author of
producing the work; (2) allowing competitors to market identical copies; and (3) allowing
competitors to introduce such identical copies instantly upon the introduction of any new work.
As discussed, copyright cannot simultaneously satisfy all three of these objectives. See text
accompanying notes 108-19. The only way a competitor could instantly introduce identical cop-
ies would be to use copying technology that copyright must prohibit in order to prevent such a
competitor from obtaining a cost advantage in producing her copies. As a result, while perfect
competition presents an interesting theoretical norm, economic analysis of copyright should not
assume that such competition exists. See, for example, Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 299-302,
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stitutes for the new product are available. 361 In the absence of exact
substitutes, our investor's new product will initially face a downward
sloping demand curve, 362 and our investor will have some degree of
market power with respect to her product. To maximize her profit in
this initial period, our investor will follow the usual profit-maximizing
rule for a monopolist: produce that quantity at which marginal
revenue and marginal cost are equal, and set the price at a level that
318-21 (cited in note 5); Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1710-12, 1715 (cited in note 5); Palmer, 12
Hamline L. Rev. at 288-300 (cited in note 143).
361. While there are always alternatives available to the consumer, we will assume that
these alternatives are not perfect substitutes-in other words, consumers prefer (to some
degree) the new type of novel over existing forms of entertainment, or the new type of soft drink
over existing forms of liquid refreshment, or the new van over existing forms of transportation.
See Chamberlin, Moiwpolistic Competition at 68-70 (cited in note 32) (stating that product
differentiation provides consumers with a basis for preference); Edward Chamberlin, Towards a
More General Theory of Value 71 (Oxford U., 1957):
One can have a monopoly of Chateau D'Yquem, of all Sauternes, of all white wines from
the Bordeaux region, or all Bordeaux wines, or of all white wines, of all wines, of all bev-
erages, and so on indefinitely until we reach the limit of all economic goods. And what-
ever the area monopolized, the monopolist will always face competition in some degree
from the wider area beyond its limits.
See also Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 889, 908 (cited in note 17).
362. The availability of substitutes determines the relative ease with which a consumer can
substitute some other product for the desired product and establishes the price elasticity of
demand faced by the producer. If adequate substitutes are available, a slight increase in price
will lead a large number of consumers to switch to substitute products, while a slight decrease
in price will lead a similar number to switch from substitutes to the producer's product. See, for
example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 50-51 (cited in note 11) (describing the effect of ex-
isting market alternatives on the price elasticity of demand for an individual firm). However,
"[a]s long as the substitutes are to any degree imperfect, (the seller] still has a monopoly over
his own product." Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition at 67 (cited in note 32).
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enables her to sell exactly that quantity.363 Such an initial pricing
decision is shown in Figure 1.364
Figure 1. Lead-Time Period: Profit-Maximizing Price
If our investor has produced a profitable new product,65 she
will be able to price the product during this lead-time period above
the average total cost of the product. This difference between average
total cost and price per unit of production is her profit per unit.36 To
363. See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 15 (cited in note 140). All
demand and cost functions are presented in terms of discounted present value to account for the
differing times at which sales are made and costs are incurred.
364. In Figure 1, our investor's lead-time period demand for her copies of her work is
indicated by the line Dd; her marginal revenue is indicated by the line DR; her marginal cost is
indicated by the line Mm; and her average total cost is indicated by the curve Tt. To maximize
her profit, our investor will produce and sell additional copies of her work until the marginal
cost of producing and selling one more copy exceeds the marginal revenue from that sale. On
Figure 1, this cross-over occurs at point y. She will, therefore, sell quantity C at price A to
maximize her profit. Note that during this period, our investor will charge a price for copies of
her work that is higher than her average total cost for the copies. Note further that the average
total cost curve was calculated using a pro-rata share of the fixed costs associated with
producing the work, with the remainder of the fixed costs attributed to the average total cost of
the copies produced during the post-entry period.
365. I have assumed that the investor's product will earn a profit. This assumption is not
essential to the analysis. Since we will eventually be dealing with relative profits from
otherwise identical investments, the question is not whether either investment is profitable or
unprofitable but how the difference in the ease with which two products can be copied affects
the relative profitability of the two investments.
366. On Figure 1, the rent earned by our investor on each unit or copy sold during the lead-
time period is reflected in the line xa.
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the extent that our investor's profit during this lead-time period ex-
ceeds (on a risk-adjusted basis) that available for alternative invest-
ments, this rent (or real profit) will attract entry into the market by
other investors who will offer competing versions of the new product
in an attempt to capture some share of this new market. In general,
such entry will continue so long as the profits available to the
entrants in the new market exceed (on a risk-adjusted basis) those
found in alternative investments.3 67 Once entry has reduced the
available profits to a normal level, no further entry should occur, and
we would say that the market has reached equilibrium. 368 Figure 2
illustrates this process.3 69
Figure 2. Entry Makes Market More Competitive
Dit
Shift in Individual Demand




367. See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 13 (cited in note 140).
368. See, for example, Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 93-95 (cited in note 11); Scherer,
Industrial Market Structure at 13 (cited in note 140); Baxter, 76 Yale L. J. at 366 (cited in note
12).
369. Please note two points about our investor's curves. First, the post-entry demand curve
for copies of our investor's work, Dpe, has fallen below her average total cost curve. This is
correct. Her post-entry demand curve is a function of the equilibrium demand curves of her
competitors. To the extent that her competitors can obtain some copying advantage, they will
incur a smaller fixed cost to create their competing works than did our investor. As a result,
their equilibrium point, which is reached when their demand curves become tangent to their
average total cost curves, will occur at a demand level below the equilibrium demand level for
our investor. To the extent the competing works duplicate the attraction of our investor's work
more closely than previously available works or products, competition from such potential
substitutes will flatten our investor's demand curve. To the extent that such competitors'
average total cost curves fall below our investor's total cost curve, competition from such
substitutes will reduce the demand for copies of our investor's work below her equilibrium level.
Second, despite this competition, our investor's demand curve remains somewhat downward
sloping. This, too, is correct. So long as our investor retains some ability to differentiate her
copies from those of her competitors, demand for her product will remain somewhat inelastic.
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During this second post-entry period, our investor will again
price her product to maximize her profit. Moreover, because of
perceived differences between our investor's product and the available
substitutes, our investor may retain some degree of market power. 370
Competition from the available substitutes will almost certainly
reduce the degree of market power our investor possesses during the
post-entry period below the degree of such power she enjoyed during
the lead-time period. 371 As a result, competition will
370. As others have recognized, an author will have the many other tools available to an
marketers of goods that can be used to create or enhance market power. See, for example,
Palmer, 12 Hamline L. Rev. at 287-300 (cited in note 143). See also Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at
299-308 (cited in note 5). While these commentators suggest a number of reasons why these de-
vices ensure an adequate return in the production of more easily copied works, each of these
tools are equally available to producers of less easily copied products. Thus, despite the ability
of an individual to use these tools to increase her return, we should expect that if producers of
more easily and less easily copied products are equally adept at using these devices, the
averaged price received for investments in more easily copied products will still be
comparatively less than that received for investing in an otherwise comparable but less easily
copied product.
371. It is not simply the entrance of additional works that will reduce the price our investor
can charge, but the entrance of additional works that duplicate the appeal of the original work
more closely than previously available works or products. See Chamberlin, MonopolistX.e
Competition at 196-97 (cited in note 32).
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tend to constrain the price our investor can profitably charge in the
post-entry period,372 as Figure 3 illustrates.373
Figure 3. Post-Entry Period: Profit-Maximizing Price
Quantity
In order to simplify our discussion further, we can combine the
lead-time and post-entry periods into a single hypothetical demand
372. See, for example, Leonid Hurwicz, Effects of Entry on Profits under Monopolistic
Competition, in George R. Feiwel, ed., The Economics of Imperfect Competition and
Employment. Joan Robinson and Beyond 305, 305 (N.Y.U., 1989) (concluding that each
individual firm's profits descrease as the number of firms in that market increases).
373. While the scale of the x- and y-axes were arbitrarily chosen, I have retained the same
scale for Figure 3 as I used in Figure 1, to give some sense of the drop that competition will
cause in the profit-maximizing price level. In Figure 3, our investor's demand for copies of her
work in this period is indicated by the line D'd' her marginal revenue is indicated by the line
DR', her marginal cost is indicated by the line Mm; and her average total cost is indicated by
the curve T't'. To maximize her profit, our investor will produce and sell additional copies of her
work until the marginal cost of producing and selling one more copy exceeds the marginal
revenue from that sale. She will therefore sell quantity C' at price A' to maximize her profit.
Because her competitor's average total costs will fall below her costs, competition will force our
investor to charge a price for copies of her work lower than her average total cost for the copies.
Under the assumptions made in preparing Figure 3, our investor will sell fewer copies of her
work in this post-entry period. As a result, the pro-rata share of her fixed costs attributable to
this period are proportionally lower than the fixed costs share attributable to the lead-time
period. Her average total cost curve for this period therefore falls somewhat below her average
total cost curve for the lead-time period.
-~:zz:-------------- a'
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and pricing model. By totaling the average total cost curves and the
quantities sold in the lead-time and post-entry periods, and averaging
the profit-maximizing price charged in those periods, we can deter-
mine an averaged price, the average total costs, and the quantity sold
for the two periods combined. We can use these values to generate a
single set of curves that represents the total demand for our investor's
version of the product, and the averaged price for the product as illus-
trated in Figure 4.374
Figure 4. Averaged Price for Combined Periods
C. d"
Quatity
By doing so, we generate a single number, the averaged price for the
product, which we can use to represent the return our investor
374. Specifically, once we have determined the quantities and profit-maximizing prices for
the lead-time and post-entry periods, the total quantity sold is simply the sum of the quantities
sold in each period, or Qa=Qi+Qe, where Qa is the total quantity sold, Qi is the quantity sold in
the lead-time period, and Qe is the quantity sold in the post-entry period. Given the profit-
maximizing price for the two periods of Pi and Pe, we can calculate the averaged price received
per copy sold as follows: Pa=((Pi*Qi)+(Pe+Qe))/(Qi+Qe). Totaling the costs incurred in the two
periods allows us to draw an average total cost curve for the two periods combined. Combining
the total quantity sold, the averaged price received, and the average total cost curve for the two
periods, we can construct a hypothetical demand curve for the two periods that is tangent to the
average total cost curve at the point QaPa. Tangency between the hypothetical demand curve
and the average total cost curve will occur so long as the market for the creation of new works
has reached equilibrium either through the entrance of additional authors, or through the
capitalization of any rents into the fixed cost of the work. See Robinson, Imperfect Competition
at 97-99 (cited in note 11); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 14 (cited in note 140)
(depicting monopolistic competition in equilibrium in Figure 2.2(b)). See also Chamberlin,
Monopolistic Competition at 194-95 (cited in note 32). The result is shown in Figure 4, with our
investor's average total costs indicated by T"t", our investor's hypothetical demand curve
indicated by D"d", our investor's averaged profit-maximizing price at A", with a total quantity
sold of C".
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expects to receive for any given investment and to examine how our
investor will allocate her resources.
375
B. Applying the Model: Allocative Efficiency and Copyright
1. Introduction: Ease of Copying and Return on Investment
To illustrate the use of the averaged price model, consider first
a situation where an individual is trying to decide between two in-
vestments. One investment will produce Product A, a product more
easily copied by competitors; the other will produce Product B, a pro-
duct less easily copied. At this point, we will assume that the social
values of these two alternative investments and the expenditure
streams needed to produce the two products are identical. Moreover,
to simplify our discussion at this point, we will assume that neither
copyright, patent, nor trademark protects either product.
Given this set of assumptions, our model suggests that the in-
vestor would expect to receive a higher averaged price for her re-
sources if invested in the less easily copied product than if invested in
the more easily copied product. Three factors account for this differ-
ence. First, in the lead-time period, if all other factors are equal, the
greater ease with which Product A can be copied means that competi-
tors will produce competing versions of Product A more quickly than
competitors will produce competing versions of Product B. The faster
response by competitors will shorten Product A's lead-time, as com-
pared with Product B's lead-time.376 Shortening the duration of the
lead-time period may reduce the degree of market power our investor
holds during this period,377 and will reduce the number of sales that
will take place at the higher, more monopolistic price our investor ex-
pects to charge during the lead-time period.
375. In considering only two time periods, I have omitted consideration of a third, post-
copyright period where a competitor would have a greater copying advantage. I have omitted
such a period because the current duration of copyright renders the present value of the
economic results in the post-copyright period sufficiently insignificant that they are essentially
irrelevant to investment decisions.
376. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 299-300 (cited in note 5) (describing an initial pub-
lisher's advantage of lead time).
377. If the lead-time period becomes sufficiently short, some consumers may decide to wait




Second, during the post-entry period, the greater ease with
which competitors can copy Product A means that copying will give
competitors a greater cost advantage than they could obtain by copy-
ing Product B. As a result, additional competitors will continue to en-
ter the market for Product A beyond the point (and continue to reduce
the market price for Product A below the level) at which equilibrium
would have been reached for Product B. Third, again because Product
A is easier to copy, competitors will likely be able to offer a more exact
substitute for Product A than they will for Product B. A more exact
substitute will reduce the extent to which our investor can expect to
rely on product differentiation to retain some degree of market power
during the post-entry period. Taken together, the greater cost advan-
tage that competitors can obtain by copying Product A and the more
exact nature of the substitutes the competitors will be able to offer
will reduce the price our investor can expect to charge for Product A
during the post-entry period, below the price she can expect to charge
for Product B during the post-entry period.
Thus, in both the lead-time and post-entry periods, our
investor should expect to receive a lower price and, as a result, earn a
lower return on an investment in Product A simply because Product A
is more easily copied than Product B. If we constructed averaged
demand and price curves for the two products, the demand curve
would be flatter, and the averaged price would be lower for Product A
than for Product B. Given this result, we can say that for two
investments which produce products that are otherwise comparable in
terms of cost and social value ("otherwise comparable" products), an
investor will earn a higher return by investing in the less easily
copied product, than by investing in the more easily copied product.
2. Averaged Price, Social Value, and Allocative Efficiency
We can extend this analysis to examine the effect that the rela-
tive ease of copying has on allocative efficiency by comparing a series
of decisions made with respect to two sets of potential investments.
Each set consists of five different potential investments, ranked by de-
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creasing social value. The equilibrium average total cost function for
each of the ten investments is identical, 378 and is reflected in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Equilibrium Cost Functions
T
Quatity
We will further assume that the corresponding investments in



















Based upon our averaged price model and our discussion of how the
ease of copying will likely affect the averaged price an investor will
378. In adopting a uniform curve for the five investments, I have implicitly assumed that
any rent that would have been earned in an investment has been capitalized into the cost curve.
See note 282.
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expect to earn on any given investment, we can make some
predictions on how our investor will invest her resources and identify
the circumstances in which relative ease of copying will lead to
allocative inefficiency.
First, we will assume that demand during the lead-time
period, and the corresponding rent, will increase as the social value of
the investment increases.3 79  Because of these increases, when we
average our investor's lead-time and post-entry period demand curves
and pricing decisions, a more valuable investment generates a
somewhat steeper averaged demand curve, and a higher averaged
price, than does a less valuable investment. Thus, within each set of
investments, Investment A will return a higher averaged price than
379. A product will be more valuable to society if it generates greater consumer demand for
a given investment, generates given consumer demand for a lower investment, or some
combination of these two. A change in the social value of a product, either because of lower
costs or higher demand, will be reflected in a change in the lead-time price an investor can
charge because the profit-maximizing price during the lead-time period is a (mathematical)
function of the product's expected demand and average total cost. (While we can use the
intersection of the marginal revenue curve with the marginal cost curve as a method of
identifying the quantity a monopolist should produce to maximize her profit, we can also
identify the profit-maximizing price and production levels using the average cost and pricing
curves. See Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition at 192-93 (cited in note 32). Some
commentators associate the practice of setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost
exclusively with a monopolist; yet, every profit-maximizing producer, even one in a perfectly
competitive market, will follow that practice. Id. at 193. If we expect a greater demand for the
product, either in terms of price elasticity or in terms of the quantity demanded at a given price,
then our profit-maximizing monopoly price will be higher than it would have been for a product
with a lower expected demand. As a result, an expected increase in demand will increase our
investor's lead-time profit-maximizing price. The same is true for a product that generates a
given demand at a lower cost. The economic literature on this point has focused on the extent to
which an increase in cost, or a tax, will be passed on to the consumer and on the extent to which
it will be absorbed by the monopolist. In analyzing this issue, commentators reach the general
conclusion that part of the additional cost will be passed on to the consumer, and part will be
absorbed in the form of reduced profits for the monopolist. See, for example, Louis Phlips, The
Economics of Price Discrimination 7 (Cambridge U., 1983) ("[1It is well known, indeed, that a
tax, for example one imposed on a commodity sold under monopolistic conditions, is only
partially reflected in the price of a profit-maximizing firm"). In general, we should expect the
same sort of sharing to occur with any increase in a product's value, whether due to increased
demand or decreased costs. While we can devise situations in which the profit-maximizing price
during the lead-time period will be higher for a product of lower social value, so long as the
demand curves are downward sloping and reasonably continuous, we should expect that the
extent of the lead-time price will more or less directly reflect the social value of the product.
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Investments B, C, D, or E; Investment B will return a higher
averaged price than Investments C, D, or E; and so on, as Figure 6
reflects.380
Figure 6. Averaged Prices at Equilibrium
QA Qb QC
Quantity
Second, we will further assume that a competitor can more
easily copy a product from Set Two than a product from Set One. The
greater ease with which competitors can copy the Set Two products
means that the demand curve and the averaged price for any one of
380. Because tangency reflects the profit-maximizing point, see, for example, Chamberlin,
Monopolistic Competition at 192-93 (cited in note 32), the profit-maximizing price will be higher
and the quantity sold lower for a product with a steeper demand curve than it will be for a
product with a less steep demand curve. Thus in Figure 6, Product A has the steepest demand
curve, reflected by the line Aa, of the three investments depicted. It also has the highest profit-
maximizing price, Pa, and the lowest quantity sold, Qa, of the three investments depicted.
Product B has the second steepest demand curve, reflected by the line Bb. It also has the
second highest averaged price, Pb, and the second lowest quantity sold, Qb. Product C has the
flattest demand curve, reflected by the line Cc, and also has the lowest averaged price, Pc, and
the greatest quantity sold, Qc.
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the Set Two investments will be flatter and lower, respectively, than
the curve and price for the corresponding Set One investment, for the
three reasons previously discussed. 38' Thus, Investment 1-A will re-
turn a somewhat higher averaged price than Investment 2-A;
Investment 1-B will return a somewhat higher averaged price than
Investment 2-B; and so on. How much higher the averaged price for
Investment 1-A will be than Investment 2-A turns on the relative ease
with which a competitor may copy the 2-A product as compared to the
1-A product. As the 2-A product becomes easier for a competitor to
copy, and as copying enables the competitor to produce a more perfect
substitute for the original 2-A product, the difference between the
elasticity of the averaged demand curves and between the averaged
prices for the 1-A and 2-A products will become more pronounced. We
can use Figure 6 again by considering demand curves Aa, Bb, and Cc,
to reflect the changes in the demand curve for any given product as it
becomes easier for competitors to copy. For example, we could take
demand curve Aa to represent the product's demand curve in a
system where the law provides extensive protection against copying;
demand curve Bb to represent the product's demand curve in a
system where the law provides only limited protection against
copying; and demand curve Cc to represent the product's demand
curve in a system where the law provides no protection against
copying.
Given this analysis, we can state that the greater ease with
which a competitor can copy the Set Two products will cause
allocative inefficiency whenever the greater ease of copying causes the
averaged price of a more valuable Set Two investment to fall below
the averaged price of a less valuable Set One investment. Once this
occurs, a rational individual will invest in the less valuable Set One
product, rather than the more valuable Set Two product, because the
greater difficulty competitors face in copying the Set One product will
ensure the individual a higher price for her resources if invested in
the less valuable Set One product. Whether and to what extent
allocative inefficiency will result in the real world is an empirical
matter that will depend on the relative ease with which a competitor
can copy a Set Two product as compared to a Set One product.
For example, if the Set Two products are only slightly easier
for a competitor to copy than the Set One products, then the averaged
price for each Set Two product might be only slightly below the aver-
aged price for the corresponding Set One product, as Table 2 reflects.
381. See PartVI.B.1.
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TABLE 2
AVERAGED PRICE PER UNIT:
SET TWO PRODUCT SLIGHTLY EASIER TO COPY
Investment Averaged Price Investment Averaged Price
(#) ($ per unit sold) (#) ($ per unit sold)
1-A 100 2-A 95
1-B 75 2-B 71
1-C 50 2-C 47
1-D 25 2-D 23
1-E 5 2-E 4
Under these assumptions, if an individual had sufficient resources to
commit to six, and only six, of these investments (and these were the
only investments available),382 then a rational individual would com-
mit his available resources to Investments 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 2-A, 2-B, and
2-C in order to receive the highest price for his resources. Given the
assumptions we have made in this example, no allocative inefficiency
results. Even though the Set Two products are somewhat easier to
copy than the Set One products, the difference in the relative ease
with which a competitor can copy the Set Two products is insufficient
to lead individuals to invest their resources in a less valuable Set One
product.3
83
On the other hand, if the Set Two products are substantially
easier to copy than the Set One products, then the averaged price for
382. As the presentation of the example suggests, I have not assumed that the individual is
facing perfectly competitive markets or that her resources are infinitely divisible. I have
rejected the perfect competition assumption because it is not compatible with the existence of
copyright protection specifically, see note 360, nor is it an accurate representation of real-world
markets generally. Compare Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 10 (cited in note 140). I
have chosen not to use the infinite divisibility assumption for similar reasons. When creating a
new work, an author rarely sets out to create one half of a painting; she either paints the work,
or she does not. While an author does have some room to adjust the size of the painting, or the
number of copies of her work that she will print, her decision remains more of an "on-off'
decision, create the work or not, than a "how much of' decision. See Chamberlin, Monopolistic
Competition at 198-99 (cited in note 32) (stating that assuming that resources are infinitely
divisible does not eliminate monopolistic competition); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at
10 (stating that a perfect divisibility assumption is not essential to economic analysis).
383. If we assume an infinite number of possible Set One or Set Two investments ranging
in profitability from Investment A to Investment E, and further assume that investment
resources are infinitely divisible, then we would expect to see some degree of allocative
inefficiency even when the Set Two products are only slightly easier to copy than the Set One
products. Instead of seeing exactly three Set One investments and three Set Two investments,
we would expect to see slightly more Set One investments than Set Two investments, perhaps
3.1 Set One investments and 2.9 Set Two investments.
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each Set Two product would be lower, perhaps substantially, than the
averaged price for the corresponding Set One product. Table 3 illus-
trates this phenomenon.
TABLE 3
AVERAGED PRICE PER UNIT:
SET TWO PRODUCT SUBSTANTIALLY EASIER TO COPY
Investment Averaged Price Investment Averaged Price
(#) ($ per unit sold) (#) ($ per unit sold)
1-A 100 2-A 40
1-B 75 2-B 30
1-C 50 2-C 20
1-D 25 2-D 10
1-E 5 2-E 2
Under these assumptions, if an individual had sufficient resources to
commit to six, and only six, of these investments (and these were the
only investments available), then a rational individual would commit
her available resources to Investments 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 2-A, and 2-
B in order to receive the highest price for her resources. Given the as-
sumptions we have made in this example, the greater ease with which
a competitor can copy the Set Two products results in allocative ineffi-
ciency. Because of the greater ease with which a competitor can copy
the Set Two products, a rational investor will make the socially less
valuable 1-D investment, rather than the socially more valuable 2-C
investment, in order to receive the higher price for her resources. A
property system that left the Set Two products substantially easier to
copy would, in this example, lead to allocative inefficiency and a net
loss to society of $250,000.
Again, whether and to what extent allocative inefficiency will
result in the real world is an empirical question. To the extent that
we can identify a class of products that are, on average, easier to copy
than most other products, we can assert that in the absence of some
form of legal prohibition on copying, such products will likely be un-
derproduced. Note that we have not concluded that in the absence of
a legal prohibition on copying such easier-to-copy products will not be
produced at all. If we hold every other factor constant, the lead-time
price, and hence the averaged price received, will increase as the so-
cial value of a product increases. 384 As a result, an individual will re-
384. See note 379.
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ceive a higher price for her resources when invested in a more easily
copied product, which is sufficiently more valuable, than she would
receive for investing in a less easily copied but sufficiently less
valuable product. Thus, in our second example, even though the Set
Two products were substantially easier to copy than the Set One
products, the averaged price received for investing in products 2-A
and 2-B was higher than the price that would have been received for
those resources invested in product 1-E. As a result, we should not
accept at face value the Stationers' Company's assertion that, without
copyright, no works of authorship at all would be created. s5 Even if
works of authorship are, as a class, much easier for competitors to
copy than the products that copyright leaves unprotected ("non-work
products"),8 6 sufficient incentives will remain for authors to produce
those works with the highest social value because competition is not
perfect. 87 Yet, to the extent that works of authorship are as a class
385. See text accompanying note 23.
386. As discussed, see note 24, this assumption is not true for some types of works of
authorship. However, most of the products for which the assumption is false, for example an
original of a work of fine art by a recognized painter, require copyright protection because of a
purchaser's ability to use her copy to serve a large number of derivative users. See Part VI.C.2.
To the extent that some works of authorship are neither relatively easy to copy, nor susceptible
to such derivative use, the inclusion of such articles as works of authorship reflects either the
inevitably imprecise nature of categories or the romantic view of copyright as a protection for
artistic works that creaps into copyright from time to time. See Peter Jaszi, On the Author
Effect- Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. 293,
298-99 (1992). We can find an example of such a romantic view in Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991),
when the Court quoted the constitutional provision that copyright is "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts," 499 U.S. at 349 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8), and then
rephrased that provision at the end of the same paragraph as "the progress of science and art,"
id. at 350. The substitution of "are' in the ordinary sense for "Arts" in the constitutional sense
of "useful Arts" or industrial arts, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (treating
"useful arts" as referring to "industrial arts"), reflects a common, but mistaken, belief that
copyright has always been, is, and should be about protecting creative and artistic endeavours.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990) (justifying copyright protection
for architectural works on the basis that such works are "a work of are' and an "art form," and
by suggesting that "[a]rchitecture is not unlike poetry"). Yet, the first copyright statute did not
share this romantic conception of copyright, protecting maps and charts, but not artistic works
of any sort. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting an author's rights in a
map, chart, or book).
387. Despite this, the argument that without copyright there would be no works at all
remains a popular rhetorical strategy among copyright proponents. See International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918) ("Indeed, it is one of the most obvious
results of defendants theory that, by permitting indiscriminate publication ... it would render
publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the
cost prohibitive in comparison with the return"); Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography 90 (U.
Cal., 1947) CTake away from English authors their copyrights, and you would very soon take
away from England her authors"); Hearings at 142 (cited in note 324) ('Unless we do something
to insure that the creators of the material are not exploited by the electronics revolution, that
same revolution which will make it possible for almost every household to have an audio and
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substantially easier for competitors to copy than most non-work
products, we should expect that unless the law provides some
protection against copying for the more easily copied works of
authorship, works of authorship will be "underproduced. 388
Specifically, resources will be devoted to producing additional non-
work products rather than to producing additional works of
authorship, even though society would value the additional works
more highly.389 To the extent that the marginal390 administrative costs
of providing legal protection against such copying would be less than
video recorder will surely undermine, cripple, and eventually wash away the very industries on
which it feeds") (statement of Howard Oliver, executive secretary, American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists); id. at 556.
388. As the textual context suggests, underproduction refers to the production of fewer
works than an optimal allocation of resources would require. We can label any given production
level as underproduction only so long as investing additional resources in creating additional
works of authorship would generate greater social value than the alternative uses to which
these resources would otherwise be devoted.
389. See Hurt and Schuchman, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. at 429-30 (cited in note 12); Machlup,
Economic Review at 58-60 (cited in note 11). See also Mackaay, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at
895 (cited in note 17).
390. If the resources are not used to produce works of authorship, presumably they will be
used elsewhere in our market economy. Wherever they are used, they will require some form of
legal protection against theft or other forms of improper interference, such as breach of contract.
Therefore, the proper comparison is between the additional administrative expense that would
have been required to protect the resources against improper interference had the resources
been used to create a non-work product and the additional administrative expense that would
have been required to protect the resources when used to create a work of authorship. As a
general matter, I assume that the marginal administrative expense associated with protecting
the resources when invested in a work of authorship is likely to be similar to the marginal
administrative expense associated with protecting the resources in a non-work product. In both
cases, the threat of legal action alone will usually suffice to deter improper interference, thus
legal action will not usually be necessary.
Three differences between tangible and intangible property create a relevant difference
between the marginal administrative expenses of protecting these resources. First, to the
extent that the law is less clear about the boundaries of intangible property than tangible
property, legal action to enforce the intangible boundaries may occur more often, either because
the owner of the intangible property mistakenly believes that someone has crossed her property
boundary when they have not, or because another mistakenly crosses the owner's property
boundary thinking she did not. See Gordon, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 1346 (cited in note 143).
Second, people may resist the creation of intangible property to a greater extent than they resist
the creation of tangible property. See id. This may occur either because the boundaries are less
certain, or because the harm to the owner is harder to perceive, or because interference with the
intangible property may be both easier to accomplish and easier to escape detection while
accomplishing. Third, to the extent the legal scope of protection changes more often with
respect to intangible property rights than tangible property rights, that higher rate of change
may reinforce the first two differences by making intangible property seem more transient and
less justifiable than tangible property. For these three reasons, the marginal expense
associated with protecting resources devoted to the creation of additional works of authorship
may be slightly higher than the marginal administrative expense associated with protecting
resources devoted to the creation of a non-work product. Because we are dealing with the
marginal administrative expense required to expand copyright protection slightly, the
difference, however, is likely to remain small.
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the lost social value such allocative inefficiency would produce, legal
protection that limits the copying of works of authorship is desirable.
3. Allocative Efficiency and the Proper Scope of
Copyright Protection
The question then becomes: If works of authorship are easier
as a class for competitors to copy,391 how much protection should
copyright provide? Because we have framed our analysis entirely in
terms of more and less easily copied products, we can summarize our
reasoning as follows. A property system that makes (or leaves 392) one
class of products substantially easier to copy than other products will
contain allocative inefficiency since the market will underproduce the
more easily copied products, while overproducing 393 the less easily
copied products.
In the previous Section, we used this reasoning to identify the
central economic justification for a legal prohibition on copying works
of authorship. To the extent that competitors could, in the absence of
legal protection, copy works of authorship more easily than non-work
products, protecting works of authorship against at least some
copying is desirable to prevent allocative inefficiency. A failure to
provide such protection would lead individuals to expect a higher
price for their resources if invested in a non-work product than in an
otherwise comparable work of authorship. This failure would cause
the market, at the margins, to underproduce works of authorship and
to overproduce non-work products.
391. As previously noted, I will not focus in this Article on the imperfect fit between the
products copyright defines as works, and the extent to which each such work can be more easily
copied than the average non-work product. See note 386.
392. As a starting point, technology determines the ease with which any given work or
product can be copied. See Adelstein and Peretz, 5 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. at 213-17 (cited in note
257) (describing competition between a seller and a "free rider" as copying and protection that
technologies advance), The law, by prohibiting certain forms of copying, can make copying more
difficult. The law cannot, however, make a product easier to copy than the available technology
permits. At best, the law can leave competitors free to make use of the best available copying
technology.
393. As the text suggests, overproduction refers to the production of more of a particular
type of product than an optimal allocation of resources would require. We can label any given
production level as overproduction if and only if we could take resources away from such
production, dedicate those resources to some other use, and generate thereby a net increase in
social value. Because available resources are finite, overproduction in one sector of the economy
must be matched by underproduction in the remaining sectors of the economy, and vice versa.
See Machlup, Economic Review at 45-46 (cited in note 11) (describing how, when "inventive
activity" expands, another activity must contract).
1996] 599
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
What has not been generally recognized, however, is that this
reasoning also defines the appropriate limits for such legal protection.
After all, copyright can and indeed is intended to make works of
authorship more difficult for competitors to copy, both directly by pro-
hibiting later authors from copying expression from earlier works and
indirectly by prohibiting later authors from producing unduly similar
works. 394 While the difficulty a competitor will experience in copying
without violating the law is not a practical one, in other words a lack
of copying technology, copyright's legal prohibition on copying
effectively prohibits the use of the most effective copying techniques
and thereby increases the expense and difficulty of imitating a
copyrighted work. If copyright allows so little copying that
copyrighted works become more difficult for a competitor to copy than
a non-work product, then copyright would itself generate allocative
inefficiency. By rendering works of authorship less easily copied than
non-work products, copyright would lead an individual to expect a
higher price for her resources invested in a work of authorship than
she would expect for them if invested in an otherwise comparable, but
easier to copy, non-work product. Such protection would lead the
market, at the margins, to underproduce non-work products and to
overproduce works of authorship. To avoid such allocative
inefficiency, copyright must not render works of authorship more
difficult, on average, for a competitor to copy than the average non-
work product.
Our analysis, thus, generates two conclusions. If the legal bar-
rier to copying that copyright provides does not make it as difficult to
copy a work of authorship as it is to copy a non-work product, then
works of authorship will be underproduced because they will remain
more easily copied than non-work products. Copyright must,
therefore, make works of authorship at least as difficult for a
competitor to copy as non-work products. On the other hand, if the
legal barrier to copying that copyright provides makes it more difficult
to copy a work of authorship than a non-work product, such legal
protection would lead the market to underproduce non-work products.
Such broad copyright protection would render non-work products
more easily copied, as a practical and legal matter, than works of
authorship. As a matter of efficiency, copyright must therefore render
works of authorship neither more nor less difficult for a competitor to
copy than non-work products.
394. See text accompanying notes 25-32.
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By ensuring that works of authorship are equally difficult to
copy, copyright would ensure an individual a comparable price for her
resources whether invested in an additional work of authorship or an
additional non-work product, when the two products generate compa-
rable marginal social value. It would, as best as a real world market
can, ensure that an individual would receive a higher price for her re-
sources if invested in the more valuable product, without regard to
whether that product is a work of authorship or a non-work product.
Such consonance between price and social value would tend to lead
rational individuals to allocate their resources to the highest valued
use.395 This consonance would, therefore, tend to promote allocative
efficiency. Moreover, because such protection would ensure the
optimal allocation of society's available resources, we can say that
such protection would assign an author a fair share of the joint value
associated with her work of authorship and would ensure an author a
reasonable opportunity to recover a fair return on her authorship
investment.
39
C. Applying the Test: Competitive and
Noncompetitive Copying
Having defined copyright's appropriate scope in general terms,
we must now determine what sorts of copying copyright must prohibit
to ensure that works of authorship are as difficult, but no more so, for
a competitor to copy as the average non-work product. In order to ex-
plore this issue, the following Sections consider two different types of
copying that might occur. The first examines the extent of protection
395. See Hayek, Individualism at 21 (cited in note 17) (stating that the rewards a creator
receives should relate to the objective results of his efforts and the utility of his efforts to
others); Hurt and Schuchman, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. at 429-30 (cited in note 12); Mackaay, 13
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 872-73, 875-76, 895 (cited in note 17). See also Machlup, Economic
Review at 62-66 (cited in note 11).
396. Both the cases and the Copyright Act refer to ensuring an author a fair share of the
value of her work. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 432; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975) (stating that the goal of copyright law is to secure a fair return for the author's
labor); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (defining as one fair use factor "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"). Neither, however,
reflects any clear sense of what portion of a work's joint value would be fair. See Goldstein, 1
Copyright § 1.1, at 8 (cited in note 5). From an allocative efficiency perspective, we can define a
fair share as that share which tends to promote the optimal allocation of society's resources.
That meaning is the share or return I will be referring to when I refer to a fair share or a fair
return. In more practical terms, a return on or share of a work's joint value will promote
allocative efficiency and hence be fair if it is comparable for a work of authorship to what it
would be for a non-work product of similar social value.
1996]
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copyright should provide against someone copying from a work of
authorship in order to produce a product that consumers would con-
sider a substitute for the work in its original form ("competitive"
uses). The second examines the extent of protection copyright should
provide against someone copying from a work of authorship in order
to produce a product that consumers would not consider a substitute
for the work in its original form ("noncompetitive" uses).
1. Competitive Uses: Reproduction
Three factors contribute to the allocative inefficiency that a
relative ease of copying can create: (1) the speed of copying, (2) the
cost advantage obtained by copying, and (3) the extent to which copy-
ing was used to produce a more perfect substitute for the original.317
In order to determine copyright's proper scope, we need to take the
following three steps. First, we need to determine the extent to which
copying enables a competitor of a non-work product, behaving reason-
ably,398 to produce a competing version of the product (a) more quickly,
(b) at a greater cost advantage, and (c) that substitutes more perfectly
for the original, as compared to a competitor producing a competing
version of the product without copying. Second, we need to determine
how various levels of copyright protection would affect the copying
advantages available to a work's competitors. Third, once we have
identified these two sets of values, we can identify the appropriate
scope of copyright protection as that protection that reduces the
copying advantages, in terms of speed, cost savings, and degree of
substitutability, of a competitor with respect to the typical work of
authorship to a level comparable to that available with respect to the
typical non-work product.
Before examining the empirical evidence available to under-
take this three-step analysis, 399 this approach immediately suggests
several important considerations.
397. See text accompanying notes 375-78.
398. To avoid the moral hazard that relying on the actual costs of producing the original or
a copy of a work would create, courts should base their decision on whether a competitor obtains
an unreasonable copying advantage based upon an objective, or reasonable, estimate of the costs
of producing or copying a work. See Arrow, Economic Welfare, in Rate and Direction at 613
(cited in note 5) (discussing moral hazards).
399. The proponents of copyright have successfully and repeatedly persuaded Congress to
expand copyright's protection without any empirical evidence establishing that such an ex-




First, because a competitor of non-work products can obtain
some advantages by copying, copyright should not prohibit every form
or instance of copying. Rather, it should prohibit only that copying
that gives a competitor a disproportionate copying advantage with re-
spect to works of authorship as compared to non-work products. For
example, competitors seeking to produce a competing version of either
a new soda drink or a new computer program can both obtain some
copying advantages by examining the original carefully and attempt-
ing to imitate those characteristics of the original that made it a suc-
cess.400 To the extent that this sort of copying, which some might call
reverse engineering,401 provides a similar degree of copying advantage
to a competitor in producing a competing version of a non-work
product, copyright should not prohibit such copying. Copyright
should prohibit only that copying which allows a competitor to obtain
a disproportionate copying advantage with respect to a work of
authorship, as compared to the advantage available with respect to a
non-work product.
Second, such a disproportionate copying advantage is most
likely to arise where a competitor can use a mechanical form of copy-
ing. As a general rule, mechanically copying a work, whether through
the use of a dual-head videocassette recorder, a dual-tape deck, or two
computer disks, will provide a copying competitor the most significant
advantages in terms of the time and expense saved in producing a
competing version of a work and the ability to produce a more perfect
substitute for the original. When a copying process requires more
human intervention and skill, it becomes more time consuming and
more expensive, and it is somewhat less likely to result in a perfect
substitute for the original. For example, if a competitor uses
400. Thus, the fact that a competitor has taken the heart of a copyrighted work, in that she
has taken what makes the work most valuable to consumers, should be irrelevant, as that is the
essence of successful competition whether done with respect to a copyrighted work or a non-
work product. Compare Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176 (stating that taking the heart of the
original does not make copying excessive in relation to a purpose of parody), with Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (taking a small portion of a work's expression constitutes infringement
if the defendant "took what was essentially the heart of the book"). The question should be
whether the method and extent of the copying would enable the competitor to obtain a
disproportionate copying advantage in producing a competing work, as compared to the copying
advantage available with respect to a non-work product.
401. See, for example, Samuelson, et al., 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2341 (cited in note 13)
(suggesting that the reverse engineering of computer programs is currently a "manual and very
tedious process involving considerable effort to learn anything of value").
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computer-enhanced photography and a high-quality color printer to
copy a Superman comic book, such copying is likely to provide the
competitor a significant copying advantage.4 2 While the competitor
would still have to incur printing and distribution expenses for her
competing version of the comic book, such copying is likely to save the
competitor substantial time and money and is likely to yield a more
perfect substitute for the original, when compared to producing a
competing comic book without reference to the original Superman. In
contrast, if a competitor copied the Superman comic book by looking
at the Superman comic book and drawing her own comic book that
mimicked the characters and story lines of the Superman comic book,
her copying would presumably save her some time, require somewhat
less skill, and result in a competing comic book that consumers would
consider a somewhat more perfect substitute for the original, than
would creating a similar work without copying. Nevertheless, despite
her copying, this competitor would incur not only printing and
distribution expenses, but also substantial expenses in creating and
marketing her work.403  Moreover, because comic books tell a
sequential story, a consumer of Superman comic books would not
consider a competitor's comic book a reasonable substitute for the
original unless it picked up and continued the story using the same
characters and plot at the point where each previous issue of
Superman left off. In other words, only literal or near-literal
duplication of each issue would enable a competitor to produce a
perfect or near-perfect substitute for the original Superman comic
book as a series of sequential works. As a result, even literal copying
done by hand would provide far less of an advantage in terms of the
time and expense saved in producing a competing work, and in terms
of the perceived substitutability of the competing work for the
original, than mechanical copying would provide. Indeed, the copying
advantage that literal, but non-mechanical, copying would provide
might prove so slight as to be equal to, or only insignificantly greater
402. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 294-99 (cited in note 5) (detailing a copier's cost ad-
vantage for books). See also Part VI.C.1.b.
403. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. In discussing whether a circus advertisement satisfied
the originality standard, Justice Holmes remarked:
The amount of training required for humbler efforts than those before us is well
indicated by Ruskin. "If any young person, after being taught what is, in polite circles,
called 'drawing,' will try to copy the commonest piece of real work,-suppose a
lithograph on the title page of a new opera air, or a woodcut in the cheapest illustrated
newspaper of the day-they will find themselves entirely beaten."
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than, the typical advantage a competitor can obtain when copying a
non-work product.
40 4
Third, some products may be relatively easy to copy in one
form, yet not in another. For example, consider the copying advan-
tages one individual can obtain over another with respect to an origi-
nal home design. The copying advantages available to one architect
in the building plan market are substantial if she can simply copy the
original building plans of another using a blueprint machine.405 The
copying advantages become far less substantial, however, if she must
attempt to re-create the building plans by examining and measuring a
home built to the original plan's specifications. Even using the best
available techniques to copy the plans in this manner, measuring and
converting the dimensions of the completed home back into archi-
tectural plans will require more time and skill and will likely yield a
somewhat less-exact copy of the original building plans than would
photographic reproduction of the original plans. Moreover, if we con-
sider the plan cost as simply one part of the ultimate cost of a home,
the copying advantages available to a competitor who builds homes
that imitate those of another builder are likely to be trivial. Such a
competing builder might save some time and expense on the plans by
examining the original builder's completed homes. But by the time
the competing builder has purchased the land on which to construct
her competing copy and has paid for the supplies and materials neces-
sary to construct the home, the copying advantages available to such
a competing builder are likely to amount to no more than a negligible
part of the total home cost.
40 6
404. See text accompanying notes 460-65.
405. Compare Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d
897, 901 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that copying architectural plans themselves constitutes
infringement, while building a home using the plans does not); Scholz Homes, 379 F.2d at 86
(suggesting that unauthorized copying of plans is an infringement even if a building constructed
using copied plans should not be considered a copy); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d
895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(same).
406. For example, my wife and I recently built a home, and the home plans amounted to
less than two percent of the final home cost. Architects' fees for homes typically run somewhat
higher, between seven and fifteen percent of the home cost. See, for example, Erica Wheeler,
Hiring the Right Architect, Santa Fe New Mexican G1 (April 30, 1995). For a "signature"
building, or for governmental projects, the architectural and engineering fees can run even
higher, but should still amount to less than twenty percent of the total project cost. See, for
example, Leah Beth Ward, $36 million and Rising: UC Building Soars $16 million over Plan,
Cincinatti Enquirer Al (July 23, 1995) (reporting that architectural fees ended up constituting
21.67% of a building's cost).
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b. Empirical Evidence
Ultimately, whether and how much protection against copying
copyright should provide to promote allocative efficiency is an empiri-
cal matter on which there is very little available evidence. Yet, what
empirical evidence there is suggests that copyright should prohibit
only exact or near-exact duplication in the competitive copying con-
text. Consider the empirical data Justice, then Professor, Steven
Breyer gathered and reported concerning the cost advantage a
competitor can obtain by copying.4 7 While Justice Breyer's cost fig-
ures are somewhat outdated,4°8 they provide some of the only empiri-
cal data available on the extent of the cost advantage copying can pro-
vide a competitor. In his work, Justice Breyer presented the following
table which detailed the cost savings that copying would provide a
competitor with respect to the average college text.
40 9
407. Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 294-99 (cited in note 5) (detailing a copier's cost advantage
for books).
408. Advances in printing technology would materially affect this analysis only ff three
conditions are satisfied. First, technological advances that reduce the cost and time of printing
are material only if they reduce the cost and time of printing disproportionately in favor of a
copier. Thus, the speed and cost advantages that desktop publishing achieves over traditional
methods of publishing are probably not relevant because the advantages are equally available to
both the first publisher and the competitors. Improved scanning technology may, on the other
hand, increase the relative advantage of the competitor as compared to older photographic
reproduction techniques. Second, to be material, advances in technology must also increase the
copying advantages with respect to works of authorship more than technological advances have
increased the copying advantages with respect to non-work products. Thus, even scanning
technology is material only if it disproportionately increases the copying advantages with
respect to the average work of authorship when compared to technological advances such as
plug molding, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 144-45, 158,
163-64 (1989), that have reduced the cost and time required to copy non-work products. Third,
to the extent that copyright prohibits certain forms of copying, only those technological
advances that copyright permits a later author to use are relevant. Thus, so long as copyright
prohibits exact or near-exact duplication, advances in scanning technology, even if they satisf
the first two conditions, do not justify broadening copyright's protection because a prohibition on
near-exact duplication would largely prohibit the use of scanners to reproduce a copyrighted
work.
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as an example, we can explore the rela-
scope and the first publisher's averaged
price by considering how three levels of copyright protection would af-
fect the copying advantages available to a competitor. For the first
level, we will assume no copyright protection ("Level One" protection).
Competitors will be allowed to copy however and whatever they would
like. Under this assumption, competitors will presumably be able to
produce their competing versions very rapidly, and we will estimate
that such competing versions will appear after six months.41o For the
410. I realize that a competitor may be able to create a copy much faster than six months.
See, for example, Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1100, 1109 (1971) (contending
that existing technology would allow a person to produce a quality copy of a book in hours). But
creating a competing copy is not simply a matter of running to the nearest photocopying
machine. A competitor will also want to wait long enough to ensure that the market will
support a competing version. As a result, even if the available copying and distribution
technology would enable a competitor to introduce a competing copy within a week, a competitor
would rarely do so. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 297 n.68 (cited in note 5). Moreover, to the
COPYRIGHT'S PARADIGM
TABLE 4
TEXTBOOKS: COPIERS' COST ADVANTAGE









second level, we will assume that copyright prohibits only literal or
near-literal paraphrasing ("Level Two" protection). Competitors can
copy from the original, but they cannot reproduce it exactly or
through near-literal paraphrasing. 411 Under this level of protection,
the competitors will presumably require somewhat more time to
produce their competing versions, and we will estimate that such
competing versions will appear after one year. For the third level, we
will assume that copyright prohibits any copying of expression to
produce a substantially similar work ("Level Three" protection).
Competitors may copy a work's ideas, in the ordinary sense of the
word, but they cannot reproduce any passage that consumers would
recognize as being taken from the original. Under this level of
protection, competitors will essentially have to produce their own
work, a work that happens to duplicate the subject matter of the
original but is otherwise the product of their own skills and labors.
Given such copyright protection, we will estimate that competitors
will require two years to produce their competing works.
To simplify our discussion, we will assume that the first pub-
lisher and the competitors together will sell a total of ten thousand
copies of the work412 and that the sales of the work will be distributed
evenly across ten years.413 How the total sales will be distributed be-
tween the first publisher and the competitors, and how many competi-
tors will enter the market, will depend on the extent of the copying
advantages copyright permits a competitor to obtain. 4 4 We will as-
extent that some of my assumptions seem unrealistically favorable to one side of the copyright
issue, some of my other assumptions will tend unrealistically to favor the other. See, for
example, text accompanying notes 412-15 (assuming that a work will a have ten-year life, and
that sales in the post-entry period will be shared evenly between the first publisher and
competing entrants). Finally, as I shall eventually propose Level Two as the appropriate
standard of protection, erroneous assumptions concerning the effect of Level One protection are
ultimately irrelevant. With respect to the assumptions for Level Two, I have used the existing
scope of protection, and other methods of estimating a competitor's copying advantages, to
confirm that my Level Two assumptions are reasonably accurate. See text accompanying notes
424-31 and note 456.
411. As the Ninth Circuit phrased a similar standard in Warner Bros., a court should find
infringement when "it is plain from the study [of the two works] that one of them is not in fact
the creation of the putative author, but instead has been copied in substantial part exactly or in
transparent re-phrasing." 216 F.2d at 950.
412. In a more detailed analysis, we would recognize that the amount of copying that copy-
right permits would shift the total number of copies of the work that would be sold because, by
allowing additional copying, copyright would reduce the equilibrium price of copies of the work,
and thereby increase the quantity sold, if we assume a downward sloping demand curve.
413. This assumption is not critical. We need only assume that the rate of price and cost
inflation, and the distribution of sales and expenses over time, are roughly even for the average
work and the average non-work product for the analysis to be accurate.
414. As copyright permits a competitor to obtain a larger and larger copying advantage, the
number of copies a competitor will need to sell to break even will fall. In order to reach equilib-
[Vol. 49:483608
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sume, however, that the sales during the post-entry period will be
evenly distributed among the first publisher and any market en-
trants.
415
At Level One, the competitors would be able to obtain the full
cost savings available to a copier, as reflected in Table 4. Given our
lead-time and cost assumptions, the first publisher would sell a total
of 1,831 copies of the work over the ten-year life of the work.416 If we
assume that the price and expense of copies of the work remain con-
stant in terms of present value over the ten-year period, 417 then the
first publisher would lose approximately $5,395 on her investment in
the work; or, in terms of the averaged price model, the first publisher
would receive $0.62 on every unit 418 of resources she expended to pro-
duce the work.4
9
rium, each competitor must sell exactly enough copies to break even. (In using a break-even
number, I have assumed that the costs in Tables 4 and 5 already include a reasonable return on
the investment. A different assumption on that issue would not affect the analysis.) If they sell
fewer than necessary to break even, then some will exit the market to avoid the expected loss.
If they sell more than necessary to break even, additional competitors will enter the market to
capture the supra-normal return available in the market. As a result, at equilibrium, sufficient
competitors will have entered the market so that each competitor will exactly break even.
415. By assuming that the equilibrium sales are evenly distributed between the first
publisher and the competitors, we have not weighted the equilibrium sales to reflect the first
publisher's ability to develop consumer loyalty to her work in the lead-time period, or otherwise
to differentiate her version of the work in the post-entry period. The ability to develop such
loyalty during the lead-time period would likely enable the first publisher to capture a larger
share of the equilibrium sales and to improve her private return on her investment. See
Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 Am. Econ.
Rev. 349 (1982).
416. The first publisher will sell five hundred copies during the lead-time period. With
Level One protection, competitors need to sell 1330.5 copies of the work to break even. Given
that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $3.57 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.80, less her variable costs of $1.23 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 1,331 copies of
the work to break even. Given that 9,500 total copies of the work will be sold, and assuming
that the first publisher will remain in the market, 6.14 competitors can enter the market and
sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. (In order to improve the accuracy of the
calculations, I have used the exact number of entrants necessary for the market to reach
equilibrium. In this case, that number is 6.14 entrants. For a single work or market, imagining
6.14 entrants is difficult, but if we assume that a similar process takes place for one hundred, or
one thousand works, then imagining 614 entrants in the one hundred new markets, or 6,140
entrants in the one thousand new markets is relatively easy.) Moreover, I have assumed that
the first publisher will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry period. She will
therefore sell approximately 1,331 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the 500
copies she sold in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total of 1,831 copies of her
work. Her competitors will sell the remaining 8,169 copies.
417. This assumption is not critical. See note 413.
418. Because we have assumed a constant wholesale price, we cannot calculate the first
publisher's averaged price in terms of the numbers of copies sold. An attempt to do so would
simply yield the wholesale price. As an alternative to that approach, I have calculated the
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In order to determine the averaged price the first publisher
can expect to earn under Level Two, we must first estimate the cost
savings available to the competitors given the copying that remains
permissible. As a starting point, the prohibition on literal copying
means that much of the cost savings identified in Table 4 for a copier
would no longer be available. Such protection would prohibit
essentially all forms of mechanical copying, and would, as a result,
prevent the competitors from simply photographing the typeset text of
the original publisher. Providing such protection would require the
competitor to perform the editing and typesetting of its competing
version of the work on her own, and would require the competitor to
spend a substantial portion of the plant and editorial expenses that
photographic reproduction could otherwise have saved. Similarly,
because the competitors' versions will now differ somewhat from the
original, the competitors would presumably need to spend more to
promote their respective versions of the work than they would need to
spend if their versions were more exact copies of the original.
Moreover, even if a somewhat less skilled author could more quickly
produce a version of the textbook by copying the original textbook to
the full extent that this level of protection permits, some time and
skill would nevertheless be required to rewrite the original without
losing its substance or coherence. While the competitors might not
have to pay a royalty of seventy cents per copy, they would have to
pay some royalty, which we will estimate at thirty-five cents per copy
or half the royalty the first publisher pays. Finally, the competitors
will also end up spending somewhat more on overhead, both to
manage the editors and authors and to obtain the necessary legal
advice.
A prohibition on literal or near-literal copying would,
therefore, significantly increase the competitor's costs as compared to
its costs in the absence of any copyright protection. Based upon our
analysis of how Level Two would affect the cost savings available to a
competitor, Table 5 presents an estimate of the costs a competitor
averaged price by dividing the first publisher's gross income by her total costs. As a result, each
unit of resources expended refers to each dollar of resources invested. This approach creates
some problems, see text accompanying notes 424-27, 441-46, but after correcting for those
problems, the approach yields a number that provides a reasonable indication of the extent to
which the copying advantages available to competitors reduce the profitability of the first
publisher's investment.
419. Given that she sold approximately 1,831 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.80 per copy, the first publisher will receive $8,786.54 in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,520 and her variable costs of $3,661, the first publisher experiences a real loss
of $5,394.52. Moreover, given gross revenue of $8,786.54 and total expenditures of $14,181.06,
the first publisher earns an averaged price of $0.62 per unit of resources invested.
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would likely incur to produce a competing version of a work if
copyright prohibited exact or near-exact copying.
TABLE 5
TEXTBOOKS: COPIERS' COST ADVANTAGE
LEVEL TWO: PROHIBITION ON NEAR-LITERAL REPRODUCTION
Fixed Costs First Publisher Copiers
Plant $ 4,500 $ 4,000
Editorial 1,440 1,000
Other overhead 2,880 2,600
Selling 1,000 1,000
Promotion 700 550
Total Fixed Costs $10,520 $ 9,150
Variable Costs
Manufacturing $ 0.80 per copy $ 0.80 per copy
* Warehousing and shipping 0.16 " " 0.16 "
Royalty 0.70 " 0.35 "
Selling 0.20 " " 0.20 "
Promotion 0.14 "  " 0.11 "
Total Variable Costs $ 2.00 per co]y $1.62 per copy
Wholesale Price $ 4.80 per copy $ 4.80 per copy
Given our lead-time assumption and these cost estimates, the first
publisher in a world where copyright prohibited literal or near-literal
copying would sell a total of 3,877 copies of the work.420 She would
earn a real profit (above the normal profit already included in her cost
420. The first publisher will sell one thousand copies in the first year. Given that the com-
petitors will receive a net cash flow of $3.18 per copy, which equals the gross income to the
competing publisher of $4.80, less her variable costs of $1.62 per copy, a competitor at this level
of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 2,877 copies of the work to break even.
Given that 9,000 total copies of the work remain to be sold, and assuming that the first
publisher will remain in the market, 2.13 competitors can enter the market. Assuming the
sales are evenly divided among the entering competitors and the first publisher, the competitors
will sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. We have assumed that the first publisher
will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry period. She will therefore sell 2,877
copies during the post-entry period. Together with the one thousand copies she sold in the lead-
time period, this means she will sell a total of 3,877 copies of her work. Her competitors will sell
the remaining 6,123 copies.
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figures) of $337 on her investment in the work, and would receive an
averaged price per unit of $1.02.421
At Level Three, copyright prohibits copying to such an extent
that a competitor would obtain essentially no advantage by copying in
order to produce a competing version of the original work. While the
competitor may obtain some cost savings in the form of reduced risk,
given that the competitor can wait and judge the success of the origi-
nal before committing her resources, 422 that risk reduction is offset
substantially by the heightened risk of a copyright infringement suit.
As a result, we will estimate that Level Three will require the com-
petitor to bear essentially the same costs to produce a competing work
as the first publisher bore. Given these assumptions and cost esti-
mates, the first publisher would sell 5,757 copies of the work.423 She
would earn a real profit of $5,600 on her investment in the work, and
receive an averaged price per unit of $1.25.424
Having estimated the copying advantage given these three pos-
sible levels of copyright protection, we should next determine which
level would render the typical textbook as difficult for a competitor to
copy as, but no more so than, the average non-work product. I should
first note, however, that the presence or absence of a profit for our
421. Given that she sold approximately 3,877 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.80 per copy, the first publisher will receive $18,611.32 in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,520 and her variable costs of $7,754.72, the first publisher earns a real profit
(over and above the normal profit built into her cost figures) of $336.60. Moreover, given gross
revenue of $18,611.32 and total expenditures of $18,274.72, the first publisher earns an
averaged price of $1.018 per unit of resources invested.
422. A competitor cannot wait too long before she commits her resources, or else she will
not be able to break even on her competing version because other competitors or the first
publisher will have taken the sales she would need to break even. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev.
at 297 n.68 (cited in note 5). This problem will be particularly acute for works whose sales are
front-loaded. Id.
423. The first publisher will sell two thousand copies of the work during the lead-time
period. Given that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.80 per copy, which equals
the gross income to the competing publisher of $4.80, less her variable costs of $2.00 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 3,757 copies of
her work to break even. Given that 8,000 total copies of the work remain to be sold, and
assuming that the first publisher will remain in the market, 1.40 competitors can enter the
market. Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering competitors and the first
publisher, the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. We have
assumed that the first publisher will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry
period. She will therefore sell 3,757 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the
2,000 copies she sold in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total of 5,757 copies of
her work. Her competitors will sell the remaining 4,243 copies.
424. Given that she sold approximately 5,757 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.80 per copy, the first publisher will receive $27,634.29, in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,520 and her variable costs of $11,514.29, the first publisher earns a real profit
of $5,600.00. Moreover, given gross revenue of $27,634.29 and total expenditures of $22,034.29,
the first publisher earns an averaged price of $1.25 per unit of resources invested.
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first producer at any given level of protection does not establish the
optimal level of protection. To the extent copyright has provided a
given level of protection for some time, sufficient entry will likely have
occurred to place the market in equilibrium. If the market is at
equilibrium, the average work of authorship will earn no more than a
normal return on investment.425  Because copyright provided a
relatively constant level of protection for textbooks in the years pre-
ceding 1968, the year from which Justice Breyer took his data, the
market for such works should have reached equilibrium. Moreover,
because copyright has almost invariably provided college textbooks,
and other non-entertainment works, with fairly narrow protection,
similar to Level Two,426 we should expect that the first publisher will
425. See, for example, Mackaay, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2635, 2638 (cited in note 22). See
also Kay, 13 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. at 344 (cited in note 320). If the average work was earning
more, or less, than a normal return, we would expect to see further entry into, or exit from, the
market in order to reach equilibrium. Thus, the arguments that publishing houses do not earn
an unreasonable return on their investment, or that only one in five works produces a profit, do
not justify the existing level of copyright protection, nor do they justify broadening that
protection. See Plant, 1 Economica at 185 (cited in note 12) ('It is not, however, to be expected
that many people would support the principle of indiscriminate encouragement of all books
which publishers regard as unlikely to sell in sufficient volume to cover their cost"). These
arguments merely establish, first, that copyright protection has remained sufficiently constant
for a sufficient period of time to induce additional investment, and second, that the existing
scope of copyright protection enables a publisher to earn a profit on the one profitable work
sufficient to support the four unprofitable works. If we broaden copyright protection, we should
expect the equilibrium success rate to drop even further, to one in six, or one in eight, or one in
ten. We can see this tendency in the historical evidence, which demonstrates a consistent drop
in the success rate as copyright has broadened its protection. Compare Arber, ed., 2 Transcript
of the Registers at 587 (cited in note 23) (asserting, in a 1643 petition on behalf of the Stationers'
Company, that "scarce one book of three sells well or proves gainfull to the publisher"); Plant, 1
Economica at 183 (cited in note 12) (citing an 1878 article for the proposition that "four books
out of five which are published do not pay their expenses"), Hearings at 29 (cited in note 324)
("[S]ix out of ten films never recoup their total investment"); id. at 547 ("Eighty-four percent of
all [sound recording] industry releases fail to recover their costs. Six percent of classical records
make it into the black") (statement of Jerry Moss, chairman of A&M Records); Digital Audio
Recording: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 88
(1992) ("[O]nly 15 percent of all recordings released recoup their costs") (statement of Jason S.
Bearman, president, Recording Industry Association of America). As a result, if a low success
rate justified broader copyright protection, we would have to expand such protection
continuously. Broader protection would lower the success rate, which would in turn justify even
broader protection.
426. See, for example, Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957)
(recognizing both that any two treatments of the same historical subject will be similar because
the facts limit the author's freedom, and that a scholar is entitled to use a predecessor's work);
Morrison v. Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); McMahon v. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1302-04 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (same); Kepner-Tregoe, 203 U.S.P.Q. at
131-32; McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Pubslishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also text accompanying notes 160.73.
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just break even on the typical textbook at Level Two, if our assump-
tions and cost estimates are reasonably accurate. As a result, that
our example produces a near-break-even result for the first publisher
at Level Two does not establish that Level Two is the appropriate
level of protection; rather, it merely establishes that our estimates of
the likely copying advantages to a competitor are reasonably accurate.
In order to determine which level of protection copyright
should provide, we must compare the copying advantages to a
competitor at each level of protection with the advantages to a
competitor for other types of works and non-work products. In
addition to the averaged price figure, two other values provide useful
indicators of the advantage copying provides a competitor. First,
Justice Breyer used a ratio of the number of copies the competitor
must sell to break even to the number of copies the first publisher
must sell as an indicator of the competitor's copying advantages.427
Second, in their study of imitation costs and patents, Edwin
Mansfield, Mark Schwartz, and Samuel Wagner used a ratio that
compared the cost for a competitor to develop and introduce an
imitative product to the cost for the original innovator to develop and
introduce the product as an indicator of the competitor's copying
advantages. 428  While each of these two approaches has certain
strengths and weaknesses when compared to the averaged price
method,42 9 the scarcity of the empirical evidence available requires
that we use all three methods if we want to generate some conclusions
concerning copyright's proper scope.
427. See Breyer, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 294-97 (cited in note 5).
428. See Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz, and Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and
Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 Econ. J. 907, 907-10 (1981).
429. The use of Justice Breyer's ratio will tend to overstate the competitor's copying
advantage because it fails to consider the lead-time period of the first publisher. Professors
Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner's approach may similarly overstate the competitor's copying
advantage because it fails to consider the lead-time advantage enjoyed by the first publisher.
(In their work, Professors Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner accounted for the lead-time
advantage by using a second ratio that compared the time it takes a competitor to market the
imitation to the time it took the original producer to innovate the new product. Id. at 909-13.)
The fixed cost ratio may also understate the competitor's copying advantage because it fails to
consider any advantage an imitating competitor might obtain in the marginal cost of producing
and marketing her product. None of these weaknesses are critical, however, because the issue
is one of the relative copying advantage available to a competitor with respect to a work of
authorship as compared to a non-work product. So long as each approach over- or understates
the copying advantage available to the same extent with respect to a work of authorship and a
non-work product, either approach will provide an acceptable means of determining copyright's
appropriate scope. The principal weakness of the averaged price method is that it requires
some assurance that two investments, which earn the same averaged price, generate products of
equivalent social value. See text accompanying notes 443-48. Such data may be more difficult
to obtain than the data necessary to calculate the fixed cost and payout ratios.
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If we examine Tables 4 and 5, we can calculate the payout ra-
tios and the fixed cost 430 ratios for each level of protection. For exam-
ple, at Level One, the competitor has fixed costs of $4,750 and a net
cash flow on each copy she sells of $3.57 per copy.43 ' In order to break
even on a competing version of the textbook, a competitor must sell
1,331 copies. In contrast, the first publisher has fixed costs of $10,520
and a net cash flow of only $2.80 per copy, and therefore, must sell
3,757 copies in order to break even. By dividing the competitor's
number of break-even copies by the first publisher's break-even
number, we can calculate a payout ratio of 0.354 at Level One.
Similarly, if we divide the competitor's fixed costs of $4,750 by the
first publisher's fixed costs of $10,520, we find that the fixed cost ratio
at Level One protection is 0.4515.
We can perform similar calculations for the payout and fixed
cost ratios at protection Levels Two and Three. Table 6 presents
these results.
TABLE 6
INDICATORS OF COPYING ADVANTAGE
FOR A TEXTBOOK
Copyright's Averaged Price Payout Ratio Fixed Cost Ratio
Scope (p ner unit)
Level 1 $ 0.62 0.354 0.4515
Level 2 1.02 0.766 0.8698
Level 3 1.25 1.0 1.0
As discussed, each of these indicators provides one measure of the
competitor's copying advantage at each level of copyright protection.
For each indicator, the lower the value, the greater the degree of copy-
ing advantage available to the competitors. As copyright broadens its
protection, it renders works of authorship more difficult to copy and
decreases a competitor's copying advantage. The indicators illustrate
430. While Professor Mansfield and his colleagues used the costs of "developing and
introducing the imitative product," rather than the fixed costs associated with producing the
product, the division of costs between fixed and variable that Justice Breyer made permits us to
substitute fixed costs for the costs of developing and introducing the product in calculating
comparable ratios because the fixed costs should essentially represent the costs of developing
and introducing a work. Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 91 Econ. J. at 907 (cited in note
428).
431. Her net cash flow equals the wholesale price that she receives for the work, $4.80 per
copy, less her variable costs of $1.23 per copy.
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this relation by increasing steadily as copyright increases its protec-
tion from Level One to Level Three.
Having defined the copying advantages each level of copyright
protection gives a competitor, we need only compare them to the copy-
ing advantages a competitor can obtain with respect to non-work
products to determine the proper scope of copyright. Before we make
that comparison, however, let us revisit the dichotomy of fact versus
fiction, or entertaining versus other-than-entertaining works, which
we have previously discussed4 2 to see whether retaining this
dichotomy promotes allocative efficiency.
Under this dichotomy, copyright has historically provided a
greater scope of protection for fictional works than it has for factual or
useful works.433 Given our analysis, such a dichotomy promotes allo-
cative efficiency only if such broader protection is needed for fictional
works in order to make them as difficult, on average, for a competitor
to copy as the more narrowly protected factual works. Yet, the evi-
dence Justice Breyer has collected tends to establish that both factual
works, such as textbooks, and fictional works, such as novels, deserve
the same level of protection.
In his article, Justice Breyer presented the following table,
which details the costs of producing a typical four hundred-page
hardbound novel for the first publisher and a copier:
434
432. See text accompanying notes 302-03.
433. See, for example, Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 563 ("The law generally
recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy"). See
also text accompanying notes 125-29 and 160-73.




NOVEL: COPIERS' COST ADVANTAGE
NO COPYRIGHT
Fixed Costs First Publisher Copiers
Plant $3,900 $725
Editorial 1,300 450
Other overhead 2,800 2,000
Selling 650 650
Promotion 1,350 675
Total Fixed Costs $10,000 $4,500
Variable Costs
Manufacturing $0.70 per copy $0.70 per copy
Warehousing and shipping 0.20" " 0.20 "
Royalty 0.70 " 0.00 "
Selling 0.13 " 0.13 "
Promotion 0.27 " 0.14 "
Total Variable Costs $2.00 per copy $1.17 per copy
Wholesale Price $4.00 per covv 14.00 per coy
In applying the averaged price model to this data, we will assume as
we assumed with respect to the typical textbook, that the cost savings
in Table 7 will be available to a competitor who copies to produce a
competing version of the copyrighted work in a world with no
copyright protection. To determine the cost savings available to a
competitor in a world with Level Two copyright protection, we need to
estimate the savings that nonliteral copying would provide such a
competitor. Because our estimates of the cost savings in such a Level
Two world were apparently accurate for the textbook (given that they
suggested equilibrium at Level Two protection) and because the
techniques for copying either form of literary work appear to be
similar, we will use similar estimates for the copying advantages
available with respect to a novel. Table 8 summarizes the estimated
cost savings available to a competitor copying a novel under Level
Two.
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TABLE 8
NOVELS: COPIERS' COST ADVANTAGE
PROHIBITION ON NEAR-LITERAL REPRODUCTION
Fixed Costs First Publisher Copiers
Plant $3,900 $3,500
Editorial 1,300 900
Other overhead 2,800 2,600
Selling 650 50
Promotion 1.350 1.0
Total Fixed Costs $10,000 $8,750
Variable Costs
Manufacturing $0.70 per copy $0.70 per copy
Warehousing and shipping 0.20 " . . 0.20 . .
Royalty 0.70 " 0.35 It
Selling 0.13 " 0.13 . .
Promotion 0.27 " 0.24 . .
Total Variable Costs $2.00 per copy $1.62 per cODV
Wholesale Price $4.00 per copy $4.00 per copy
Similarly, we will continue to assume that a copying competitor will
obtain no net cost savings by copying under Level Three.
According to Justice Breyer, these cost estimates are for a
novel expected to sell five thousand copies. We will assume that the
sales of these copies are distributed evenly over five years 435 and that
the first publisher has a six month, one year, and two year lead-time
period in the Level One, Level Two, and Level Three protection
worlds, respectively. As before, the distribution of the total sales
between the first publisher and the competitors and the number of
competitors who will enter the market will depend on the extent of
the copying advantages copyright provides to a competitor. We will
also retain our assumption that sales during the post-entry period
435. To the extent that sales are not distributed evenly over the five year period, but are
more likely to occur disproportionately in the first months after publication, such front-loading
of the sales of the work would increase the number of sales made by the first publisher and
reduce the number of sales made by competitors. As a result, the assumption in the text will
generate an averaged price that suggests a greater need for copyright protection than is likely to
exist in the real world.
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will be distributed evenly between the first publisher and any market
entrants.
With Level One protection, the first publisher will sell a total
of 2,490 copies of the work,438 will lose approximately $5,820 on her in-
vestment in the work, and will receive an averaged price of $0.59 on
every unit of resources expended.437 With Level Two protection, the
first publisher will sell a total of 4,676 copies of the work,438 will lose
approximately $647 on her investment in the work, and will receive
an averaged price per unit of $0.97. 431 With Level Three protection,
the first publisher will sell all 5,000 copies of the work,40 will exactly
436. The first publisher will sell 500 copies of the work during the lead-time period. Given
that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.83 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $1.17 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 1,590.1 copies
of her work to break even. Given that 4,500 total copies of the work remain to be sold after the
lead-time period, and assuming that the first publisher will remain in the market, 1.83
competitors can enter the market. Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering
competitors and the first publisher, the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to
break even. We have assumed that the first publisher will share equally in the sales made
during the post-entry period. Given this degree of entry, the first publisher win sell an
additional 1,590.1 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the 500 copies she sold in
the lead-time period, the first publisher will sell a total of 2,090 copies of her work. Her
competitors will sell the remaining 2,910 copies.
437. Given that she sold approximately 2,090 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.00 per copy, she will receive $8,360.42 in gross revenue. After deducting her fixed costs of
$10,000 and her variable costs of $4,180.21, the first publisher experiences a real loss of
$5,819.79. Moreover, given gross revenue of $8,360.42 and total expenditures of $14,180.21, the
first publisher earns an averaged price of $0.590 per unit of resources invested.
438. The first publisher will sell 1,000 copies of the work during the lead-time period.
Given that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.38 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $1.62 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 3,676.5 copies
of her work to break even. Given that 4,500 total copies of the work remain to be sold after the
lead-time period, and assuming that the first publisher will remain in the market, 0.088
competitors can enter the market. Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering
competitors and the first publisher, the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to
break even. We have assumed that the first publisher will share equally in the sales made
during the post-entry period. She will therefore sell 3,676.5 copies during the post-entry period.
Together with the 1,000 copies she sold in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total
of 4,676.5 copies of her work. Her competitors will sell the remaining 323.5 copies.
439. Given that she sold approximately 3,676.5 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.00 per copy, the first publisher will receive $18,705.88 in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,000 and her variable costs of $9,352.94, the first publisher experiences a real
loss of $647.06. Moreover, given gross revenue of $18,705.88 and total expenditures of
$19,352.94, the first publisher earns an averaged price of $0.967 per unit of resources invested.
440. The first publisher will sell 2,000 copies of the work during the lead-time period.
Given that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.00 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $2.00 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell 5,000 copies of her work to
break even. Given that only 3,000 copies remain to be sold, a competitor could not expect to en-
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break even on her investment, and will receive an averaged price per
unit of $1.00.441
Again the presence or absence of profit at any given level of
protection does not establish which level is most desirable. As was
the case for the textbook market, we should expect the market for
fictional novels to be at equilibrium given the reasonably predictable
level of copyright protection such works received in the years
preceding 1968. As a result, we should expect to find, if our cost
estimates and assumptions are accurate, that the first publisher will
roughly break even at the level of protection copyright has
traditionally afforded fictional literary works. That the first publisher
breaks even at Level Three, therefore, merely confirms the accuracy
of our cost estimates and assumptions given that our Level Three
most closely matches the scope of protection copyright provided
fictional literary works in the 1960s.442
In order to determine whether Level Three should be the level
of protection for fictional works, we must determine that (1) an
individual would expect to receive a roughly equal price for her
resources when invested in a fictional work for which copyright
provides Level Three protection, as she would if she invested them in
a factual literary work for which copyright provides Level Two
protection, and (2) the two works are otherwise comparable or of
roughly equal social value. Further examination of Justice Breyer's
data establishes that his typical novel has substantially less social
value than his typical textbook. For a similar expenditure of society's
resources," 3 investing in the novel produces a work that sells five
thousand copies at a wholesale price of $4.00. Investing in the
textbook, on the other hand, produces a work that sells ten thousand
copies at a wholesale price of $4.80. To the extent that market value
fairly represents a work's social value, that the typical textbook sells
a greater volume at a higher price than the typical novel strongly sug-
gests that the typical textbook has a greater social value than the
typical novel. Indeed, so long as the two works create proportional de-
ter the market and break even, even if the competitor could sell every one of the remaining
copies. As a result, no competitors would enter the market.
441. Given that she sold 5,000 copies of her work at a wholesale price of $4.00 per copy, the
first publisher will receive $20,000 in gross revenue. After deducting her fixed costs of $10,000
and her variable costs of $10,000, the first publisher will exactly break even. Moreover, given
gross revenue of $20,000 and total expenditures of $20,000, the first publisher will earn an
averaged price of $1.00 per unit of resources invested.
442. See text accompanying notes 197-201.
443. The two works require similar fixed expenditures and similar per-copy expenditures,
although slightly fewer resources are expended for the novel across its entire production run,
because it sells only 5,000 copies.
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grees of positive and negative externalities, the greater demand for
the typical textbook establishes its greater social value.
444
From this, we must conclude that copyright's current practice
of providing different levels of protection for factual and fictional
works has led to allocative inefficiency. By providing increased
protection for fictional works, copyright ensures individuals a higher
price for resources invested in additional fictional works, even when
society would value additional factual works more highly. Copyright
thereby encourages individuals to create additional fictional works of
lesser value rather than additional factual works of greater value. If
individuals devote their available resources to the uses for which they
receive the highest price, such protection will lead, and indeed has
led, the market to overproduce fictional works and to underproduce
factual works. As a result, the typical or break-even fictional literary
work in Justice Breyer's data has substantially less social value than
the typical or break-even factual literary work.445 In addition, because
this disparate protection has led the market, at equilibrium, to
produce a typical novel of less social value than a textbook, we cannot
compare the averaged price earned on these two investments because
the two investments do not produce works that are of equivalent
social value.
In order to use Justice Breyer's data and the averaged price
model to suggest how much protection copyright should provide, we
must examine the averaged price received for resources invested in
two works of similar social value. In other words, we must consider
the copying advantages and the averaged price returned to an
investor who, for a similar investment of resources, can produce two
works, one fictional and one factual, of similar value to society. This
444. The consumer surplus associated with each work will satisfy this condition so long as
the demand curves for the two works exhibit similar slope, or elasticity. To the extent that
courts are correct in assuming that the slope of the demand curve is steeper, or that the demand
is less elastic, for factual works than for fictional works, the social value of the textbook will be
that much greater than the social value of the novel.
445. As copyright broadens its protection, it increases the profitability of any given work.
As a result, works that would have been marginally profitable or even unprofitable under a
more narrow scope of protection may become substantially profitable with broader protection.
To the extent that at any given level of copyright protection a given work will be more
profitable, increasing the scope of copyright protection tends to make it possible for an author to
break even on a less valuable work. In other words, if copyright provides broader protection,
then we should expect that the break-even work will have less social value than the break-even
work under a more narrow standard of protection. Thus, to the extent that copyright provides
broader protection to fictional works than it does to factual works, we should expect that the
break-even fictional work will have less social value than the break-even factual work.
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hypothetical will necessarily be counterfactual, as the actual level of
copyright protection available has already caused individuals to over-
or underinvest in the relevant markets. Such over- or
underinvestment has, in turn, skewed the actual costs and sales
figures associated with the typical work.446
To construct a hypothetical that will enable us to compare the
averaged price received for two otherwise comparable literary works,
one fictional and one factual, we will retain the cost figures Justice
Breyer reported for the typical novel and simply assume a greater de-
mand for our hypothetical fictional work.447 In fact, we will assume
that our hypothetical fictional work has a demand comparable, on a
price-adjusted basis, to the typical textbook. By making the price-ad-
justed demand for our hypothetical novel and the typical textbook
comparable, we ensure that the two works would have roughly equal
social value."8 Thus, we will assume that for the costs Table 7 re-
flects, the first publisher of our hypothetical novel can produce a novel
that sells a total of twelve thousand copies,449 with sales evenly dis-
tributed across a ten-year life. If we retain our assumptions with re-
spect to the first publisher's lead-time and a competitor's cost savings
under each level of protection, then we can calculate the averaged
446. If copyright were to narrow its protection of fictional works by prohibiting, for
example, only literal and near-literal copying of such works, then it would reduce the
profitability of any given fictional work. As copyright narrows its protection, works that would
have been very profitable under a broader protection scheme might become only somewhat
profitable, somewhat profitable works might only break even, break-even works would become
unprofitable, and so on. Such a narrowing in the protection would necessarily change the cost
or demand characteristics of the break-even fictional work. In order to break even under a
narrow protection standard, a work would need, as compared to the break-even work under a
broader protection standard, either to sell more copies at a given price for the same production
cost, or to sell the same number of copies, but cost less to produce. As a result, the break-even
work under a narrow protection standard would have a higher social value than the break-even
work under a broader protection standard.
447. In the alternative, we could construct two comparable works, one fictional and one
factual, by (a) decreasing the cost of the novel, while retaining its reported sales volume of 5,000
copies, (b) increasing the costs of the textbook, while retaining its reported sales volume of
10,000, or (c) decreasing the sales volume of the textbook, while retaining its reported costs.
Any of these alternatives would generate the same result and suggest that for two comparable
works, one fictional and one factual, copyright would need to provide comparable levels of
copyright protection for the two works in order for an investor to receive a comparable private
return from investing in either work.
448. Because the two works would cost essentially the same and generate the same price-
adjusted demand, the two works will have similar social value to the extent the two works have
similarly sloped demand curves and similar degrees of positive and negative externalities.
While neither assumption will be true in every case, they will probably be accurate often enough
to rely upon.
449. Twelve thousand multiplied by a wholesale price of $4.00 per copy equals 10,000
multiplied by a wholesale price of $4.80 (the sales volume and wholesale price of the textbook).
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price an individual can expect to receive for investing in such a liter-
ary work.
With Level One protection, our investor will sell 2,190 copies of
the work,450 will lose approximately $5,620 on her investment in the
work, and will receive an averaged price of $0.61 for every unit of re-
sources she expended to produce the work.451 With Level Two protec-
tion, the first publisher will sell 4,876 copies of the work,452 will lose
approximately $247 on her investment in the work, and will receive
an averaged price of $0.99.453 With Level Three protection, the first
publisher will sell 7,400 copies of the work,454 will earn a real profit of
$4,800 on her work, and will receive an averaged price of $1.19.
455
450. The first publisher will sell 600 copies of the work during the lead-time period. Given
that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.83 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $1.17 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 1,590.1 copies
of her work to break even. Given that 11,400 total copies remain to be sold after the lead-time
period, and assuming that the first publisher will remain in the market, 6.169 competitors can
enter the market. Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering competitors and
the first publisher, the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. We
have assumed that the first publisher will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry
period. She will therefore sell 1,590.1 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the
600 copies she sold in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total of approximately
2,190 copies of her work. Her competitors will sell the remaining 9,810 copies.
451. Given that she sold approximately 2,190 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.00 per copy, the first publisher will receive $8,760.42 in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,000 and her variable costs of $4,380.21, the first publisher experiences a real
loss of $5,619.79. Moreover, given gross revenue of $8,760.42 and total expenditures of
$14,380.21, the first publisher earns an averaged price of $0.609 per unit of resources invested.
452. The first publisher will sell 1,200 copies of the work during the lead-time period.
Given that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.38 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $1.62 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 3,676.47 copies
of her work to break even. Given that 10,800 copies of the work remain to be sold after the lead-
time period, and assuming that the first publisher will remain in the market, 1.94 competitors
can enter the market. Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering competitors
and the first publisher, the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. We
have assumed that the first publisher will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry
period. She will therefore sell 3,676.47 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the
1,200 copies she sold in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total of 4,876 copies of
her work. Her competitors will sell the remaining 7,124 copies.
453. Given that she sold approximately 4,876 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.00 per copy, the first publisher will receive $19,505.88 in gross revenue. After deducting her
fixed costs of $10,000 and her variable costs of $9,752.94, the first publisher experiences a real
loss of $247.06. Moreover, given gross revenue of $19,505.88 and total expenditures of
$19,752.94, the first publisher earns an averaged price of $0.987 per unit of resources invested.
454. The first publisher will sell 2,400 copies of the work during the lead-time period.
Given that the competitors will receive a net cash flow of $2.00 per copy, which equals the gross
income to the competing publisher of $4.00, less her variable costs of $2.00 per copy, a
competitor at this level of copyright protection would need to sell approximately 5,000 copies of
her work to break even. Given that 9,600 total copies of the work will be sold, and assuming
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Taking this averaged price data and calculating the payout
and fixed cost ratios for each level of protection,456 we can generate the
following table which details the copying advantage for our
hypothetical novel.
TABLE 9
INDICATORS OF COPYING ADVANTAGE
FOR AN OTHERWISE COMPARABLE NOVEL
Copyright's Averaged Price Payout Ratio Fixed Cost Ratio
Scope ($ ner unit)
Level 1 $0.61 0.318 0.45
Level 2 0.99 0.735 0.875
Level 3 1.19 1.0 1.0
Moreover, because our hypothetical novel has a social value roughly
equivalent to that of the typical textbook, we can compare the aver-
aged price figures to those in Table 6 to determine whether copyright
should continue to provide disparate protection for factual and fic-
tional literary works.457 A brief comparison of the values of each indi-
cator in Tables 6 and 9 reveals that the copying advantages available
to a competitor copying a textbook are nearly identical to the copying
advantages available to a competitor copying an otherwise
comparable novel at each level of copyright protection.4 8  This
suggests that copyright should provide a similar level of protection for
that the first publisher will remain in the market, 0.92 competitors can enter the market.
Assuming the sales are evenly divided among the entering competitors and the first publisher,
the competitors will sell a sufficient number of copies to break even. We have assumed that the
first publisher will share equally in the sales made during the post-entry period. She will
therefore sell 5,000 copies during the post-entry period. Together with the 2,400 copies she sold
in the lead-time period, this means she will sell a total of 7,400 copies of her work. Her
competitors will sell the remaining 4,600 copies.
455. Given that she sold approximately 7,400 copies of her work at a wholesale price of
$4.00 per copy, she will receive $29,600 in gross revenue. After deducting her fixed costs of
$10,000 and her variable costs of $14,800, the first publisher experiences a real profit of $4,800.
Moreover, given gross revenue of $29,600 and total expenditures of $24,800, the first publisher
earns an averaged price of $1.194 per unit of resources invested.
456. Because they do not depend on the number of copies sold, or on the social value of the
work, the payout and fixed cost ratios are identical for both Justice Breyer's reported novel and
for our hypothetical novel.
457. This assumption of roughly equivalent social value is not required in order to use the
payout and fixed cost ratios since these numbers are the same for Justice Breyer's typical novel
and for our hypothetical novel. To the extent these ratios confirm the extent of the copying
advantages available to a competitor at each level of protection, they provide assurance that our
assumptions with respect to the hypothetical novel have not generated an unrealistic averaged
price for such novel.
458. See text accompanying notes 431-32.
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both factual and fictional literary works. The data further suggests
that if copyright were to provide Level Three protection for the
otherwise comparable novel, while only providing Level Two
protection for the textbook, it would render the novel more difficult to
copy than the textbook. By making the novel more difficult to copy
than the textbook, copyright would lead an individual to expect a
higher averaged price for her resources when invested in a novel than
she would expect from investing her resources in an otherwise
comparable textbook. Such disparity in the scope of protection and
the corresponding disparity in averaged price received would, at the
margins, lead individuals to invest in additional novels even though
society would place greater value on additional textbooks. This would
generate the sorts of allocative inefficiency that Justice Breyer's
actual data reflect.
459
The available empirical evidence thus indicates that copyright
should provide a similar level of protection for factual and fictional lit-
erary works, but raises the further question whether copyright should
equalize protection between these two types of works, either (a) by ex-
tending the broader protection now given fictional literary works to
factual works, or (b) by limiting the protection of fictional literary
works to the narrower protection copyright presently accords factual
literary works. To answer this question, we must turn to the empiri-
cal evidence on the copying advantage available to competitors with
respect to non-work products.
In 1981, Professors Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner pub-
lished their study detailing the extent of the copying advantage avail-
able for non-work products. 460 Based upon their study of forty-eight
new products in the chemical, pharmaceutical, electronics, and ma-
chinery industries, Mansfield and his colleagues calculated an
average ratio of imitation cost to innovation cost of "about 0.65."461 To
459. Thus, at Level One protection, the averaged price received for the resources invested
is $0.62 for the textbook, and $0.61 for an otherwise comparable novel. At Level Two, the
averaged price received for the resources invested is $1.02 for the textbook and $0.99 for an
otherwise comparable novel. At Level Three, the averaged price received for the resources
invested is $1.25 for the textbook and $1.19 for an otherwise comparable novel. See also text
accompanying notes 442-46.
460. See Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 91 Econ. J. at 907 (cited in note 428). See also
Edwin Mansfield, et al., Technology Transfer, Productivity, and Economic Policy 132-53 (W. W.
Norton, 1982) (providing empirical data on the effects that patents have on imitation costs and
on the "rate of innovation"). As far as I am aware, their work represents the only systematic at-
tempt to determine a competitor's copying advantages for non-work products generally.
461. Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 91 Econ. J. at 909 (cited in note 428). The
Mansfield study examined the copying advantages available to competitors for five products
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the extent this ratio represents the copying advantages available to
competitors with respect to non-work products generally, we can
identify the appropriate scope of copyright protection by determining
which level of protection ensures a similar fixed-cost ratio for
competitors with respect to works of authorship. Returning to Tables
6 and 9 and examining the ratio of fixed costs presented therein
reveals that providing Level Two protection may render works of
authorship more difficult to copy than the average non-work
product.462 We can, however, read Tables 6 and 9 to establish that
less allocative inefficiency would result from providing literary works
Level Two protection than from providing such works no protection at
all.463
To the extent the relative copying advantages depicted in
Tables 6 and 9 represent the relative copying advantages available to
authors generally, the empirical evidence tends to establish that
copyright should protect literary works only against exact or near-
exact duplication. Such a prohibition would reduce the copying
advantages a competitor could obtain with respect to a literary work
to a level where they are comparable to, or perhaps even less than,
the copying advantages a competitor can obtain with respect to non-
work products generally. Such a prohibition would eliminate the
quickest, least expensive, and most exact forms of copying, and would
on average reduce a competitor's copying advantages to a level where
an author would have a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return
introduced before 1960, for fifteen products introduced in the 1960s, and for twenty-eight
products introduced during the period from 1970-1976. See id. at 908 n.1.
462. The fixed cost ratios for the textbook and the novel were: 0.4515 and 0.45 respectively
with Level One protection; 0.8698 and 0.875 respectively with Level Two protection; and 1.0 and
1.0 respectively with Level Three protection. See text accompanying notes 431, 456, 467-68.
463. Assuming the fixed cost ratios are an accurate measure of a competitor's copying
advantage, providing Level Two protection will result in less allocative inefficiency than
providing Level One (or no) protection, if the fixed cost ratio associated with Level Two
protection is closer to the non-work product ratio of 0.65 than it is at Level One protection.
Arithmetically, the Level One ratios in Tables 6 and 9 are closer to the 0.65 ratio for non-work
products than the Level Two ratios-0.872-0.65 = 0.222 versus 0.65-0.45 = 0.20. However, if a
change in the fixed cost ratio creates a proportional change in private return, as one might
expect, then the Level Two ratios are proportionally closer to the 0.65 ratio than the Level One
ratios-0.65/0.872 = 74.5% versus 0.45/0.65 = 69.2%. To the extent that the fixed-cost ratios
indicate that even Level Two protection makes works of authorship more difficult to copy than
non-work products, this suggests that copyright should limit its term of protection. By limiting
the term of protection to fourteen years, copyright would leave works of authorship with Level
One protection after that period. We would then want to average, in some sense, the
competitor's copying advantage for the post-copyright years with the advantage during
copyright. Because the competitors could copy more easily after copyright ended, the difficulty
of copying works of authorship would tend to be more in line with the difficulty for non-work
products.
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on her investment.46 4 While allowing a competitor to copy at higher
levels of abstraction would still give the competitor some, perhaps
substantial, advantages over the original author of the work, those
copying advantages would appear to be somewhat less than the
advantages a competitor can obtain when copying one of the broad
range of consumer and industrial products that fall outside the scope
of copyright's protection.465
c. Conclusion
While we must be careful about drawing any definite conclu-
sions given the limited empirical evidence available, both the avail-
able empirical evidence and common sense strongly suggest that copy-
right should significantly narrow its protection for entertaining liter-
ary works. While I have not seen any empirical evidence on the copy-
ing advantages available with respect to sound recordings, musical
works, dramatic works, audio-visual works, or the other types of copy-
righted works, this analysis also tends to suggest that these works
merit protection only against exact or near-exact reproduction.466 In
the usual case, manual reproduction and marketing of an imitation of
such works would simply not provide a competitor a sigificantly
greater copying advantage in producing a competing work than a com-
petitor could obtain by copying to produce an imitation of a non-work
product.467 A prohibition on exact and near-exact duplication would
464. We have defined a fair return to be one that promotes allocative efficiency, or one that,
in practical terms, provides for a work of a given social value a return comparable to those found
in the many other productive endeavors competing for the investor's dollar. See note 396.
465. Note that the Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner study was based on real world data
and incorporated the effects patents have on competitors' copying advantages. See Mansfield,
Schwartz, and Wagner, 91 Econ. J. at 907 (cited in note 428). As a result, the availability of
patent protection for certain new products does not change this conclusion.
466. Under present law, sound recordings receive protection only against exact duplication.
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
467. For example, in Daly, 6. F. Cases at 1132, the court found copyright infringement
where a defendant produced his own play that copied a scene depicting a last-second rescue of
an individual bound to railroad tracks by the hero from the plaintiffs work. Id. at 1138. It is
extremely unlikely that this copying would give the defendant any significant savings in the
total cost of creating and performing her play. Such a defendant would still have to pay the
actors, obtain a hall, furnish the sets, and create the remainder of the play. She would as a
result not be able to underprice Daly's ticket prices to any significant extent. Similarly, in
MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 701, the court remanded for trial based upon similarities, such as the
common "reference to trees looking like sentinels." Such similarities, even if the result of
copying, would not give the defendant any significant cost advantage in producing a competing
novel, and should not therefore suffice to establish infringement. See id. at 702 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("Confining myself, therefore, to this issue, for my part I must consider it as
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therefore likely eliminate the disproportionate copying advantages
competitors would otherwise have with respect to works of authorship
and would thereby ensure that the market would not underproduce
works of authorship.
468
Moreover, if copyright provided more extensive protection, it
would likely render works of authorship more difficult to copy than
the average non-work product. Such overbroad protection would lead,
and indeed already has led,469 to allocative inefficiency in the form of
too much investment in additional works of authorship and too little
investment in non-work products. As a result, while we may need to
expand copyright's protection beyond exact duplication in order to
capture the plagiarist who would otherwise "escape by immaterial
variations," as Judge Hand suggested,470 we should not expand
copyright's protection beyond a near-exact duplication standard if we
want to ensure the optimal production of such works.
2. Noncompetitive Uses: Derivative Works, Public Performance, and
Public Display
In addition to prohibiting the reproduction of a copyrighted
work, the Copyright Act also prohibits particular uses of a
copyrighted work. Specifically, the Copyright Act forbids someone
who has purchased or otherwise legitimately obtained a copy of a
work from using that copy to create a derivative work, from
performing the work publicly, or from displaying the work publicly,
unless the purchaser pays an additional fee 471 acceptable to the author
to license such derivative use.472 In most cases, a derivative use will
bordering rather on the fantastic, as implying callousness towards, if not derision of, real
literary talent and skill, to suggest that such trifling and coincidental similarities as a
microscopic examination of the two books is thought to bring out here be considered to weigh at
all against the sharp differences between them in all matters which really should count").
468. Limiting reproduction to cases of exact and near-exact duplication is also more
consonant with the ordinary meaning of reproduction. See Leslie Brown, ed., 2 New Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary 2554 (Clarendon, 1993) ("reproduce: . .. 3b. Repeat in a more or less
exact copy; produce a copy or representation of (a work of art, picture, drawing, etc.)"); Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary 982 (Merriam, 1974) ("reproduce: ... c: to imitate closely").
469. See Plant, 1 Economica at 183-84 (cited in note 12). See also text accompanying notes
442-46.
470. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
471. Whether we are dealing with the making of a film out of a book or the playing of a
song on the radio, in almost all cases the user will already have paid the market price to obtain
a copy of the work. Thus these rights require an additional licensing fee over and above the
market price for a copy in order to make one of the proscribed uses of the work.
472. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(2), (4), (5).
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not substitute for the original work in its original form, 473 and such
derivative uses are therefore properly considered noncompetitive
uses. While these uses do not compete with or reduce demand for the
work in its original form, a failure to require derivative users to pay
an additional fee for such uses may nevertheless reduce the price an
individual would expect to receive for the resources she devotes to
creating any given work.474  From the perspective of allocative
efficiency, however, the relevant question is not whether requiring a
license for these uses would increase the averaged price an individual
would receive for investing in a work of authorship, but whether
requiring such licenses will promote the allocation of society's
resources to their highest-valued use. 475 And on this issue, while the
existence of the author's right to control these uses is reasonably plain
given the express language of the Copyright Act,47 6 the desirability of
granting authors such control is far from clear.477
473. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 354 (cited in note 5). For example, a
movie version of a novel does not generally substitute for or displace sales of the novel itself.
See, for example, Abend, 863 F.2d at 1481-82 (noting that a motion picture version of a novel is
not likely to decrease sales of a novel); Nimmer and Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05[B], at 13-199 to 13-200 (cited in note 57) (same). Similarly, the playing of a musical
work on a radio does not usually decrease demand for recordings of the musical work. Indeed,
in most cases, both the movie and the playing of the work on the radio will increase demand for
the underlying work in its original form, which goes a long way towards explaining the "payola"
scandals that have repeatedly cropped up in the music industry. See, for example, Chuck
Philips, Record Industry Nervous over New Payola Prosecution, L.A. Times D-1, D-5 (Jan. 17,
1995) (discussing the practice of record promoters paying radio stations to increase air-play of
their songs).
474. See text accompanying notes 231-48.
475. See, for example, Mackaay, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2635-36 (cited in note 22).
476. In dealing with the Copyright Act, we should bear in mind that it directly benefits a
well-organized special interest group, authors and publishers, at the expense of a more
dispersed group, the public. Given a statute with such a distribution of benefits and burdens,
public choice theory predicts that over time the statute will inevitably come to favor more and
more the desires of the special interest group at the expense of the more dispersed group. See
generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Harvard U., 1965); Gordon Tullock, The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking (Kluwer, 1988). See
also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1244-46
(1996). When combined with some superficially plausible rationale that can serve to screen the
legislator's motivations, the concentrated group's disproportionate ability to raise money that
can be used-whether in the form of campaign contributions, bribes, or for expert opinions that
back the group's position-to convince legislators to favor the concentrated group's position, has
proven unfortunately persuasive in convincing our elected representatives to serve the special
interest at the expense of the general public. That our elected representatives have therefore
broadened copyrighes protection to include these additional rights provides no assurance that
there is adequate justification for these rights. Awarding authors these rights will often be the
result of interest group pressure, combined with a superficially plausible explanation to cover
the legislators' actions. See Kay, 13 Intl. J. L. & Econ. at 347 (cited in note 320) ("To put it
bluntly, copyright law has evolved for the systematic purpose of securing rents for certain
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a. Introduction to Derivative Rights
In addressing derivative rights, I begin with the basic point
that by granting the author the exclusive right to perform a copy-
righted work publicly, to display a copyrighted work publicly, or to
create a derivative work based upon a copyrighted work, we are
essentially granting the author the right to engage in price
discrimination. By enabling authors to prohibit certain uses unless
the user pays a separate and additional fee, we give authors the
ability to charge more for certain uses of their respective works. If an
individual wants to purchase a musical work recorded on a compact
disc and perform the work for her own private enjoyment, she need
only pay the market price for the compact disc. If an individual wants
to perform the work publicly, for example by broadcasting the work
through a radio transmitter, she must pay both the market price to
obtain a copy of the work and a fee that the author of the work will
accept to license the public performance of the work.478 To the extent
a derivative user would be "willing"479 to pay more for her planned use
than the ordinary user is willing to pay for her planned use,
480
providing an author a separate right to control derivative uses grants
the author some ability to charge a correspondingly higher price to
those consumers who are likely to value the work more highly.
481
organized producer groups, primarily publishers, record companies, and in the last decade,
software houses").
477. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 354-57 (cited in note 5) (discussing the ar-
gument for giving the original author or owner control over derivative works).
478. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining public performance to include radio transmissions); id.
§ 106(4) (granting the author an exclusive right to perform the musical work publicly).
479. For a discussion of reservation price, see note 15.
480. The price a derivative user would be willing to pay for her planned use will depend on
the extent to which the market for selling derivative uses is perfectly competitive and the extent
to which the market for purchasing the right to make a derivative use is perfectly competitive.
If either the derivative selling or purchasing market is perfectly competitive, then a derivative
user would be willing to pay no more than the ordinary use price to obtain a copy of the
underlying work. See Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 103, 110 (cited in note 11). If the
derivative selling market is perfectly competitive, then the derivative users will earn no real
profit and hence could not afford more than the ordinary use price for the work. If the
derivative purchasing market is perfectly competitive, then the author of the underlying work
could obtain no more than the marginal cost of her work from a derivative user.
481. The reproduction right alone gives authors some ability to price discriminate among
ordinary use consumers. Thus, an author will often publish her new literary work only in
hardback form for a year, before offering a lower-priced paperback form, in an attempt to price
discriminate among her readers. See, for example, Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1709 (cited in
note 5); Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 328 (cited in note 5). But see Tyerman, 18
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1110 (cited in note 410) (suggesting that hardback and paperback forms of a
work are not substitutes for one another in the minds of "many individuals"). Similarly, an
author of an audio-visual work may present her work initially only in full-price theaters, then in
dollar theaters, then on cable and videotape, and finally on television, in an attempt to price dis-
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While these derivative rights do not enable an author to price
discriminate perfectly,42 these rights do provide the author a
substantial ability to price discriminate among a work's various
consumers. 4 3 Once we recognize that these rights essentially grant
the author an increased ability to price discriminate, the question of
whether these rights are desirable turns on whether, and under what
circumstances, such an increased ability to price discriminate would
promote allocative efficiency. 4
As a starting point, we can quickly dispense with the so-called
natural rights485 basis that proponents have usually advanced for
criminate among those who wish to see her work. See, for example, Hearings at 30 (cited in
note 324) (report of Media Statistics, Inc.); John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of
Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than For Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An
Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 St. Louis U. L. J.
647, 680 (1984); Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 328 (cited in note 5).
482. These rights do not enable an author to charge each consumer's full reservation price
because an author must still set a specific price for each of the various uses. Ordinary users, for
example, need only pay $24.95 for a hardback copy of their favorite author's latest novel, even if
they have a reservation price significantly in excess of that price. As a result, we should
consider Professor Goldstein's assertion that the "copyright law in the United States entitles
copyright owners to capture the full value that consumers attach to their works," Goldstein, 1
Copyright § 1.1, at 7 (cited in note 5), as an expression more of wishful thinking than an
accurate summary of copyright law.
483. Some may argue that because the author is selling different products to each of these
users-to one the right to enjoy the work privately, to another the right to perform the work
publicly-the author is not engaging in price discrimination. A proper definition of price
discrimination, however, incorporates not only instances where an individual sells the same
product at different prices to different consumers, but it also includes those instances where
"two varieties of a commodity are sold (by the same seller) to two different buyers at different
net prices, the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) corrected for the cost associated with
the product differentiation." Phlips, Price Discrimination at 6 (cited in note 379). See also
Melvin L. Greenhut, George Norman, and Chou-Shun Hong, The Economics of Imperfect
Competition: A Spatial Approach 4, 102 (Cambridge U., 1987); Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure at 316-19 (cited in note 140); Paul Milgram, An Essay on Price Discrimination, in
Feiwel, ed., The Economics of Imperfect Competition at 365 (cited in note 372) ("To identify price
discrimination... modern economists emphasize the motives of the price-setter to create a
situation in which the price charged to a customer can be based partly on the value of the good
to the customer, rather than just on the cost of producing the good"). As a result, even if we
consider a copy of a work for ordinary use and one for derivative use to be different, an author
who priced those two products differently would still be engaging in price discrimination unless
the difference in price was justified by a corresponding difference in the marginal costs of the
two products. See Phlips, Price Discrimination at 5-7. Given that the only difference in the
marginal cost of these two products is the additional transaction costs associated with
negotiating the license for the derivative use, any price that would increase the author's net
price received (after paying such transaction costs) for a derivative use copy of her work would
constitute price discrimination.
484. While the Clayton Act formally forbids price discrimination, see 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1994 ed.), the practice remains ubiquitous. See Phlips, Price Discrimination at 7 (cited in note
379).
485. Given the decisive rejection of natural-rights-based arguments for real property at the
end of the Lochner era, the continuing viability of natural-rights-based arguments in the
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these derivative rights. Given the joint nature of the value associated
with every product in our market economy,486 the argument that the
author of the underlying work should receive a direct share of the
value of the derivative uses through a licensing right because the
author made the derivative use possible is unpersuasive. Any number
of people labor to produce products which then become inputs for
someone else's labor. If we believed that it was appropriate, on that
basis alone, to assign a direct share of an end product's value by
granting a licensing right to everyone whose labor helped create the
end product, then clearly authors are not the only ones who would be
entitled to such a right. Indeed, if we want to get right down to it,
those who provide the essentials of life make possible every other
form of labor, including the labor that creates works of authorship
and their derivatives. Perhaps we should therefore award these
providers separate and additional licensing fees for all the products
that their labors make possible.
Yet, we do not. In a reasonably competitive market, providing
such rights with respect to non-work products is neither necessary to,
nor would it, promote allocative efficiency.487 The question is whether
intellectual property realm is puzzling. Even though the basic criticisms the Realists leveled at
natural-rights-based real property arguments apply with equal force against natural-rights-
based intellectual property arguments, some commentators who would reject out of hand
natural-rights arguments for real property nevertheless accept them for intellectual property.
As a general matter, I see three reasons why commentators continue to rely on natural-rights
arguments in intellectual property today. First, some commentators use it to cover flawed
economic analysis, or to substitute idiosyncratic value judgments for reasoned analysis. Second,
some commentators like to label themselves as proponents of natural rights in order to
preference their positions as advocates. See Plant, 1 Economica at 182 (cited in note 12)
('[Proponents of a perpetual common law copyright] did better when they emphasized in those
days the interests of authors, just as a century and a half before they found it more profitable to
profess anxiety for the safety of the realm"). These commentators seem to believe that by
labeling their arguments "natural," people who oppose them must favor unnatural positions.
Compare Machlup, Economic Review at 23 (cited in note 11) ("Some of the [early] French
lawyers conceded that they preferred to speak of 'natural property rights' chiefly for propaganda
purposes, especially because some of the alternative concepts, such as 'monopoly right' or
'privilege,' were so unpopular"). Third, some commentators invoke the names of well-known
natural rights advocates in order to make a repetitive and unoriginal work seem like something
more.
486. See text accompanying notes 338-48.
487. In a perfectly competitive market, products would be priced at marginal cost
regardless of the presence or absence of such licensing rights.
Under conditions of perfect competition price discrimination could not exist even if the
market could be easily divided into separate parts. In each section of the market the de-
mand would be perfectly elastic, and every seller would prefer to sell his whole output in
that section of the market in which he could obtain the highest price. The attempt to do
so, of course, would drive the price down to the competitive level, and there would be
only one price throughout the whole market.
Robinson, Imperfect Competition at 179 (cited in note 11). See also Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure at 12-13 (cited in note 140) (defining a perfectly competitive market). As a result,
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works of authorship differ from non-work products in a way that justi-
fies giving authors such rights when we do not give them to those who
produce non-work products. Or to put it another way, is there a dif-
ference between works of authorship and non-work products that jus-
tifies granting authors a greater ability to price discriminate than we
provide those who create non-work products? If we cannot identify
such a difference, then we must conclude that granting authors the
right to control derivative uses would be undesirable. Specifically, if a
property system granted individuals a greater ability to price dis-
criminate in one class of products than it did in another, then indi-
viduals would expect a higher price for their resources when invested
in a product with respect to which the individual is more able to price
discriminate than when invested in an otherwise comparable product
with respect to which the individual is less able to engage in price
discrimination.488  This disparity in price would lead rational
individuals to overinvest in, and overproduce, the product that carries
a greater price discrimination ability while underproducing the
products that carry less such ability. As a result, granting authors
more extensive control over derivative uses, with a correspondingly
greater ability to price discriminate, would lead the market to
overproduce works of authorship and to underproduce non-work
products. This remains true unless there is some difference between
the respective derivative uses that would mitigate the allocative
inefficiency created by granting authors a greater ability to price
discriminate.489
providing such licensing rights for every conceivable end use of a product would not enable a
producer to charge anyone more than marginal cost for the licensing, and would merely increase
the transaction costs required to distribute the product to everyone who wanted it.
488. If a work of authorship and a non-work product are comparable in cost and value,
except that the work may be copied more easily, prohibiting reproduction will ensure an
investor an equivalent private return from investing in either product. If copyright were also to
grant the individual the right to pick out and charge certain consumers an additional fee for
their use of the work, then the individual could charge the same averaged price for the work as
she would charge for the non-work product, but she could also charge certain users an
additional fee. See Phlips, Price Discrimination at 18-19 (cited in note 379). When added to the
comparable averaged price the individual would already have received for the work generally,
this additional sum would ensure the individual a higher price for resources invested in the
otherwise comparable work of authorship. See id.
489. Traditional economists assume that the only potential harm from monopoly is the
reduced supply of the monopolized product. See, for example, Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 107-12
(cited in note 47). As a result, they judge the potential harm of a price-discrimination scheme in
terms of its tendency to reduce or increase the supply of the monopolized product, as compared
to the product's supply in the absence of price discrimination. See, for example, Scherer,
Industrial Market Structure at 258-59 (cited in note 140); Fisher, 101 Harv. L. Rev,. at 1709-10,
1742 (cited in note 5); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection A Reappraisal, 97 Harv.
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In terms of promoting allocative efficiency, the relevant differ-
ence between the derivative use of works and non-work products that
may justify granting authors these derivative rights turns on the
connection, or the lack thereof, between the number of copies of the
underlying work the derivative user must purchase in order to satisfy
a given number of derivative consumers. With a work of authorship,
an individual need only purchase one copy in order to create a
derivative work that will satisfy thousands, and in some cases
millions, of derivative consumers. The ability to replicate the
attraction of the underlying work from a single copy, whether by
using the single copy to create a derivative work and multiplying this
copy or by using the single copy to broadcast the underlying work over
the public airways, allows the derivative user to satisfy many
derivative consumers with only one copy of the underlying work. In
contrast, derivative uses of non-work products do not usually share
this public good aspect typically associated with the derivative use of
a work of authorship. With non-work products, the derivative user
must usually purchase a quantity of the underlying non-work product
that bears a reasonably direct relationship to the number of
derivative consumers the individual intends to satisfy.490
That we have identified a difference between the derivative
uses of works of authorship and those of non-work products and ap-
plied the label public good to it, does not, however, end our analysis.
It remains to be seen how and in what circumstances refusing to ad-
dress this public good aspect of the derivative use of works of
authorship might lead to allocative inefficiency and to the
L. Rev. 1813, 1873-76 (1984). Because the ability to price discriminate could increase or
decrease the supply of the monopolized product, traditional economists believe that the effects of
price discrimination are indeterminate. See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure
at 258-59. Once we recognize, however, that it is a question not only of how much of each
product, but of which additional products should be produced, the traditional approach no longer
adequately defines the problem. We must examine not only how much output price
discrimination can ensure, but also of what product.
490. In economic terms, consumption of such non-work products is "rivalrous." See, for ex-
ample, Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 387
(1974); Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist Consequences of the Weak Connection Between
Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 1343, 1365 (1991). See also
Thomas E. Borcherding, Competition, Exclusion, and the Optimal Supply of Public Goods, 21 J.
L. & Econ. 111, 111-12 (1978); R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & Econ. 357,
357-59 (1978). Thus, if an individual plans to build several homes, or to serve tomato soup to a
large number of customers, she cannot simply purchase one nail, one two-by-four, or three
tomatoes, and magically multiply them so that they satisfy all of her derivative consumers. See,
for example, Cirace, 28 St. Louis U. L. J. at 657 (cited in note 481) ("Private goods are such that
when consumed by A cannot be consumed by B, C, or D. An apple is an example"); Yen, 52 Ohio
St. L. J. at 1365 ("If someone eats an apple, no one else may do so.... One generally does not
obtain an apple to eat unless one purchases it from a willing seller").
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underproduction of works of authorship. As the following analysis
indicates, the relationship between this public good aspect of works of
authorship and allocative inefficiency is not as clear as the talismanic
public good label might suggest.
b. Justifying Derivative Rights
To understand how this public good aspect might lead to a mis-
allocation of resources, consider again a situation in which a rational
individual seeking the highest return for her resources is facing a de-
cision between two investments. One investment leads to the creation
of a new work of authorship, and the other leads to the creation of a
new non-work product. Both investments require similar expenditure
streams, with a high initial or fixed cost and a constant, relatively low
marginal cost, and each leads to a product or work with identical so-
cial value. In addition, we will assume that both the product and the
work have value for an ordinary and several derivative uses and that
the reservation prices of the ordinary and derivative users fairly re-
flect the ordinary and derivative use value, respectively, for either of
the resulting goods.49' We will further assume that our investor will
receive no specific protection against unauthorized derivative uses for
either good.
As discussed, if a derivative user can make her planned deriva-
tive use simply by obtaining a copy of the underlying work, a deriva-
tive user may have a higher reservation price with respect to a work
than an ordinary user.492 This may also be true for a derivative user
of a non-work product.493 The public good aspect associated with the
typical derivative use of a work of authorship, however, is likely to
create a far more substantial difference between the derivative and
ordinary use price for a work of authorship than that for a non-work
product.494 Specifically, because a derivative user of a work of author-
491. As we shall see, the relation between the derivative users' reservation prices and the
derivative use value is somewhat more complicated and will depend on the degree of
competition present in the derivative use markets. See Part VI.C.2.c.
492. See text accompanying notes 478-81.
493. The extent of the difference between the ordinary use price and the derivative use
price will depend on the degree to which the derivative use market is competitive and the
degree to which the derivative user considers other products perfect substitutes for the desired
product. See also Part VI.C.2.c.
494. Thus, film producers are willing to pay more than a thousand times the ordinary use
price for a copy of a literary work that they can turn into a film. See, for example, Arlene
Vigoda, Crichton's Dino-Size Deal, USA Today ID (June 17, 1993) (noting that Michael Crichton
sold the film rights to his unpublished work on sexual harassment for $3.5 million and that
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ship will often need to purchase only one copy of the underlying work
to satisfy any number of derivative consumers, she will have a reser-
vation price for that one copy that reflects the full real profit she ex-
pects to receive for her derivative use of the work. In contrast, be-
cause a derivative user of a non-work product must usually purchase
a number of units of the underlying non-work product, she cannot
concentrate her full real profit into her reservation price for one unit
of the underlying product. Instead, she must spread her real profit
across the number of units of the underlying product she will need to
purchase given the number of derivative consumers she intends to
satisfy. As a result, her reservation price for each unit of the
underlying product will reflect only a fraction of the total real profit
that she expects to earn from her derivative use.
Because of the public good aspect associated with the typical
derivative use of a work of authorship, a derivative user is likely to be
willing to pay far more for one copy of the work 495 than a derivative
user would be willing to pay for one unit of the non-work product,
even where the two derivative uses otherwise earn a comparable real
profit, serve a comparable number of derivative consumers, and
create comparable social value. This public good aspect is also likely
to create a far greater difference between the price the typical
derivative user is willing to pay and the price an ordinary user is
willing to pay for a copy of the work, than the difference between the
ordinary and derivative use reservation price for a unit of the non-
work product.498 As a result, the demand curve facing our investor for
units of the non-work product is more likely to be relatively
continuous, as reflected in Figure 7(a).
John Grisham sold the film rights for his novel The Client for $2.5 million). Yet a restaurant
owner is not likely to be willing to pay much more than the ordinary use price for the
ingredients she needs to create meals for her customers. To some extent, this difference may be
due to reduced competition in the derivative use market associated with works of authorship
caused by copyrightfs present scope of protection. See Part VI.C.2.c.
495. Again, we are assuming that her purchase of the copy legally and practically enables
her to make her planned derivative use.
496. In the absence of perfect competition, there is likely to be some, perhaps considerable,
degree of variation in the reservation price of various ordinary users. As a result, in some cases
the difference between the ordinary and derivative use price for units of a non-work product
may be sufficiently small that ordinary variations among the reservation prices of ordinary and
derivative users would make it difficult to tell, on the basis of a consumer's reservation price
alone, whether that consumer planned an ordinary or a derivative use of the product.
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Figure 7(a). Continuous Demand Curve
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Quantity
The demand curve for our investor for copies of the work of
authorship, on the other hand, is more likely to be relatively
discontinuous, as reflected in Figure 7(b).




If our investor is unable to separate derivative and ordinary users
into separate markets and price discriminate between them,497 she
497. Our investor would of course prefer to price discriminate between the two groups, and
even in the absence of a separate derivative use right has some ability to price discriminate by
offering special services of one sort or another along with the copies or units she sells to the
derivative users, or by selling to derivative and ordinary users at different time periods. Yet in
many cases, such approaches, as with price discrimination more generally, may prove difficult
to implement and enforce. See, for example, Lardner, Fast Forward at 192-202 (cited in note
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will attempt to capture some share of the derivative users' higher
reservation prices through her ability to set the price at which she
will sell copies of the work or units of the product. In setting such a
profit-maximizing price, our investor will face, to the extent that the
derivative users have a reservation price higher than the ordinary
users, a choice between selling to derivative users at a higher price
but foregoing sales to ordinary users,498 or selling to ordinary users
but foregoing the higher priced sales to derivative users. 499 While our
investor will face this trade-off for either investment, she will face
this trade-off more sharply with respect to the work of authorship
because the difference between the typical ordinary and derivative
use reservation prices is likely to be greater for the work. Given a
relatively continuous demand curve, such as the one shown in Figure
7(a), our investor would likely be able to set a price for units of the
product that will enable her to capture a considerable part of both the
ordinary and the derivative users' demand for her product. In es-
sence, by carefully setting her price our investor could capture some
portion of the higher derivative use value without foregoing an undue
number of ordinary use sales. Such a balancing act would enable the
creator of a non-work product to capture a certain share of both the
ordinary and derivative use value of the product.
For the work of authorship, on the other hand, the sharper and
often vast difference between the derivative and ordinary use reserva-
tion prices, such as the difference reflected in Figure 7(b), will usually
render such a trade-off impracticable. If our investor were to attempt
to find some middle pricing ground, so that she could obtain some
part of the derivative users' higher reservation price and also sell to
ordinary users, she would likely reduce her income from her
derivative user sales without seeing any offsetting increase in the
sales of the work for ordinary use.500
336) (recounting movie companies' unsuccessful attempts to separate the rental and home-
ownership markets for video cassettes). Nevertheless, the analysis in the text remains accurate
so long as our investor's ability to price discriminate, other than through a separate right to
control derivative uses, is roughly the same for either the work or the non-work product.
498. In the absence of a legal prohibition on derivative uses, a derivative user could make
her planned use simply by purchasing one of the copies that the author marketed for ordinary
use.
499. In some cases, such as literary works that appear from the outset destined for a film
version, the author can arrange the derivative use first and provide a substantial headstart for
the authorized derivative user. See Landes and Posner, 18 J. Legal Stud. at 354-55 (cited in
note 5). In other cases, however, such an approach is not practicable either because the
derivative use does not become apparent until after the work has been released generally, or be-
cause the derivative and general uses ordinarily occur over the same time period.
500. See S.J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals,
93 J. Pol. Econ. 945, 948 (1985). As a result, her profit-maximizing price will, depending on the
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In many cases the public good aspect associated with the typi-
cal derivative use would force our investor to choose between setting
the price of copies of the work for one market or the other-either set-
ting a price that will maximize her profit from derivative use sales or
a price that will maximize her profit from ordinary use sales. For an
investment characterized by high fixed and low marginal costs, either
pricing decision will reduce the price our investor would receive for
the resources she invested in a work of authorship that has value for
both ordinary and derivative uses. If she chooses the first pricing
alternative, she will necessarily price copies of her work beyond the
reach of all but perhaps a very few ordinary users, and will therefore
forego obtaining a share of the ordinary use value of her work. If she
chooses the second, she will forego her opportunity to obtain an
increased price for, and an increased share of, her work's derivative
use value. As a result, if the public good aspect of the typical
derivative use of a work of authorship forces our investor to choose
between pricing for either the derivative use market or the ordinary
use market, she would receive a price for her resources that reflects
either the ordinary or derivative use value of her work, but not both.
In contrast, if our investor devoted her resources to an otherwise
comparable non-work product, she would more often be able to set a
price for units of the product that reflects some combination of the
ordinary and derivative use value of the product. As a result, price
setting alone would often enable our investor to capture a greater
share of the product's combined derivative and ordinary use value
than that associated with an otherwise comparable work.501
Because of this difference, we can certainly imagine a case
where the combined ordinary and derivative use value of a work of
authorship is comparable to the combined ordinary and derivative use
value of a non-work product; yet an individual, absent a prohibition
on unlicensed derivative uses, would expect a lower price for her re-
relative demand curves for the two groups, either fall at a point where only derivative users will
purchase the work or at a point where both ordinary and derivative users will purchase the
work. If the profit-maximizing point falls at the ordinary use level, the author will receive
nothing extra for the higher reservation prices held by the derivative users. If the profit-
maximizing point falls at the derivative use level, then the author will make no sales to general
consumers at all, and thereby destroy a substantial part of the social value of her work as well
as forego any income from such sales. We could avoid the potential loss from such derivative
use pricing by allowing others to prepare and sell unauthorized copies for ordinary use.
501. See Liebowitz, 93 J. Pol. Econ. at 948-49 (cited in note 500).
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sources when invested in the work.5 2 As we saw before, when a prop-
erty system generates a lower price for resources when invested in an
otherwise comparable work, such a property system can lead to
allocative inefficiency.50 3 Allowing unlicensed derivative uses may,
therefore, lead the market to underproduce works of authorship.
Copyright can address this risk of underproduction by prohibiting
unlicensed derivative uses. Such a prohibition would allow authors to
price access for derivative uses separately from access for ordinary
uses. It would, thereby, increase the averaged price an individual
would expect for investing in the work, and make investing in works
of authorship relatively more attractive.
Such a prohibition may, however, also contribute to allocative
inefficiency. Specifically, by allowing the author to price for ordinary
and derivative uses separately, a prohibition on unlicensed derivative
uses may enable an individual to recover a share of the work's com-
bined derivative and ordinary use value greater than the share she
could recover for an otherwise comparable non-work product. As a re-
sult, we can certainly imagine a case where a work and a non-work
product are of equal social value; yet, an individual, because of a pro-
hibition on unlicensed derivative uses of the work, would expect a
502. For example, consider a case where there is a work, one copy of which is sought by 40
individuals for different derivative uses, each of whom has a reservation price of $1,000, and by
10,000 individuals for ordinary use, each of whom has a reservation price of $10.00. If the
marginal cost of each copy of the work for either use is $5.00, then the work's author would
maximize her profit by selling to all users at a price of $10.00 a copy. She would, therefore, sell
10,040 copies at $10.00 a piece. Given the reservation prices and quantity demanded, such a
work has a value of $40,000 for derivative uses, and $100,000 for ordinary uses. As a result, for
a work with a combined derivative and ordinary use value of $140,000, the individual would
receive an averaged price of $2.00 for every unit of resources invested to create the work and its
copies. In contrast, consider a case where there is a non-work product, 204 units of which are
sought by each of 10 derivative users, at a reservation price of $19.61 per unit, and one unit of
which is sought by 8,000 ordinary users, at a reservation price of $12.50. If the marginal cost of
the product is $5.00, then the products creator would maximize her profit by selling to all users
at a price of $12.50 per unit. She would, therefore, sell a total of 10,040 units of her work at
$12.50 each, and would receive an averaged price of $2.50 for every unit of resources invested.
Given the reservation prices and the quantity demanded, the value of her product for derivative
use would be roughly $40,000, and $100,000 for ordinary use. As a result, for a product with
roughly the same social value as the work, requiring a similar investment of resources, an
individual would receive a higher averaged price for her resources by investing in the otherwise
comparable non-work product. Of course, we could simply reverse the sales figures and
generate the opposite result. Such an example, however, would not as accurately reflect our
expectations of how the public good aspect associated with the derivative use of a work will
likely affect the variation in the ordinary and derivative use reservation prices. In creating this
example, I have assumed that the derivative reservation price reflects the full value of each
possible derivative use. The relation between reservation price and derivative use value is not,
however, that straightforward. See Part VI.C.2.c. Nevertheless, we can rely on the reservation
price of the derivative users as a reflection of the derivative use value so long as the derivative
use markets experience similar degrees of monopolization.
503. See text accompanying notes 381-90.
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higher price for resources invested in the work.5 4 At the margins,
such disparity between the price received and the value created would
lead individuals to overinvest in and overproduce works of
authorship, at the expense of more valuable, non-work products.
To reconcile the respective risks to allocative efficiency that
either allowing or prohibiting unlicensed derivative uses will create
requires an empirical consideration of the relative risks to allocative
efficiency involved,5 5 of the marginal administrative expense that pro-
tection would entail, and of whether, if forced to choose, underprotec-
tion or overprotection comes closer to ensuring that an individual
would expect roughly the same price for her resources whether in-
vested in a work or a non-work product of roughly equal social value.
In the absence of such empirical evidence, this analysis nevertheless
suggests that copyright will promote allocative efficiency by prohibit-
ing only those derivative uses that satisfy, at a minimum, the follow-
ing three criteria.
First, copyright should protect works of authorship against
only those derivative uses that exploit a work's public good aspect. If
a derivative use of a work of authorship does not allow the derivative
user to satisfy any number of consumers from only one or a very few
copies of the underlying work, then such derivative use is not materi-
ally different from the typical derivative use of a non-work product.
So long as the derivative use retains a reasonably direct connection
between the number of copies of the underlying work that must be
purchased and the number of derivative consumers who can be satis-
fied, we are unlikely to find an unusually sharp difference between
the reservation prices of the ordinary and derivative uses of the work.
The difference between the ordinary and derivative use reservation
price is, in this case, unlikely to be significantly greater than the dif-
ference between the ordinary and derivative use reservation prices
typically associated with non-work products generally. 506
504. For example, if copyright prohibited the 40 derivative consumers of the work in note
502 from making their derivative use without a license, such a prohibition would enable the
individual to charge an ordinary use price of $10.00, and a derivative use price of $1,000 for
copies of the work. Given such pricing, she would receive an averaged price of $2.79 per unit of
resources invested in the work, higher than the $2.50 per unit she would receive for investing in
the otherwise comparable non-work product.
505. This analysis should also consider the relative ability of an individual to control
derivative uses through contract and other means. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J.
Legal Stud. at 326 (cited in note 5).
506. A derivative user should be free, for example, to cut out pages of a work and market
those separately, just as a restaurant owner is free to chop a tomato into pieces and market
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Second, copyright should protect works of authorship against
derivative uses that exploit a public good aspect of the underlying
work only in circumstances where the public good aspect exploited is
unique to works of authorship. Because each and every product con-
veys information of one sort or another about itself, its composition, or
its nature, non-work products have a public good aspect as well.507
Those who know how to read the information conveyed can take that
information and publish a work based on it, usually without being re-
quired to obtain the permission of the creator of the non-work
product. Thus, a chemist could purchase a bottle of Coca-Cola,
analyze the product to discover its composition, and publish the
resulting information without incurring any liability to the creator of
Coca-Cola.50 8 Similarly, an individual can purchase one unit of a non-
work product, and then proceed to produce a work based on the
product, its identity, or its characteristics, which reviews the product,
those pieces separately. In terms of the statutory definition of "derivative work," such action
does not produce a work that is "based upon one or more preexisting works," 17 U.S.C. § 101
(defining a derivative work), rather the resulting product is (a piece of) the preexisting work, see
C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 192 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (so concluding). But see
Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (reaching
the opposite conclusion); National Geographic Soc. v. Classified Geographic, 27 F. Supp. 655,
660 (D. Mass. 1939) (same). Similarly, once a copy is sold, the resale of that copy will not
usually enable the reseller to satisfy any number of "derivative" consumers with only one copy
of the underlying work. As a result, copyright should not and does not allow an author to
control the resale of a copy of a work. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), (c) (codifying the first sale
doctrine). Short-term leasing, or lending, of a copy may, however, enable the lender to satisfy
any number of derivative consumers with only one copy of the underlying work, particularly
with respect to the most easily copied works such as computer programs and sound recordings.
For these works, the borrowing (or derivative) consumer can simply take the copy home, make
her own copy, and then return it to the lender, who can in turn lend it out to another derivative
consumer. For that reason, copyright should and does more carefully control the lending of the
works susceptible to such derivative "copying." Id. § 109(b).
507. See Adelstein and Peretz, 5 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. at 217-20 (cited in note 257) (noting
that intellectual property can exist in a more or less "pure" form depending on the ease with
which it may be extracted from the physical object in which it is reflected, carried, or contained).
508. While the Coca-Cola formula may be protected by trade secret law, trade secret law
does not prohibit legitimate reverse engineering. See, for example, Restatement of Torts § 757,
comments a, g & illustration 2 (1939) ('One who discovers another's trade secret properly, as,
for example, by inspection or analysis of the commercial product embodying the secret.., is free
to disclose it or use it in his own business without liability to the owner"); Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition § 43 (1995); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir.
1982). Of course, even if the formula became public knowledge, that would not likely undermine
Coca-Cola's market position which depends principally on Coke's well-known trademark and
advertising expenditures, rather than on the "secrecy" surrounding its precise formulation. See
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 657 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (noting that Warner-Lambert was still earning sufficient funds from production of
Listerine mouthwash to cover its annual royalty payment of $1.5 million in the late 1950s, even
though the formula for Listerine mouthwash became public knowledge before 1949).
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parodies it, criticizes it, or otherwise takes advantage of the public
good implicit in the product's identity and public persona.50 9
While tort law's doctrines of product or trade disparagement
place some limits on the factual assertions an individual can make re-
garding another's product,510 the law does not directly or indirectly
prohibit another from making money by exploiting these public good
aspects of non-work products. Nor do these doctrines provide the
creator of such non-work products the right to control and license
these derivative uses. Because these derivative uses exploit a public
good aspect when done with respect to non-work products, that such
derivative uses would also exploit a public good aspect if done with
respect to a work of authorship would not justify granting authors the
right to control such derivative uses.51' As a result, even if the
509. Courts have begun to interpret trademark law in a manner that limits to some extent
the ability of others to use another's trademark in the context of making fun of another's non-
work product. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398-402 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding infringement of Mutual of Omaha's trademark by the phrase "Mutant of Omaha");
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (granting a
preliminary injunction against the "ENJOY COCAINE" slogan as likely to infringe the "ENJOY
COCA-COLN' trademark). While I believe these efforts are misguided, they remain the
exception, not the rule. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (7th
Cir. 1993) (reversing the grant of summary judgment finding trademark infringement and
noting that "[a]n intent to parody, however, raises the opposite inference" that consumers are
not likely to be confused); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318-19 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a T-shirt that presented an add for Myrtle Beach that mimicked many
aspects of Anheuser-Busch's Budweiser trademark, trade dress, and advertising slogans did not
infringe Anheuser-Buschs marks); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc.,
886 F.2d 490, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a parody that mimicked some aspects of the
plaintiffs trade dress and trademarks was not infringing); Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a successful parody is unlikely to
cause actionable trademark confusion); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26,
33-34 (lst Cir. 1987) (holding that a parody of another's trademark is protected by the First
Amendment).
510. See, for example, Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229, 231 (10th
Cir. 1939) ('One without privilege ... has no right to issue and publish an untrue or deceptive
statement of fact which has a disparaging effect [when] ... a reasonable person [would] foresee
that it will have such effect"); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.); Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition §§ 2, 3.
511. We could equalize our treatment of works and non-work products with respect to such
derivative uses by allowing the creator of either sort of product to control such derivative uses.
Such control, however, would grant creators far too much power to limit the ability of others to
discuss their work or product freely and would be inconsistent with the notions of free speech
reflected in the First Amendment. See, for example, Gordon, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1635-37
(cited in note 41). See also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech.- Constitutional
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 397 (1990); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983
(1970); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Diane L.
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difference between the reservation prices for the ordinary use and
such derivative uses was substantial for works of authorship, it would
presumably be equally substantial for non-work products because the
derivative use exploits a public good aspect of the underlying work or
product in either case.5
12
Third, in some cases, simply because of the nature or character
of the derivative use at issue, a derivative user, even though she takes
advantage of a public good aspect uniquely associated with a work of
authorship, will not have a reservation price significantly greater
than that of the typical ordinary user. To promote allocative
efficiency, copyright should not prohibit such derivative uses.513
Instead, even for those derivative uses that take advantage of a public
good aspect uniquely associated with a work of authorship, copyright
should prohibit only those derivative uses which, by their very nature,
are likely to have a reservation price substantially greater than the
ordinary use price.
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces
and the Bill of Rights, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 665 (1992).
512. Examples of this approach might include works about other products or works. For
example, we allow anyone to write a repair manual for particular cars, or magazine articles that
describe a piece of real property. As a result, copyright should allow similar leeway for individu-
als who would like to write about other copyrighted works. Compare Twin Peaks Prods., 996
F.2d at 1371-1373 (finding that a book about a television series infringed the copyrights in the
audio-visual works that constituted the television series); Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162-63
(suggesting that still photographs of a ballet could infringe a copyright in the ballet's
choreography); Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (finding
that a book that provided the answers to problems in a math textbook was an infringing
derivative work), with Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1131, 1133-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that a mobile that included images of the plaintiffs copyrighted
movie was not an infringing copy of the plaintiffs work); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 201, 208-14 (D. Mass. 1986) (finding that a reproduction of the plaintiffs artwork
in a magazine was a fair use when done as part of a review of the work); Mura v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that a broadcast that
contained images of copyrighted puppets was not an infringement of the puppets' copyrights). It
might also include works intended to operate or work with another's product. Compare Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-69 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that
a game genie designed to work with Nintendo's game system was not a derivative work), with
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 138-40 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (finding that tapes prepared to work with one of Worlds of Wonder's toys amounted to
infringing works).
513. Examples might include using a radio to perform musical works to provide a pleasant
shopping background or mood in a retail clothing store, see 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), the performance
of a nondramatic literary or musical work in certain non-profit settings, see id. §§ 110(3), (4), (6),
(8), (10), or the public display of a purchased copy of a work to "viewers present at the place
where the copy is located" because that is the ordinary use of many such works, see id. § 109(c).
To the extent these exceptions identify instances where the derivative user is not likely to have
a reservation price significantly greater than that of ordinary users, these exceptions promote
allocative efficiency and cannot be written off as "[a] kind of copyright pork-barrel ... with
exemptions from liability being granted to favored constituents." Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for
Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579, 593 (1985).
COPYRIGHT'S PARADIGM
If a derivative use does not satisfy each of these three criteria,
then the difference between the ordinary and derivative use
reservation prices for a work of authorship will not differ significantly
from those for non-work products. As a result, an author will not
face, or not face more sharply than the creator of a non-work product,
the choice between selling to these derivative users at a higher price
but foregoing sales to ordinary users, or selling to ordinary users
generally but foregoing higher priced sales to these derivative users.
In such cases an author's ability to set the price at which she will sell
copies of her work should enable her to capture a share of her work's
value for these derivative uses that is comparable to the share the
creator of a non-work product can capture with respect to the
derivative uses of her product. As a result, copyright should leave
authors to recover what they can of the higher reservation prices
associated with these derivative uses through the ability to balance
higher price against greater sales volume in setting the price at which
they will sell copies of their respective works. While using the price
mechanism to capture that share, rather than relying on a separate
licensing right, would force an author to choose between a higher
sales price and greater sales volume, the creators of non-work
products routinely face that trade-off. Moreover, to do otherwise by
providing an author with the right to control such derivative uses
would itself create allocative efficiency by giving authors a
disproportionate ability to capture the derivative use value associated
with their works. As a result, when the derivative use of a work of
authorship does not create a difference between the ordinary and
derivative use reservation prices substantially greater than the
difference between such prices typical for non-work products,
copyright should not protect the author against such derivative uses.
Having identified the three criteria that define where there is
at least a plausible efficiency justification for granting authors the
right to control the unlicensed derivative use of their respective
works, we can turn to the question of how broadly copyright should
protect an author against such a derivative use, assuming that the
empirical evidence would establish that such protection is
appropriate. In approaching this issue we must keep in mind that
allocative efficiency cuts both ways. It can justify granting authors
the right to control unlicensed derivative uses in circumstances where
such use would lead an individual to expect a price for resources
invested in a work of authorship lower than the price she would
expect for investing in an otherwise comparable non-work product.
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But it also requires a limit to those derivative rights to prevent
copyright from leading an individual to expect a price for resources
invested in a work that is higher than the price she would expect for
investing in an otherwise comparable non-work product. In order to
promote allocative efficiency, we must therefore ensure that copyright
not define an author's derivative rights so broadly that an individual
can recover a share of the derivative use value of a work greater than
the share that she can recover with respect to an otherwise
comparable non-work product.
c. Scope of the Right
To understand when an author's derivative rights become
overbroad, we must return to the relationship between derivative use
value, the derivative user's real profit, and the derivative user's reser-
vation price. In analyzing an investment choice between a work and
a non-work product, where both have ordinary and derivative use
value, I assumed that the reservation price associated with a deriva-
tive use was a fair reflection of the value of the work or product for
that derivative use.514 Yet such an assumption is valid only to the ex-
tent that two derivative use markets experience similar degrees of
competition. If two derivative uses are otherwise comparable, yet one
derivative use market is less competitive than another, then an indi-
vidual will earn a more substantial real profit by being the first to
enter the less competitive derivative use market than she could earn
by being the first to enter the more competitive derivative use market.
As we saw in our discussion of competitive copying more generally,
the longer it takes others to enter a market, and the less cost
advantage she can obtain by imitating earlier market entrants, the
higher the price the first individual into a market will receive for the
resources she invested to enter such a market.55 For derivative use
markets, this higher price reflects the first entrant's ability to
capture, in the form of rent or real profit, a greater share of the
derivative use's value in a less competitive derivative use market.516
514. See text accompanying note 491.
515. See text accompanying notes 375-78.
516. The proof is straightforward that an individual will capture a greater share of the
value of a product in her averaged price when a market is more monopolistic. First, the value of
a product is less in a more monopolistic market than in a less monopolistic market, because the
price will be higher in the more monopolistic market and fewer units of the product will
therefore be sold. Second, the averaged price received will be higher in a more monopolistic
market than in a less monopolistic market. Because the averaged price will be higher and the
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To the extent that an individual faces a choice between invest-
ing in one of two goods, the first with derivative use markets that are
less competitive, and the second with derivative use markets that are
more competitive, she will likely receive a somewhat higher price for
resources invested in creating the good with the less competitive
derivative use market, even if the two goods are otherwise compa-
rable. To illustrate, assume that two goods each have a single
derivative use, and that each derivative use generates identical social
value. In such a case the first entrant into the less competitive
derivative use market will earn a somewhat higher real profit than
the first entrant in the more competitive derivative use market. The
first entrant into the less competitive derivative use market will,
therefore, have a correspondingly higher reservation price for the
underlying good than will the first entrant into the more competitive
derivative use market. Thus, the derivative use reservation price
associated with the first good will likely be higher than that of the
second. To the extent that our investor can capture a comparable
share of the derivative use reservation price for either product, she
will receive a somewhat higher price for the derivative use of the first
product than she will receive for the second. If her costs incurred and
price received from ordinary users is otherwise the same for the two
goods, the somewhat higher price she receives from the first product's
derivative use will ensure our investor a higher total return, and a
somewhat higher price, for resources invested in the first good than
she would receive by investing in the second, even though the two
goods are otherwise comparable.
The higher price received for resources invested in one of two
otherwise comparable goods will lead to allocative inefficiency as indi-
viduals will invest their resources in creating additional goods that
have less competitive derivative use markets, when the resources
could more valuably have been used to create additional goods that
have more competitive derivative use markets. As a result, if copy-
right were to grant an author a derivative use right that effectively
enabled an author, through careful exercise of her derivative use
right, to reduce the degree of competition in the derivative use mar-
kets for her work below that typically found in the derivative use
markets for non-work products, copyright would likely award authors
a greater share of the derivative use value associated with their re-
value of the work lower in a more monopolistic market, an individual will capture a greater
share of a produces value in a more monopolistic market.
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spective works than we enable the creators of non-work products to
capture with respect to their products. Such a use would lead to allo-
cative inefficiency in the form of too many additional works at the ex-
pense of more valuable non-work products.
To determine how broadly copyright should protect authors
against unlicensed derivative uses, assuming that some such protec-
tion is appropriate, we must resolve two issues: (1) what degree of
competition is appropriate in derivative use markets for works of
authorship? and (2) how do we define an author's derivative use
rights to ensure such a degree of competition? To answer the first
question, we begin with the general standard that the degree of
competition in the derivative use markets for works of authorship
should be roughly equal to that found in the derivative use markets
for non-work products. Such a standard will tend to ensure that the
real profit associated with a derivative use and the corresponding
derivative use reservation price provide a reasonably consistent
reflection of the social value associated with that derivative use (in
that a higher derivative use reservation price indicates a higher
derivative use value and vice versa). The degree of competition likely
in a derivative market will turn on the ease with which competitors
can produce competing versions of an authorized derivative work and
the extent to which consumers will perceive such competing versions
to be perfect substitutes for the authorized derivative work. To
ensure a comparable degree of competition in the derivative markets
for works of authorship as there is in the derivative markets for non-
work products, we must make it as easy, but no more so, for a
competitor to produce a competing version of an authorized derivative
work as it is for a competitor to enter the derivative markets for non-
work products. We have already identified near-exact duplication as
the level of protection copyright should provide to ensure that
competitors face as difficult, but no more so, a task in producing a
competing version of a work of authorship as competitors face in
producing a competing version of a non-work product.517 To the extent
that similar forms of copying would produce comparable copying
advantages with respect to an authorized derivative work as they
would with respect to an original work, a proposition which seems
likely,518 a prohibition on exact or near-exact duplication will likely
517. See text accompanying notes 463-68.
518. For example, there is no reason, ex ante, to believe that two audio-visual works, one
based upon a literary work and one from scratch, which are otherwise comparable, would
present materially different challenges to copying competitors. Whether the authorship costs of
the work are entirely in the form of script-writing expenses or are split between script-writing
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make an authorized derivative work as difficult for a competitor to
copy as the typical non-work product.519 By making an authorized
derivative work as difficult, but no more so, for a competitor to copy
as a non-work product, such a standard should ensure an appropriate
degree of competition in the derivative markets associated with a
work.
520
expenses and a licensing fee, the various copying techniques should provide comparable
advantages to competitors in producing competing versions of either audio-visual work.
Moreover, to the extent that the two audio-visual works are otherwise comparable-that they
have a similar social value-the author(s) of each audio-visual work should receive comparable
private returns to ensure the optimal allocation of society's resources. See id. Having to split
the authorship fee between a derivative author and an underlying work author would not justify
increasing copyright protection with respect to the ultimate product any more than the joint
authoring of an original work would. In either case, the total private return on the authorship
investment should remain comparable to that available on an otherwise comparable work with
a single author. Once copyright ensures an appropriate total return, it can leave the two
authors to their own devices to determine a fair split of the authorship return depending on
their relative contributions or other relevant factors, but in neither case should the mere fact
that two authors were involved persuade us to provide more extensive protection, and hence en-
sure a higher (total) private return, for either sort of joint work than we provide for a solo work.
To do otherwise would lead to allocative inefficiency. At the margins, individuals would invest
together in less valuable, but more broadly protected, jointly authored works, than in more
valuable solo works and non-work products.
519. One relevant difference between the competitor's advantage in producing a competing
version of an original work is that a competitor might be able to anticipate an original
derivative work and use the underlying work to produce an unauthorized derivative work before
the authorized derivative work is published. This would reduce and in some cases eliminate the
lead-time period the authorized derivative work would enjoy if competitors were required to
wait until the derivative work was published before they began work on their competing
versions. Moreover, because prohibiting those forms of copying that unduly reduced the lead-
time period was an important part of rendering works of authorship as difficult to copy as non-
work products, allowing competitors to produce competing versions of a derivative work in ways
that would eliminate this lead-time period may render an authorized derivative work more
easily "copied" than original works or non-work products. Such a result would reduce the
private return an individual would expect on an authorized derivative work. This would in turn
reduce the reservation price of derivative users for the derivative work right and would
therefore reduce the price the author of the underlying work could extract as a licensing fee for
the derivative work right. In some cases, allowing competitors to begin producing
transformative derivative works before the author of the underlying work can bring a
nontransformative derivative to market might force the author to choose between the derivative
market and the ordinary use market. Because such a choice might lead to allocative
inefficiency, an argument can be made that copyright should prohibit both nontransformative
and transformative derivative works until either (1) an authorized derivative work appears, or
(2) the author of the underlying work has a reasonable opportunity to bring an authorized
derivative work to the market, whichever occurs first.
520. Please recall that the standard was developed based upon somewhat limited empirical
evidence. As a result, even though the standard fits the existing evidence and comports with a
common sense understanding of how broad copyright's protection should be to render works of
authorship as difficult, but no more so, for a competitor to copy as non-work products, further
empirical evidence may establish the need for a somewhat broader, or narrower, standard of
protection.
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Having defined the sorts of copying which we must prohibit
and which we must allow to ensure an appropriate degree of competi-
tion in a work's derivative markets, we need only define the
derivative work right521 consistently. Copyright can, as a practical
matter, ensure such consistency by granting the author of the
underlying work a degree of protection against unauthorized
derivative works that corresponds to the degree of protection that the
reproduction right provides against competing works.522 In other
words, to the extent that copyright should prohibit only exact or
nearly exact duplication under the reproduction standard, copyright
should apply a similar standard to unauthorized derivative works and
prohibit as an infringing derivative work only those instances where
an individual has exactly or nearly exactly reproduced a copyrighted
work in a new language or medium of distribution.523  Whether
considered under the reproduction standard or the derivative use
standard, any significant transformation of or variation from the
underlying work should preclude a finding of infringement even if the
underlying work remains recognizable.
521. To the extent that copyright limits the reproduction right to prohibit only exact or
near-exact reproductions, as the empirical evidence suggests it should, see id., this scope will
ensure an appropriate degree of competition in the markets for the underlying works unless the
market for assigning public performance or public display rights becomes monopolistic or
oligopolistic for reasons unrelated to the precise scope of the protection copyright affords any
given work. See, for example, Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 894 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (finding that ASCAP was illegally restraining trade and fixing prices in granting public
performance licenses); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948) (same).
See also Report of the Register of Copyrights at 5 (cited in note 3). As a result, so long as the
public performance or display right encompasses only the performance or display of a work that
constitutes an exact or near-exact duplication of the underlying copyrighted work, the public
performance and public display rights should not limit the degree of competition that will be
present in the derivative use (public performance or display) market. In those circumstances
where the public performance or display of a work would implicate the three criteria that
together suggest the likelihood that allowing unlicensed derivative use of a work would lead to
allocative efficiency, copyright could properly protect an author against such public performance
or display.
522. See, for example, Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (relying on the reproduction standard to
determine whether a later work constituted an infringing derivative work); Twentieth Century-
Fox, 715 F.2d at 1329 n.4 ("Where defendant's work is adapted for use in a medium different
than that of plaintiffs, the test for infringement remains the same"); Nimmer and Nimmer, 1
Nimmer on Copyright § 3.01 (cited in note 57) ('[A] work will be considered a derivative work
only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material that it has derived from a pre-
existing work had been taken 'without consent' ").
523. I realize that in transferring a work into another language or medium, some changes
in the underlying work will inevitably occur. See, for example, Umbreit, 87 U. Penn. L. Rev. at
947-51 (cited in note 102); Dam v. Kirk La Sheie Co., 175 F. 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1910). Yet,
despite this difficulty, I believe the proposed standard is workable if phrased in terms of
reproducing the underlying work as nearly as possible given the constraints of the new
language or medium of distribution.
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While this proposed standard significantly narrows the present
scope of the derivative work right, defining the derivative work right
more broadly to encompass, for example, any reuse of expression,
would enable the author of the underlying work, through licensing
and infringement suits, to reduce the degree of competition in her
work's derivative markets. Specifically, such a broad derivative work
right would enable an author to prohibit potential competitors in the
derivative work market from undertaking the nonliteral copying that
we have already identified as necessary to ensure an appropriate de-
gree of competition in the derivative work market. By prohibiting
such nonliteral copying, the underlying work's author could make the
task of imitating an authorized derivative work more difficult than
the task facing competitors of non-work products. Such protection
would make an authorized derivative work more difficult for
competitors to copy than non-work products and would therefore limit
the degree of competition present in the derivative use markets
associated with works of authorship. By reducing the degree of
competition in her work's derivative markets, the author of the
underlying work could enable each of her authorized derivative users
to capture in the form of rent or real profit a share of the authorized
derivative use value which would be greater than the share that
derivative users would usually capture with respect to non-work
products. The author of the underlying work in turn could, by pricing
the derivative right appropriately,524 capture the derivative users'
(increased) rents,52 and thereby capture a share of her work's
derivative use value greater than that the creator of a non-work
product can capture. Providing such protection would therefore
enable an author to extract a share of the derivative use value
associated with her work greater than the share we permit the
creators of non-work products to extract. This would lead an indi-
524. The author can recover that rent simply by setting a profit-maximizing price for the
derivative use licenses. Her ability to recover the rent will not ordinarily present a bilateral
monopoly negotiating situation, because she can license her work to one of any number of
potential derivative users. Compare Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155
(2d Cir. 1968) (noting that, once an author has authorized the creation of a derivative work, new
technologies or markets may, if unaddressed in the original authorization, create a bilateral
monopoly negotiating situation).
525. Of course, once the author of the underlying work has capitalized what would have
been rents for the derivative users into the price of the derivative use license, the capitalized
rents will be a part of the cost of the derivative use and will no longer be rents. But, as
discussed in note 282, whatever label we apply, the additional price received for resources
invested represented by such capitalized rents can lead to allocative inefficiency.
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vidual to expect a higher price for her resources when invested in a
work of authorship than she would expect for investing in an other-
wise comparable non-work product. 5 6 By producing such expecta-
tions, expansion of the derivative work right to encompass any reuse
of expression would lead to allocative inefficiency and to the overpro-
duction of works of authorship527 at the expense of more valuable non-
work products.
In order to avoid such allocative inefficiency, copyright should
limit an author's derivative work right, even where granting the
author such a right is otherwise appropriate, to ensure that the
author cannot limit the degree of competition in the derivative
markets associated with her work.528 To the extent that an exact or
near-exact reproduction standard defines the appropriate degree of
competition within each derivative work market, copyright should
526. In the market for the derivative uses of a non-work product, a derivative user's real
profit is constrained by the ability of others to enter the derivative use market in competition
with the first derivative user. As a result, competition in the market for the derivative use will
constrain the derivative users' real profit, and hence their reservation prices for the underlying
product. In such a reasonably competitive market, most of the social value of the derivative use
will take the form of consumer surplus and will not be reflected in the derivative users'
reservation prices for the underlying product. Competition in the derivative market will
therefore limit the ability of the creator of the non-work product to recover the full value of the
derivative use even if she were able to recover each derivative users' full reservation price.
527. In particular, such protection would lead to the overproduction of derivative-capable
works of authorship.
528. One other concern is that the producer of a non-work product must still trade-off
higher prices against greater sales volume for the two markets, while an author can treat the
ordinary and derivative use markets as entirely separate. See Phlips, Price Discrimination at
19 (cited in note 379) (arguing that price discrimination may enable an individual to separate a
single market into two different markets). This ability raises the possibility that the author
may be able, by setting two separate prices, to recover a somewhat greater share of the
derivative value associated with her work than an individual could recover with respect to the
derivative value of a non-work product, even if the derivative right is limited to controlling
nontransformative derivative uses that take advantage of a public good aspect uniquely
associated with works of authorship. See id. (noting a higher income given the ability to
separate a single market into two different markets). See also note 504 and accompanying text.
We can address this possibility in part by ensuring that authors hold such a derivative right
only in circumstances where the derivative use is likely to create a far more substantial
difference between the ordinary and derivative use reservation prices for the work than is
typical for a non-work product. In such a case, granting the author a separate derivative right
would likely generate a price for resources invested in a work of authorship closer to the price
an individual would receive for the resources invested in a non-work product than would
relegating the author to her price-setting ability. We can also address this possibility by
granting authors the right to group into one market purchasers who are likely to have a
reasonably consistent reservation price given their planned use, rather than granting rights
that allow authors to charge each member of the group their precise reservation price. See
Liebowitz, 93 J. Pol. Econ. at 949-56 (cited in note 500) (establishing that magazine publishers
can recover an adequate share of the value of their magazines by charging higher subscription
fees to libraries and commercial establishments and need not be able to charge such users an
additional fee for every copy made of an article); Stanley M. Besen, Private Copying,
Reproduction Costs, and the Supply of Intellectual Property, 2 Info. Econ. & Pol. 5, 7, 19 (1986).
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define the derivative work right in a manner compatible with the
degree of competition such standard would otherwise ensure. As a
practical matter, copyright can ensure such compatibility by granting
authors the right to control only those derivative works that amount
to an exact or near-exact reproduction of their original work in
another language or medium of distribution (a "nontransformative
derivative use").
d. Conclusion
In order to ensure that an individual receives a fair share of
the derivative use value associated with a work of authorship that she
helps to create, we must ensure that she has the ability to capture a
share of the derivative use reservation prices associated with the
work roughly comparable to that the creator of a non-work product
can capture. We must also ensure that the relationship between
derivative use reservation price and derivative use value remains
consistent for works and for non-work products. To ensure the first,
copyright must protect authors against those derivative uses, and
only those derivative uses, which are likely to create a difference in
the derivative use and the ordinary use reservation price for a work
significantly greater than the difference between such prices for non-
work products generally. To ensure the second, copyright must limit
the scope of an author's derivative rights to prevent the author from
reducing the degree of competition found in the derivative use
markets for works below the degree found in the derivative use
markets for non-work products more generally.
D. Summary: Allocative Efficiency and Copyright's Scope
The conclusion is simple. Everything new conveys information
and therefore has a public good aspect that others can take advantage
of, either through imitating to create a competing good or through use
of the original to create some further good. Works of authorship may
exhibit this public good aspect to a greater degree than non-work
products in that they are more easily copied or are more subject to de-
rivative uses, in the absence of special protection, than the typical
non-work product. But these are differences in degree, not in kind.
Given that our tangible property system allows competitors to obtain
substantial copying advantages by imitating new and creative prod-
ucts, and further allows others freely to make derivative use of non-
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work products, copyright's proper role is not to prevent others from
obtaining any copying advantage from, or to bar all derivative uses of,
a work of authorship. Rather, copyright's proper role is to ensure (1)
that works of authorship are neither more nor less easily copied than
non-work products, and (2) that an individual has an opportunity to
recover a share of the derivative use value associated with a work
comparable to that available with respect to non-work products.
This role necessarily means that copyright should not attempt
to award an author the full value associated with the resulting work.
Given that our tangible property system generally enables an individ-
ual to recover something approaching only the cost of creating a new
non-work product, allocative efficiency and fairness demand a similar
rule for authors. If copyright were to do otherwise by providing an
author with such extensive rights that she could recover something
approaching the full value associated with her work, we would
establish a legal system that enabled an individual to recover the
value of the resulting good for investments in one sector of the econ-
omy, while it enabled an individual to recover only the cost (more or
less) of the resulting good in every other sector. Such a disparate
standard would be both inefficient and unfair. It would be inefficient
because it would inevitably lead to overinvestment in and overproduc-
tion of goods in the value-based sector of the economy. It would be
unfair because it would enable those who produced goods in the value-
based sector of the economy to recover a disproportionate share of
society's wealth.
VII. COPYRIGHT AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
The first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, provided the
author of any "book, map or chart" protection against unauthorized
"printing' of her work for a period of fourteen years with a renewal
period of fourteen years.5 9 Since that time, copyright has vastly
expanded its reach in terms of the items that fall within its
protection, the scope of its protection, and the duration of its
protection. Some part of this expansion may have been justified by
changing technology and by the introduction of new forms of
authorship. But much of it was not.53
0
529. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
530. For example, Congress added the public performance right in the mid-nineteenth
century, see the acts cited in note 214, yet I am unaware of any change in public performance
technology with respect to dramatic or literary works between 1790 and 1856 or 1870, respec-
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The incentives-access paradigm has played a critical role in
providing a superficially attractive justification for this expansion. By
suggesting that more extensive copyright protection is desirable un-
less and until broader protection threatens a compelling need for ac-
cess, the paradigm suggests that copyright not only can, but should,
continue to expand until it begins either to interfere with the produc-
tion of future works or to create a risk of undue monopolization. In
combination with the natural rights notion that an author is entitled
to the value of a work she creates, the paradigm has played a central
role in convincing courts and Congress to expand copyright from a
system that ensures an author the sole right of multiplying copies of
her work, to a system that seeks to award an author the full value
associated with her copyrighted work.
Yet, in a world of finite resources, we cannot accept the para-
digm's suggestion that the sole cost of broadening copyright is the risk
that such protection may limit access to existing or future works.
More variety in works of authorship must mean less of something
else. Because the production of additional works of authorship is not
inherently more valuable than any other potential use of society's re-
sources, justifying copyright requires some determination that society
will benefit more from devoting additional resources to creating works
of authorship than from the alternative investments to which the re-
sources would otherwise have been devoted.
The relative ease with which competitors can copy the creativ-
ity embodied in, and the public good aspect associated with certain de-
rivative uses of, works of authorship provides some basis to believe
that the market will underproduce works of authorship in the absence
of some degree of legal protection against copying. Because of this, we
can reasonably believe that some degree of legal protection against
the copying and unlicensed derivative use of works is desirable. Such
protection would attract additional resources into the production of
copyrighted works. But, to the extent such protection merely
addressed one of the differences between works and non-work
products that would lead an individual to expect a lower price for
resources invested in an otherwise comparable work, the additional
works to which such protection would lead are likely to be of greater
tively, that would justify extending protection to authors against such performances, if such
protection was unjustified, as the First Congress apparently concluded, in 1790. Similarly,
Congress granted the author the exclusive right to translate her literary work in 1870. See id.
And yet, I am again unaware of any change in translation or publication technology that would
justify such a change in the author's rights.
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value to society than the alternative investments to which the
resources would otherwise have been devoted. If copyright were to go
beyond correcting for such differences, however, as it presently does
for entertaining works, such protection would be and is undesirable.
It would attract additional resources into the production of
copyrighted works, and would likely lead to the creation of additional
works. Yet, the very same concerns for allocative efficiency that
justify some measure of copyright protection in the first place suggest
that the additional works produced thereby would have less value to
society than the alternative investments to which the resources would
otherwise have been devoted.
Determining copyright's optimal scope therefore requires a
determination of how much and what sort of protection copyright
needs to provide to address those differences between works and non-
work products that would, in the absence of legal protection, likely
lead the market to underproduce works of authorship. To address
those differences, copyright must provide that degree of protection
which will lead an individual to expect roughly the same price for her
resources whether invested in a work or a non-work product, when
the two investments generate roughly the same social value. While
limited, the available empirical evidence, together with a common
sense analysis of the relevant differences between works and non-
work products, suggests that copyright should prohibit only exact or
near-exact duplication and certain nontransformative derivative uses
of a copyrighted work to ensure such a fair price. Providing such
protection should tend to ensure a consonance between price and
marginal social value that will lead individuals to devote their talents
and resources to the highest-valued use, whether that be the creation
of additional works or additional non-work products. Providing copy-
righted works more extensive protection would be undesirable-not
because it would limit access to the resulting works, though it may do
that as well-but because it would draw resources into the production
of additional works when those resources would otherwise have been
more valuably used elsewhere in our economy.
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